

**POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS  
OF SUBREGIONAL  
IN WEST AFRICA**

**Inaugural-Dissertation**

zur

Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors  
der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften  
am Fachbereich Politische Wissenschaft  
der Freien Universität Berlin

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vorgelegt von

**Francis Prempeh Jantuah**  
aus Kumasi (Ghana)

1976



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## P R E F A C E

In spite of the fact that many books, pamphlets and articles have been written on the economics and on the politics in West Africa, the combination of the two, in respect of Integration efforts in the sub-region, has not yet gained prominence.

With this as the background, the prime object of this dissertation is to throw light on the factors that have actively obstructed the speedy formation of a common organization that could have helped to integrate, both politically and economically, the states in the sub-region. However, our sorting out only the negative aspect of integration efforts in this work, must not be taken to mean our opposition to the bringing together of the political or the economic institutions of the states concerned. On the contrary, we are only facing realities by indicating to our readers that the problems that are envisaged in integration efforts in West Africa are of immense significance.

To this end and for the logical sequence of analysis of the work, the historical process in regard to Pan-Africanism as well as its related problems have been extensively dealt with in the work.

The political and the ideological conceptions of some leaders in the sub-region have also been treated. Analysis of the different interpretations of the word "Integration" has been made. This has specifically been made to cover the two main political trends that exist in West Africa. Of these, the first portrays the strife for a common unified action against imperialism and colonialism; the second, on the contrary, serves to weaken this unified course of action.

These are not the only obstacles that have been standing in the way of integration efforts in the sub-region. For others such as the existence of different regimes in the sub-region; tribal conflicts, military

take-overs, suspicion and distrust amongst the leaders there have in one way or the other dictated the pacing of the formation of a common, operative organization for integration in the sub-region.

In writing a dissertation of this kind I have been indebted to various usefull sources of materials and in particular books like the "Sovremennii Teorii Meshdunarodnih Ekonomicheskoi Integratsii" by Dr. Abram Fumkin; "Osnovnye Problemy Imperialisticheskoi Integratsii" by Dr. M.M. Maksimova all of the USSR; and "West Africa", London.

Readers have to be reminded that the actual writing of the work was completed long before the Economic Community of West African States was formed.

Francis Prempeh Jantuah

## CHAPTER I

### EMERGENCE OF INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA

#### I. From the Pan-African Congresses to the Attainment of Independence by Ghana in 1957

In these last two decades, especially after the attainment of independence by many African countries, there has been a steady growth of common aspiration among the leaders of those countries which have newly achieved their independence. This common aspiration is the establishment of a sort of economic community. This, it is hoped, will eventually lead to the formation of a regional economic community.

Undoubtedly, this desire to form an African economic community is a progressive phenomenon which, it is believed, will help put these newly freed African states on a genuine path to economic independence, since formation of a regional economic community in Africa is viewed to some extent as an elimination of the colonial economic groupings which their former metropolises left behind. For a number of years the wish of the leaders to form a regional economic community on the continent has been shown in the way the African countries have been organizing themselves into special unions, small-scale economic communities, or special economic commissions with the ultimate aim of developing trade and other economic relations which have hitherto existed between them. However, the idea and the desire for such an objective is conducive to achieving self-determination. If all the existing communities were to function well; if all projects of the communities were to serve the interest of every member state on an equal basis; if the communities were to devote special funds to common projects and institute a common tariff; and if they were to work up some tentative plans to expand their intra-African trade based on a joint economic programme, they would undoubtedly be right on the course of an integration process which could eventually lead to political unification. Unfortunately-

ly, it must be stated that most of these attempts which eleven African states have made have not contributed much towards the development of intra-African economic relations.

This, of course, is not to be taken in the extreme. For although the integration process in Africa is still in the making, it has brought to life some significant changes, especially in the field of the development of Pan-African movements, thus doing much for the course of national liberation movements on the continent. For this reason regional integrational organizations and other economic unions can to some extent be considered as a product of a particular form of Pan-African efforts or as one of the component parts of the struggle for the unification of the continent. Unity has ever been the source of strength. For this reason, the Fifth Manchester Pan-African Congress held in 1945 underlined the need for unity by calling on all ... "Colonial and Subject Peoples of the World to Unite." 1/

On West Africa the Congress stated in its resolution that "the artificial divisions and territorial boundaries created by the imperialist powers (were) deliberate steps to obstruct the political unity of the ... peoples there." 2/

This depicts the ultimate aim of the continent participants of the Manchester Congress. Their main objective was primarily focused on unity of the continent of Africa, for it was in that way and in that way only that the continent could really "be free from foreign imperialist control both politically and economically." 3/

Social, political and economic progress of the continent was also examined at the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress. The Congress worked out some comprehensive and tactical ways through which the fight for freedom, democracy, and social betterment in Africa could be conducted. Nevertheless, their main objective at that time was the struggle for political power by colonial and subject peoples, and that struggle was to be but the first step towards the achievement of complete social, economic and political emancipation. It must be borne in mind that at first the Pan-African movement was actually a Pan-Negro

movement centered in America to unite the Negro peoples of America and Africa in their struggle against racialism and colonialism. In fact, no Africans at all attended the Fourth Pan-African Congress held under the guidance of Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois in America in 1927. The reason for this can be attributed to the fact that the independence movement had not yet gained momentum or assumed a mass scale in Africa and that at that time African political and social organizations limited their demands to reforms in the colonial administration. The resolutions adopted at the first four Pan-African congresses, 1919 to 1927, reflected this moderation, but all the same the Pan-African movement played a useful role in drawing the attention of world opinion to African problems.

The Fifth Congress held in Manchester in 1945 helped to broaden the tasks of the Pan-African movement. In fact, the composition of the Congress made it really an African affair. Among Africans who attended were Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta. The main aim of the Congress was geared to the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. It called on the peoples of Africa to fight by all the means at their disposal for the abolition of colonial regimes and the attainment of political independence. The struggle for political power by colonial and subject peoples is the first step and the necessary prerequisite to complete social, economic, and political emancipation.

This was the first congress to make a call for African unity and for the majority of all countries and peoples of the continent to unite in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism and advance the idea of a union of African states.

Although many black Africans from different sub-regions did attend the Congress, practical efforts could unfortunately be started only in one sub-region. That was in the form of a West African National Secretariat which was based in London, and this, too, restricted its political activities as far as dealing with particular colonial territories was concerned.

American Pan-Africanists concentrated their efforts to the civil rights movement in the United States, while the African participants engaged themselves actively in freedom-fighting in Africa. Some of these freedom fighters, like Kwame Nkrumah, were imprisoned and others, like Jomo Kenyatta, were confined to some restricted area under conditions not favourable to human life. Torture and humiliation became their daily companions. But justice later took its course; for the colonialists were forced by the right cause of self-determination of the black African peoples to leave most parts of the continent. Their departure actually began in 1957, the year in which Ghana achieved her independence under the leadership of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.

Having broken the international chain of colonialism, Kwame Nkrumah called two conferences, namely, the Accra Conference of Independent African States (1958), and the All-African Peoples' Conference (AAPC) which was also held that year in the same city. These two conferences gave birth to a new concept of Pan-Africanism.

## II. From the Conference of Independent African States in Accra 1958 to the Formation of the OAU in 1963

It is with regret that we must say that the concept of African unity has been dubious. Some African intellectuals interpret African unity as Africa being transformed into one political entity which will eventually lead to the creation of a continental government to form a United States of Africa. The other group of leaders and their satellite intellectuals have a different interpretation altogether. African unity, they assert, should be understood just as a confederation of countries of the continent which should not have the eventual aim of establishing a continent-wide government. The so-called union is to be limited to the form of an organization like the Organization of American States, not the form of one state like the Federal Republic of Germany or the USSR. This shows quite clearly that the parties involved are, theoretically, speaking from different corners. For there are two issues involved, namely, the theory of international organizations and the theo-

ry of statehood.

The idea of Pan-Africanism, as has been said above, took a different shape in 1958. This was after the Conference of Independent African States, which was held in April 1958, and the All-African Peoples' Conference (AAPC), which was held in December 1958. The change of shape of the concept is envisaged in these words which are embodied in the "aims and objectives" of the AAPC.

1. "To promote understanding and unity among peoples of Africa,
2. "To develop a feeling of one community among the peoples of Africa with the object of enhancing the emergence of a United States of Africa." 4/

This shows that the idea of Pan-Africanism has taken the shape of a struggle exclusively waged in Africa. In light of this, K. Wadajo was right in claiming that one of the main results of the First Conference of Independent African States was a "transformation of the idea of Pan-Africanism into African Unity."<sup>5/</sup> The Conference did not endorse the idea of economic regionalism in Africa. This is clearly evident under the terms of Resolution Number 8 passed by the Conference, which states, among other things, that "non-African forces have arbitrarily divided the African continent into economic regions, and that the Conference does not recognize this division, since Africa could be developed as an economic unit."<sup>6/</sup> As regards political unification of the continent, however, nothing on this subject appeared in the resolution. There was no mention of an establishment of one "political unit." On the other hand, this concept figured prominently in the resolution adopted at the First All-African Peoples' Conference (AAPC). The Conference declared that its ultimate objective was the evolution of a Commonwealth of Free African States. A provision was made by the Conference for the formation of regional political groups in Africa. These groups, it was suggested, should be based on geographical contiguity, economic interdependence, and linguistic and cultural affinity, and they should have the ultimate objective of one Pan-African commonwealth rather than hardening as separate en-

ties, thereby impeding progress towards a continental commonwealth.

There were three definite guiding principles to this effect: 1) such an amalgamation of states was to consist only of independent states, and only countries which were being governed by Africans should come together; 2) the establishment of groups should not be prejudicial to the ultimate objective of a Pan-African commonwealth, and 3) adherence to a group should be based on the wishes of the people ascertained by a referendum on the basis of universal suffrage. It was further stipulated that those countries which did not naturally fall within one specific group should decide by similar means whether to adhere to any group or to evolve different groups.

The idea of regionalism in Africa had been voiced even long before the calling of the AAPC. George Padmore, a distinguished Pan-Africanist, had long before the Conference stated that "self-determination of the independent territories (was) just a preliminary condition of a federation of independent states on regional basis which (would) eventually lead to the formation of a United States of Africa."<sup>2/</sup>

When we take a close look at this from the point of view of international law, especially that part of it which stipulates that every country has the right to form or accede to any organization including regional groupings at its own wish, we should arrive at the conclusion that any union formed by a big or a strong country with a small or weak one without the clearly expressed wish or consent of the latter is to be considered an act of annexation from the side of the stronger or bigger country, no matter where the two countries are situated.<sup>8/</sup>

Commenting on the All-African Peoples' Conference and at the same time underlining the importance of regional groupings in Africa, Professor I. T. Potechin wrote that the recommendation which was presented by the AAPC after its first session as regards the formation of regional groupings in Africa was not only a progressive one "but a real-

ity under the present circumstances prevailing on the continent."<sup>9/</sup> Further, he said, "formation of regional federations was the most appropriate means by which misunderstandings between neighbouring countries could be avoided." Looking for a solution to African problems, the author found a possible remedy in regional federation. He expressed his idea by stating that formation of a federation in Africa could help solve the main problems which confront the young African states, i.e., the struggle for economic independence as well as the consolidation of their national sovereignties.

As a matter of course, the formation of regional organizations, as has been stated in the resolution of the AAPC, is a more profound approach to genuine independence in Africa. Unfortunately, the activities of the groups heretofore formed have been the main source of conflicts, dissatisfaction and obstruction in Africa. The reason for this is widely attributed to the differences in understanding of the concept of African unity and to the influence which some metropolises exert on some African leaders in this regard.

Despite all these differences which have existed between the African leaders, their common aim, that of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, has always been upheld. When Guinea voted by referendum against the formation of the French Community and as a result became an independent state, the Government of France took stern retaliatory action against the former colony by recalling all her advisors and specialists. No more financial aid was forthcoming to Guinea from France. This action was one which could have completely destroyed the economy of Guinea, had it lasted for a long time, but very fortunately the Government of Ghana came to the aid of Guinea by giving her a loan. The Government of Ghana furthermore promised the Government of Guinea her unflinching support and solidarity. This gesture of support and solidarity, coupled with fraternal help which Ghana rendered her at that critical mo-

ment and the close personal relationship which existed between Sékou Touré and the Trade Unions Congress of Ghana, induced the Government of Ghana and that of the Republic of Guinea to enter into a special relationship, one which was much closer than had hitherto existed between them. This policy led to the formation of a union known as the Union of Independent African States.

This Union was calculated to embrace those African states which would adhere to the principles upon which it was formed. The most significant point here is that each member state of the Union preserved its own individuality and structure. At the same time it was stated in the Declaration of the Union that the member states would decide in common what portion of their sovereignty should be surrendered to the Union in the full interest of the African community. This is an indication that the leaders of the participating countries felt that it was premature to state specifically that they were to surrender even a part of their sovereignty at that time. On the other hand, the clause appears to be a compromise formula.

The Declaration urged member states not to commit themselves to any one group or bloc; i.e., they should stay nonaligned. The Declaration further bound the members of the Union to determine common policy on matters of defence, although each state or federation could still possess its own army. A bank known as the Union Bank was to be established. Its task would be to issue and back the respective currencies of the member states or federations.

From the context and nature of this Declaration of 1 May, 1959 it can be deduced that the Ghana-Guinea Union of Independent African States was one based on mutual understanding and respect and on one common objective, unmistakably the self-determination of the Peoples of Africa, not to mention the struggle against colonialism, imperialism, poverty, and all forms of oppression. In the light of this it can be clearly seen that the leaders (Ghana and Guinea) had a common approach towards the most burning African problems. That is perhaps due to the fact that both coun-

tries subscribed to one political ideology, a move which has brought their aims and objectives together and which apparently has put them on the path of radicalism. By this path the Union was able to some extent to impart to other African leaders the spirit of uncompromising struggle, and that resulted in their helping those African countries which were still under the colonial yoke.<sup>10/</sup>

In the pursuit of their aim the leaders of Ghana and Guinea further stipulated that the Ghana-Guinea Union was the foundation of a union of independent African states. The use of the term "union" apparently did not please President Tubman of Liberia, for which reason he later invited Dr. Nkrumah of Ghana and President Sékou Touré of Guinea to a conference in a town in Liberia called Sanniguellie.

The result of this conference was a Declaration made on 19 July 1959 in which the word "union" was completely deleted and in its place ten principles, presumably intended to help achieve a community of independent African states, were formulated. The first of the principles underlined the fact that President Tubman never wanted to accede to the Ghana-Guinea Union. Instead, he wanted an altogether different political organization to be formed, to be called "The Community of Independent African States." The reason why he wanted a new organization to be formed under that name and did not accede to the one which already existed between Ghana and Guinea has been buried. And why the leaders of the Ghana-Guinea Union compromised to form a different organization with Dr. Tubman, when they actually knew that the Ghana-Guinea Union was purposely formed to be the nucleus of a union of independent African states, is also a mystery.

However, on careful study of the two Declarations it is clear that the rules for admitting new members into either of the two organizations were after all identical. Thus, the Declaration of the Ghana-Guinea Union stipulates that "membership of the Union shall be open to all independent

African States or Federations adhering to the principles on which the Union is based." In the same vein the Sanniguellie Declaration stipulates that "Membership in the Community shall be opened to all independent African States and Federations, and any nonindependent country of Africa shall have the right to join the Community upon its attainment of independence." Maintenance of national identity of the participating countries appeared in both Declarations but with different concepts. The Ghana-Guinea Declaration accepted the principle that each state or federation which is a member of the Union shall preserve its own individuality and structure. Further, it says that "the member states or federations will decide in common what portion of sovereignty shall be surrendered to the Union in the full interest of the African Community." The Sanniguellie Declaration, on the other hand, although it does not reject this principle, places much stress on the point that each state and federation which is a member of the Community shall maintain its own national identity and constitutional structure. It adds that the Community is being formed with a view to achieving unity among independent African states. It is not designed to prejudice the present or future international policies and relations and obligations of the states involved. "Each member of the Community," it says, "accepts the principle that it shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any other member."

Incidentally, the motto of both Declarations is just the same: "Independence and Unity." But when these two Declarations are studied carefully, it is evident that Ghana and Guinea compromised much so as to make it possible to form a union with Liberia. The Ghana-Guinea Union even went to the extent of causing its own dissolution just for the sake of the formation of another organization which could embrace other independent African states in the interest of the Unity of the Continent, self-determination, African personality and progress, and peace. Unfortunately, President Tubman had a different approach to unity of the continent. He appeared to be somehow suspicious and for this reason did

not feel comfortable in the ranks of such good organizers as Sékou Touré and Kwame Nkrumah, both radicals and bent on the course of political union even to the extent of re-linquishing their national sovereignties for the sake of a better and more solidly organized and powerful all-African Government. Dr. Tubman was not a radical and would not have been able to manage his affairs in the fields of ideology, politics and mass organization easily with such radicals. But President Tubman was one of the old politicians at that time in black Africa. In comparison, M. Sékou Touré and Kwame Nkrumah were new on the political scene, although matured. Their ideas were good, youthful and progressive, and capable of disclosing and fighting colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, whereas the ideas of Dr. Tubman were old and more attuned to the course of the wind of change which was then sweeping away foreign domination in Africa South of the Sahara. The situation was just like putting "new oil into an old bottle."

President Tubman knew quite well that birds of the same feather flock together and for that reason thought it fit to participate in an organization in which many were of his way of thinking and in which he could play a leading role. He therefore called another conference, this time at foreign minister level, in August 1959, barely one month after the Sanniguellie Conference. Liberia was joined by a number of African states, namely, Libya, UAR, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Guinea, Ghana, and Morocco. The Provisional Government of Algeria was also represented.

The representation itself is evidence that the majority of the participants (Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Morocco and UAR) were unable to carry on a businesslike conference with Liberia, Tunisia, Sudan and Ethiopia at that time. They therefore had to go their own way. For this reason another conference of Heads of African States was convened at Casablanca from 3 to 7 January 1961 by His Majesty King Mohammed V. of the Kingdom of Morocco, which later came to be known as the Casablanca Group. In the light of this, it can clearly be seen that the Casablanca Group was not created in op-

position to the Brazzaville Group (see Footnote 14), as some authors, such as Colin Legum say,<sup>11/</sup> but was formed because the member states, after having met in Liberia in August 1959, realized that they had a large area of mutual understanding, and it is against this background that they formed the group.

The group comprised Morocco, UAR, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and the Algerian Provisional Government. Libya and Ceylon took part in the Casablanca Conference but did not agree with a clause in the organization's Charter which stipulated that the member states were to discourage the maintenance of foreign troops and the establishment of bases which endanger the liberation of Africa. USA then had a military air base in Libya, and perhaps it would have brought difficulties to Libya, had she taken any action which might have implied the expulsion of the Americans.

The African Charter of Casablanca set forth many useful ideas which could have helped promote the building of African Unity. The Charter among other things affirms the will of the member states to preserve and consolidate their identity of views and unity of action in international affairs, to safeguard their hard-won independence, to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, and to reinforce peace in the world by adopting a policy of nonalignment. It further pledged the members to intensify their efforts towards the creation of an effective form of cooperation among Africans in the economic, social, and cultural domains.

On national liberation movements the leaders proclaimed their determination to liberate those African territories which were still under foreign domination by giving them aid and assistance and to liquidate colonialism and neo-colonialism in all their forms. On distribution of wealth the leaders proclaimed the need for independent African states to direct their political, economic and social policies towards exploiting their national wealth for the benefit of their peoples and ensuring an equitable distribution of that wealth among their nations. They further

agreed to intensify their efforts to create an effective form of cooperation among the African states in the economic, social, and cultural domains.

For the purpose of achieving this and also in the interest of consolidating liberty in Africa and strengthening unity and security, the member states decided to create an African Consultative Assembly as soon as conditions permitted. It was to be composed of representatives of every African state, have a permanent seat, and hold periodical sessions. For the more effective fulfilment of this task, four committees were created. The African Political Committee, which comprised Heads of States or their duly accredited representatives, was to meet periodically with a view to coordinating and unifying the general policy of the various African states. The Committee for Economic Cooperation was entrusted with the task of establishing postal and telecommunication links among the various African capitals. A special committee of Ministers of Education of the member states was also created. It was charged with the responsibility of preserving and developing African culture and civilization and intensifying African cultural cooperation and assistance. Finally, a fourth committee, known as the Joint African High Command and comprising the Chiefs of Staff, was created to ensure the common defence of Africa in case of aggression against any part of the continent. This presumably was calculated to safeguard the independence of African states. The important thing which we wish to point out is that the word "union" is deleted here again but the phrase "African unity" is retained in the Charter.

On 1 July 1961 another Charter was signed in Accra by the Presidents of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali to form yet another union, the Union of African States (UAS). This is viewed as an expansion of the Ghana-Guinea Union, which most of the other African leaders never wanted to participate in. It should, however, be stated that before the signing of this Agreement the President of Mali had met separately with the President of Ghana in November and the President of Guinea in December of 1960 and that two bilateral com-

muniques had been issued, one in Bamako and the other in Siguivi, in both of which the leaders expressed their wish to form a Union.

Although the union was called the Union of African States, its structure did not appear to be a real union; it took rather the form of a confederation. This fact is proved by clauses which are frequently used in the Charter. The Charter states, for example, that "the Supreme Executive Organ of the Union of African States shall be the Conference of Heads of State of the Union." This shows that the supreme executive power is not invested in one president, who in that case could have been the ultimate head of the government of the union states. There was not even a mention of a formation of a continental government in the Charter. On the contrary, the Charter provides equal chances for each of the leaders who are to preside at a conference in rotation.

On the strength of this, it becomes very difficult to agree with African leaders and writers who have conceived the idea that some of the members of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union (UAS) claim to be the Messiah of Africa and who say that they would prefer to stay outside the union rather than become a "camp follower." This allegation is nothing less than defeatism, because the Heads of States of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali have participated in many different African interstate organizations, for example the Sanniguellie Group, the Casablanca Group and the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, but nowhere and in no case have they collectively or has any one of them individually tried to assume leadership. There has not been an occasion when any one of these three leaders has seceded from an organization because he was not elected leader.

The fact is that most of the leaders in Africa at that time were simply afraid of the revolutionary ideas of the leaders of the Union of African States (UAS). They themselves believed in evolution and so wanted everything to go that direction; if it did not, then anybody involved was said to be ambitious.

Naturally, President Tubman as well as most of the then African leaders would not like to be signatories to a Charter such as the UAS Charter which contains a clause like "In order to safeguard sovereignty, the member states shall oppose any installation of foreign military bases on their soil." Nor would they like their countries to become member states of a Charter in which it is categorically stated that "there shall be established among political organizations and Youth Movements of the Union States a coordinating Committee for organizational purposes, to impart to the said bodies a common ideological orientation which is absolutely necessary for the development of the Union" or a clause like "At international gatherings, Conferences, or Meetings, the delegations of the Union States must as in duty bound consult one another and arrive at a common stand which no one shall be allowed to ignore, and all are expected to support."

And yet there is no provision in the UAS Charter which gives one particular member the chance to be automatically the leader or head of the organization. Should an African Continental Government be formed, it would by all means have a Constitution in which all the regulations governing the electoral systems would be defined. Besides, political parties would be formed all over the continent which would nominate their candidates to run for election, and that party which had a majority of seats in parliament, congress, or whatever it might be called, would form the Government.

Unfortunately, it is this party politics which has caused most concern in Africa, for the leaders of the old social order, the conservatives, were afraid of the leaders of the new social order, the radicals, for they see in them the ability, power and strength to organize, armed with a powerful Marxist-Leninist ideology. For this reason the differences between the leaders of the new social order and the old social order were ideological, economic and consequently had a class character as well. It was a struggle between those leaders who liked the socialist form of society and those who detested it. Finally, it was a struggle between those on the one side who advocated African unity with the

concept of converting Africa into one big country, one Government, one state, with all the mineral wealth and resources being exploited for the wellbeing of its people, and those on the other side who preached African unity but who in fact meant "intra-African cooperation." Some African leaders use the phrase "African unity" as a pretext to cover their unwillingness to unite; they dare not say openly that they are against "African unity" as they are afraid of international opinion which has accepted the fact that it is only through unity that Africa can really be free from imperialism.

Let us analyze two speeches, the first is by a representative from the ranks of those who favour the old social order, i.e., those leaders who would like African unity to be achieved by way of evolution. Thus, The Honourable Y. M. Sule, leader of the Nigerian Delegation to the Second Conference of Independent African States held in Addis Ababa in June of 1960, said, among other things: "Pan-Africanism is the only solution to our problems in Africa, no matter what kind of problems they are. No one in Africa doubts the need of our being in friendly relationship with our neighbours in African territories. But we must not be sentimental; we must be realistic. It is for this reason that we would like to point out that at this moment the idea of forming a Union of African States is premature. On the other hand we do not dispute the sincerity and indeed the good intentions of those people that advocate it. But we feel that such a move is too radical, perhaps too ambitious, to be of any lasting benefit. Gradual development of ideas and thoughts is more lasting. It must be remembered also that nations are like ordinary individual human beings and must therefore be treated as such. Hence, it is essential to remember that whatever ideas we may have about Pan-Africanism will not materialize or at least will not materialize as quickly as we would like them to if we start building from the top downwards. We must first prepare the minds of the different African countries - we must start from the known to the unknown.

"At the moment we in Nigeria cannot afford to form a Union by Government with any African States by surrendering our sovereignty. We need to wait until the African States are independent and have formed governments of their own. We believe that many of the African States would prefer to rule themselves by themselves, and that they would like to taste the atmosphere of freedom after having been under foreign domination for some time ...

"President Tubman's ideas of the association of states is therefore more acceptable, for it is yet premature to form a Union of States under one sovereignty. We must first break all artificial barriers; build international roads; promote mutual exchange of information, scientific and otherwise; etc., lifting any ban on the movement of free trade and people between the various African Countries. All these must be done in order to pave the way for this union of African States ... The Unity of Africans comes as a natural course and there can exist no barrier against it."<sup>12/</sup>

Some countries were able to achieve independence without bloodshed but others were forced to do so; some countries achieved independence in a reasonably short space of time while it took others many years, and there are other countries, such as South Africa and Rhodesia, who are unlikely to attain their independence even in the foreseeable future.

The Honourable Y. M. Sule said that the newly liberated states of Africa wanted to taste "the atmosphere of freedom." He so expressed his idea as if unity meant slavery. On the contrary, unity, here, is freedom as well as strength and with that strength Africa would be able to fight any force of aggression or encroachment on the freedom of the proposed nation.

From the text of the speech it can be seen that the speaker was frightened by groundless suspicions. It is not only the speaker who held that opinion. Most of the African leaders felt that international conferences which were called by Ghana, Guinea, or Mali were called in order to take their freedom away from them.

If we now examine the views put forth by one of those leaders who favour African unity, we have a completely new picture. Let us examine the viewpoint of President Sékou Touré of Guinea. The President once stated: "Our people are proud of cooperation with the peoples of Africa and particularly with the fraternal peoples of Ghana and with whom our people are seeking a close union even up to complete renunciation of individual sovereignty."<sup>13/</sup> If we compare this speech with the one by Mr. Sule, we will undoubtedly have no difficulty in coming to a conclusion as to which of the two speakers would actually like Africa to be united, i.e., which believes in outright political union.

Nevertheless, The Honourable Y. M. Sule and his followers could not stay in isolation, so they were forced by circumstances to organize themselves into some sort of organization. It is for this reason that they formed the Monrovia Group, which emerged as the result of the Monrovia Conference held in that city in May of 1961. The Group was comprised of the member states of the Brazzaville Group<sup>14/</sup>, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Togo, Somalia, and Libya (Libya had deviated from the course of the Casablanca line mainly because of the question of foreign bases). The Sudan stayed away because she objected to Mauritania's participation. Tunisia chose to be just an observer. The sponsors of the Conference were President Tubman of Liberia, President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo, and Sir Abubarkar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister of Nigeria.

Now the picture is clear. Dr. Tubman was unable to agree with the leaders of Ghana-Guinea and Mali at Sanniguellie some years back, and Sir Tafawa Balewa's representative at the Second Conference of Independent African States held in Addis Ababa in 1960 had spoken openly against the formation of a Union based on one Government. As regards Togo, her President, Mr. Sylvanus Olympio, had frozen his country's relationship with Ghana because of their border dispute.

These leaders sought in vain to persuade Mali and Guinea to act as co-sponsors. President Olympio and his friends might otherwise have heard from Mali and Guinea that the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union (UAS) was open to every independent African state so that if the sponsors felt there was anything good to be done for Africa, it would be better for them to do that within the realm of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. As a matter of fact, the leaders of Ghana, Guinea and Mali had so many things in common that to persuade Guinea or Mali to renounce Ghana was a target which could not easily be hit. In short, the leaders' efforts at persuasion did not succeed and so they had to get things going on their own after Guinea and Mali had declared the Conference to be inopportune. The Conference went on as planned, and in his opening address to the delegates Dr. Tubman analyzed some of the aims of the Conference. He also told the delegates about the circumstances which had called for the convening of the Conference. The President said:

"It should be crystal clear to every leader that Africans cannot live in isolation if they expect to allay suspicion, fear and tension. The idea of "primus inter pares", first among equals, is destructive to African Unity and Peace.

"The sense of oneness should be deeply rooted in the breast of every African. But the whirls of circumstances and ambition can make it difficult for us to fit ourselves into the picture of a unified Africa, the foundation for which we hope will be laid before this Conference closes. I come now to the question of leadership of Africa ... In this connection I have observed that there seems to be three schools of thought in this subject.

"There are those who feel that Liberia should assume leadership based on the fact that she is the oldest African Republic and is riper in political experience; but it will require more than age and political experience to assume leadership of Africa. There are others who assume that Ghana should assume that role because she is

physically more developed and embraces large territory to assume leadership of Africa. And there are yet those who opine that Egypt with its rich traditions dating back to the remotest antiquity should do so. It will require more than rich traditions of antiquity. It will require, in my opinion, the aggregate of the best that is in all compounded in such a manner as to represent the divisibility of Africa invisible."<sup>15/</sup>

Glancing through this, it can be seen that the President has pronounced the very word which the Honourable Y. M. Sule of Nigeria used some time ago: "ambition." But no wonder this was the only weapon of those who were against the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union at that time. The word "ambition" was always used to put fears into other countries who wanted to join hands with the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union.

There were two schools of thought in Africa at that time as to who should lead the continent. The first was centered on Ghana. President Nkrumah was considered to be an able and possible contender for the leadership. The second was centered on the UAR, which was also favoured for the leadership of the continent. Coincidentally or miraculously both of these countries were members of the Casablanca Group; they might have their own differences, but they understood one another.

In the light of this, President Tubman's speech directed against personal ambition in the affairs of African Unity was nothing but irony. On the contrary, he was trying to call the attention of his audience to the fact that since the two most favoured Presidents were non-participants at the Conference, he was then the automatic choice, as he was the most experienced leader among those who were present.

As a matter of fact, Ghana is larger than Liberia, for Ghana has a territory of 238,500 square kilometres whereas Liberia has only 111,400 square kilometres. (Ghana is smaller than Guinea (245,800 sq. km.), Mali (1,240,000 sq. km.), Nigeria (923,800 sq. km.), UAR (1,001,400 sq. km.), Chad (1,284,000 sq. km.), and Libya (1,759,500 sq. km.).

It is clear that it is not the size of a territory of a country which determines the leadership of a Union Government; if so, Ghana would not be considered at all.

The fact lies in what has been indicated above, namely, that Dr. Tubman wanted to remind the delegates to the Monrovia Conference that the two "probables" were not there and so he had enough political experience to assume leadership. His ambition was thus betrayed. However, this did not influence his audience. On the contrary, they passed a resolution on the means of promoting better understanding and cooperation towards achieving unity in Africa and Malagasy which adhered to the principles of "non-acceptance of any leadership." Among other things the Resolution provided for absolute equality of African and Malagasy states, whatever the size of their territories, the density of their populations, or the value of their possessions; non-interference in the internal affairs of states; respect for the sovereignty of each state and its inalienable right to existence and development of its personality; unqualified condemnation of outside subversive action by neighbouring states; and promotion of cooperation throughout Africa based upon tolerance, solidarity and good-neighbour relations, periodical exchange of views. The unity aimed to be achieved at the moment according to the Resolution is not the political integration of sovereign African states but unity of aspirations and of action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political unity.

The Resolution urged all African and Malagasy states to refrain from directly or indirectly encouraging dissident groups or individuals of other states in subversive activities by permitting their own states to be used as bases from which such dissidents may operate or by financing dissidents in other countries or otherwise.

The participants at the Conference accepted in principle that an inter-African and Malagasy advisory organization was to be created, the essential purpose of which

was to put into effect the above principles and to establish the organization at the next Conference.

Other Resolutions were also passed, including one on threats to peace and stability in Africa and the world. This dealt mainly with Algeria, Congo, Angola, and the Union of South Africa and with other matter such as disarmament and the United Nations. Another Resolution dealt with the settlement of conflicts which might arise between African states.

Now then, it is a fact that both the Monrovia Group and the Casablanca Group had declared that they were against colonialism and racism, but there were fundamental questions concerning which they stood on different rails, the most important of which was the scope of Unity in Africa. The Monrovia Group was interested in a form of cooperation among African states but did not want a Union Government to be established. The following statement speaks for itself: "The Unity that is aimed to be achieved at the moment is not the political integration of sovereign African states but unity of aspirations and of action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political identity." The Charter of the Casablanca Group, on the other hand, sets to intensify the efforts of the member states "for the creation of an effective form of cooperation among the African states in the economic, social and cultural domains" and it appeals to "all independent African States to associate themselves with common action for the consolidation of liberty in Africa and the building up of its Unity."

On disarmament, the Monrovia Conference was only able to indicate the assurances given by the French Government that all further nuclear explosions in Africa would be stopped. This is a manifestation that the member states of the Monrovia Group were ready to compromise with any statement made by any European power but disagreed with any statement made by their brother Africans, even if such a statement was made honestly and in good faith.

One thing more. The Monrovia Group, in their attempt to draw the then Government of President Kasavubu to their ranks, loosely inserted in one of their Resolutions that all African states should "desist from activities such as the hasty recognition of breakaway regimes in Congo, and generally from taking sides with rival groups in any form or manner." This viewpoint was contrary to the one held by the Casablanca Group, for the latter had even recognized the opposing Gizenga Government in Stanleyville.

The main issue here is the divergence of outlook of the leaders of Africa on African unity. Some hold the opinion that international roads should be built in Africa, that other economic projects should also be built in various countries in Africa, that exchange of information should be made among the countries on the Continent, and that above all the peoples of Africa should be prepared ahead before an all-African government is created. This sounds nice, but it is neither realistic nor objective, because if there had been a merger of all the countries of the continent, the task of building roads anywhere on the continent would automatically have become the responsibility of the union government. In the same way the creation of information centres as well as establishment of economic projects would have been the duty of the government.

The problem is clear. It is not merely the division of Africa into small territories which constitute the source of obstruction to the cause of African unity. The root of the obstruction is planted in the existence of a great number of governments on the continent. Had all these governments been fused together, they would have been powerful and more effective. Unity is strength; a strength which would undoubtedly have helped to whither away the existing artificial boundaries which the colonialists left behind them. But this is what the imperialists would not like to see, for although they have given independence to some states in Africa, they still have investments and properties there. For this reason, they are still pledged to preserving their interests and their capitalist gains

based on exploitation of their former colonies. In this vein it was not strange that a part of the Constitution of France was adjusted to make a provision for the independent states of Africa to remain as members of the French Community. Countries like the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, the Malagasy Republic, and Senegal thus remained in the Community. Those independent African states which remained outside the Community one way or the other concluded a variety of economic and other agreements with France, which practically made the difference between membership and non-membership of the Community negligible. The train of events is fully illustrated when the EC, membership of the franc zone-free currency movements and a guaranteed franc exchange rate are examined. What needs be pointed out here is that most of those countries which constituted the French Community were at the same time members of the Union Africaine et Malagaske (UAM), which later joined the ranks of some others to form the Monrovia Group. In the light of this, C. Shephered was right in stating that some colonial powers, particularly France and Belgium, were using the advantage of pro-Western African elements in forming political blocs against ultra-Africanism on the continent. 16/

This fact is illustrated by an action taken by the Brazzaville Group on the Algeria-France question at the United Nations. Algeria was then fighting for her independence from France. This turned into a military confrontation which took away many lives, mostly lives of the freedom fighters. Help was inevitably needed, especially from the progressive forces who cherish the cause of peace and from all peace-loving people everywhere in the world. To this end, the Afro-Asian group at the UN proposed a resolution which would empower the UN to interfere in the "Franco-Algerian" war by holding a referendum under its auspices. Coincidentally, the Brazzaville Group was holding a session of their Conference at the same time. The leaders of the Group took a decision by which they ordered their representatives at the UN to do all that they could to argue

to the satisfaction of the General Assembly that the UN had no jurisdiction to hold a referendum in a territory in which it had no authority.<sup>17/</sup> The Guinea Press Agency declared that Africans "openly came to the defence of colonialism against their Algerian brothers ..." and against the "freedom of their brothers." <sup>18/</sup>

This is a testimony and but one of the reasons why the imperialist countries do not want Africans to unite. But we must not forget that usually influence exerted by one party on another never lasts long. In other words, there is an end to every event, no matter how good or bad; it is only its duration which causes anxiety and concern.

It is important to mention in this regard that since most of the African leaders had already caught the fever of unity, they did not yield to the manipulations of their former colonial masters. In one way or the other African leaders have realized that with Africa divided into small pieces of territories as it is now, there is no guarantee of genuine independence. Modibo Keita, former President of Mali once said: "We are convinced that the States of Africa will never be independent in the full sense of the word if they remain small States, more or less opposed one to another, each having its own policy, its own economy, each taking no account of the policy of the others."<sup>19/</sup> It can be seen that the President was not satisfied with the state of affairs in Africa. He realized that policies of African states should be coordinated and that their economies should be integrated. This, in fact, is one of the practical approaches to the question of unity of the continent, in contrast to those who talk only about leadership and other visions when even the union itself has not been formed.

There are similar speeches of this nature which serve as an indication of the willingness of their authors to unite. An example of such a speech is the one made by the then Prime Minister of Tanganyika, Mr. Julius Nyerere, <sup>20/</sup> some time ago, in which he said: "The balkanization of

Africa is a source of a weakness to our Continent. The forces of imperialism and of neo-imperialism will find their own strength in this basic weakness of our Continent. Surely, one would have expected that if we have a chance to undo part of the harm that has already been done by this balkanization of our Continent, we would not hesitate in taking that chance.<sup>21/</sup>

This demonstrates that the Prime Minister's interest in the continent, its strength and stability, is placed well above anything else. It may therefore rightly be said that Mr. Nyerere wanted the continent to be free from imperialism and those harms which imperialism had inflicted on the continent before anything else could be considered, presumably leadership. On this question, Dr. Namandi Azikiwe of Nigeria has a vivid view of the events in Africa. His point of view reflects mainly on the ideas of those African leaders who are opposed to outright political union. He says: "From the evidence at our disposal it would appear that West European nations may be rightly accused of balkanizing Africa in the nineteenth century, yet they have atoned for it by federating many African nationalists on the attainment of the independence of their countries. British West Africa, French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa are examples of balkanization by African nationalists, and the Central African Federation is an example of balkanization in process brought about by the racial segregation and discrimination practices by a small minority of European settlers against the African majority who are the owners of their countries." <sup>22/</sup>

There are more such speeches with regard to African unity. Mr. Ako Adjei, the then Ghana's Foreign Minister, once remarked that the former colonial territories become independent but with new dangers awaiting them. Elaborating his point, Mr. Adjei said that although the colonial powers were being compelled by the forces of African nationalism to grant independence to the African states, they nevertheless were planning the continuance of their domination of "Africa by a new system of foreign domination, namely, the

balkanization of Africa." Exposing further how such powers could exert their domination on Africa, Mr. Ako Adjei said that the imperialists were "ready" to grant independence, but only under certain conditions such as the negotiation of defence agreements and the guarantee of economic advantages such as would satisfy the demands of African nationalism. By this means they expected to be able "to create a large number of small independent states which shall continue to be dependent upon the former colonial powers perpetually for their economic, technological, social, and cultural development." <sup>23/</sup> Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana, had this to say: "We have, or should have, an effective answer to balkanization, and the answer is African Unity." <sup>24/</sup> In passing it should be mentioned that there were yet other leaders of African states who adhered to this view, and one of such people was the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, who demonstrated his belief in African unity by playing host to a Conference of Heads of African and Malagasy States and Governments, held in Addis Ababa in May 1963, which brought about the formation of a continent-wide organization, the Organization of African Unity (OAU).<sup>25/</sup> This organization consists of continental African states, Madagascar, and other islands surrounding Africa. <sup>26/</sup> The aims and purposes of the Organization are stipulated in Article II of its Charter. The Organization was created to promote unity and solidarity among African states, to coordinate and intensify their efforts to improve living standards in Africa, to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence; to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and to promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In order to achieve these purposes, the member states have to coordinate and harmonize their general policies especially in the fields of political and diplomatic cooperation; economic cooperation, including transport and

communications; educational and cultural cooperation; health, sanitation, and nutritional cooperation; scientific and technical cooperation; and cooperation for defence and security.

Article III of the Charter lists the principles which the member states are to adhere to. It says that all member states of the Organization are equal and sovereign. There should be no interference in the internal affairs of member states. The member states should have respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence. There should be peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration; unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other state; and absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent.

On careful study of the principles of the Organization, it is clear that there are clauses like "the sovereign equality of all member states," "non-interference in the internal affairs of states," and "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence," which do not permit the formation of a continental government, let alone the eventual formation of such a government.

One could say that the OAU is a sort of an international assembly which passes resolutions, etc., but which has no effective coercive power to help implement them. 27/ On the contrary, the Charter feebly states that "all member states shall observe scrupulously the principles laid down in Article III". 28/

Nonetheless, it is not right to conclude that the OAU is a useless organization. Ever since its formation it has been an instrument of peace. In this sphere the OAU has not only done much for the maintenance of peace in Africa but has also tried in as many ways as possible to

help promote peace and security in the world. Its unceasing call for general and complete disarmament in the recommendation which it once made to its member states to accede to the Moscow Agreement on a Partial Ban on Atomic Tests are all a proof of the usefulness of the Organization.

At its 1964 Cairo Assembly the OAU adopted a Declaration making Africa a nuclear-free zone, and ever since the 1967-1969 period the OAU has been calling for a more effective and peaceful way of settling the conflict that exists between the countries in the Middle East, which has taken so many lives, both Arab and Israeli. Had due audience been given to the OAU plea, there would not have been the 1973-74 oil crisis.

It can easily be imagined that the course of peace taken by the OAU has a great and global significance which has in one way or another put the external relations of its member states on a path which other countries have no other alternative than to reckon with. For example, most of the former French colonies were able to sign the partial test ban agreement without fear of reprisal from France, on which they depend both economically and militarily, despite the fact that France had refused to sign the agreement and had even engaged in a worldwide campaign against it. On the contrary, France had to accept the fact that her former colonies were honouring their international obligation as put forth by the OAU.

Against this background it must be mentioned that African countries which once served as a booty for the metropolises and which for that reason had no voice in the international arena, can now have their own voices heard even to the extent of participating in the deliberations of the Security Council of the United Nations and in its Specialized Agencies.

It has to be stressed that the OAU to a certain extent represents a security system. Its Charter provides for the renunciation of the use of force when situations of

conflict arise, for the peaceful solution of all disputes and misunderstandings between its members, and for non-interference in internal affairs. It is in this spirit of brotherhood that the OAU has done much in settling intra-African political and territorial conflicts in a peaceful way. Most of the conflicts have occurred due to colonial imposition of boundaries in Africa, which caused the separation of ethnic groups and in some cases even of families, a part in one country and a part in another.

In these efforts the OAU had the choice of two possibilities. The first is centered on the Resolution adopted at the All-African Peoples Conference held in Accra in 1958, at which time only a few states on the continent had actually gained their independence. The Resolution rejected those boundaries which had been established by the colonial powers and called on the peoples of Africa to reestablish their own African-created boundaries, taking into account historical, ethnic and other factors. The other possibility was to accept existing boundaries which the colonial powers had created during colonial days. In order to preserve peace in Africa the OAU adopted a decision in compliance with the latter, thus confirming the status quo in Africa. This decision was applied in the Algeria-Morocco border dispute in October 1963 and the Ethiopia-Somalia border case in February of 1964. For this purpose the OAU formed a special arbitration committee whose duty it was to peacefully solve the conflict between Algeria and Morocco by appealing to the parties involved to lay down their arms. In the same way the OAU helped Ghana and Togo, Ghana and Upper Volta, Sudan and Chad, and Burundi and Rwanda to solve their border disputes peacefully.

Nevertheless, border problems still exist in Africa, and it appears that it will take some years to uproot them. The contention now is that most of the African leaders do not agree to the principle of status quo which the OAU has adopted as its cornerstone policy in settling border questions. Nevertheless, they have in one way or

another managed to accommodate to this principle with respect to their obligations to the OAU as an international organization. It is mainly because of this that border conflicts now arise only intermittently in Africa.

Border problems are sometimes closely connected with the problems of refugees on the continent. This, as a matter of fact, has an influence on inter-state relations.

It sometimes happens that tribal conflicts flare up within a country, and in most cases the ruling tribe which has been affected uses instruments of the state against the other tribe. The latter, trying to avoid reprisals, sometimes seeks refuge in a neighbouring country. The same may be said with regard to a coup-d'etat being staged in a country; in such cases some members of the toppled government manage to escape to neighbouring countries to seek refuge. But the coup leaders always find that their lives are in danger as long as those refugees remain in the neighbouring country. <sup>29/</sup> In such circumstances the coup leaders try to take some security measures along their borders. Such measures always tend to infuriate the leaders of the countries that have accorded protection to the refugees. In most cases this leads to border conflicts.

In some instances the act of according political asylum to a citizen of a neighbouring country is also viewed by the first country as a hostile action, and this leads to strained relations which sometimes results in border conflicts.

The number of refugees on such grounds, together with those who left their countries because of racial discrimination or persecution, was about 800,000 people in 1968, but rose up to about one million in 1969. Most of these refugees lived in Congo (Kinshasa), Burundi, Senegal, Guinea, and Ghana.

This refugee question has two aspects, namely, economic and political; economic because in most cases those countries which give shelter to refugees are unable to provide

them even with basic needs, and political because in most cases the countries which give shelter to the refugees always find themselves in political conflict with those countries to whose citizens they have granted asylum, and this ultimately results in deterioration of relations. 30/

The OAU has given much attention to the refugee problem. A special bureau has been established under its auspices to deal with this problem. A conference was held on this problem under its auspices in Addis Ababa in 1967, and in 1969 a Convention regulating specific aspects of this problem was adopted. This Convention guarantees the right to political asylum. It stipulates that the right of according refugee status to a citizen of another country is not and must not be taken as a hostile action in relation to the country whose citizens have sought refuge. In the same way the country which has accorded asylum is not to involve the refugees in any political action or in any hostile action against their country or against any member of the Organization of African Unity.

In giving a general assessment on the activities of the OAU, it is important to mention that the activities of the OAU are facilitated by the fact that its members, most of whom won their national independence in the early 1960s, have a more or less equal level of economic development. That has been the main factor that has made it not possible for any state to raise the question of its leadership over other states.

Although the functioning of the OAU does not always proceed smoothly, it does not have to contend with the problem of differences between its members with respect to the question of fully abolishing colonialist and racist regimes on the continent. It is apparently this goal which unites African countries in their struggle against their chief enemies, neocolonialism and racialism. 31/

### III. New Trends in West African Interstate Relations After 1966

The year 1966 was a turning point in intra-African state relations. For this was the year in which many of the Heads of State in Africa were ousted by coup d'etats. It was also the year in which Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, who, his opponents alleged, was ambitious of becoming the first President of Africa, was removed from the ranks of effective leaders of the continent.

Before 1966, of course, there had been many coup d'etats in countries in Africa and there had also been attempted coups in some parts of the continent, but the one against the most feared person amongst the leaders of Africa was the coup that took place in Ghana. That coup brought some mixed feelings to the people of Africa. The continent seemed to be divided into two camps, those who welcomed the coup and those who condemned it. The former consisted mainly of those Heads of State who lived in fear and thus entertained the idea that President Nkrumah was working secretly to remove them from their posts, such as President Felix Houphouet Boigny and those such as President Leopold Sador Senghor of Senegal who feared Nkrumah's organizational ability as well as his approach to African problems including the concept of African unity. Those who detested Dr. Nkrumah's removal from office were the group of people who were actually involved in national liberation movements, especially in Rhodesia, Southern Africa, Angola, Mozambique, etc.

From this the picture is clear. Whereas a handful of individual Heads of State welcomed the coup against ex-President Nkrumah because of personal animosities against him, a greater part of the African population were against his removal, although there was nothing they could do about it.

This change of Government in Ghana also brought with it some changes in the relationship between Ghana and the countries that had hitherto had either frozen relation-

ship or strained ones. For example, all during the time of Dr. Nkrumah's office Nigeria had a rift with Ghana, and this grew to such a pitch that it once seemed as though Nigerian papers would never stop attacking the Ghanaian leader in their columns.

The same feeling was prevalent in Ivory Coast, Togo, and most of the countries that formed the Monrovia Group. The main and immediate reason for this attitude was that the leaders of these countries always feared that President Nkrumah had a strong ambition to create a Continental Government, of which he hoped to be President. In other words, the leaders of these states feared that President Nkrumah would one day neutralize their positions as Heads of State. Hence the enmity.

The fears and hatred these Heads of State had for President Nkrumah spread wide beyond the personality of Nkrumah to all those who shared his lofty aims of total unification of Africa, and his colleagues such as President Ahmed Sékou Touré and Modibo Keita suffered isolation from other francophone African countries.

All this was so because Nkrumah believed in real African freedom. He expressed his belief in these terms: "We shall continue to give encouragement, comfort, and support to the nationalists movements for independence which are now developing in many parts of the African continent. One of the cardinal tenets of our policy is to see all Africa free from foreign rule, for we believe that freedom for Africans on their native continent of Africa is essential for world peace." <sup>32/</sup> He confirmed this position by the speech he made at the Positive Action Conference for Peace and Security in Africa, Accra, April 1960, by saying that "so long as one inch of African soil remains under colonial rule there will be strife and conflict." These words were but manifestation of his concern for the well-being of the continent. At the same time they were what some African leaders classified as ambition and for that reason rejoiced at his removal from office.

Adversely, his removal from office brought many a change in the whole political scene in Africa. Support for the national liberation movements, which had been on Nkrumah's priority list since he achieved independence for Ghana in 1957, became then a second preoccupation for some African leaders. Contributions to the OAU funds allocated to the liberation movements were no longer coming in. Little, if any, encouragement was given to the freedom fighters, and some leaders such as President Houphouët Boigny, who were opposed to Nkrumah, never offered material help to the liberation movements at that time, when such help was vitally needed. Instead, he suggested that there should be a dialogue with South Africa, a suggestion which, if it had gained the popularity it needed, would have given more fame to President Houphouët Boigny and thus made him the best of the leaders in Africa. But this ambition of his failed when the OAU refused to endorse his suggestion. Even during the whole period when the suggestion was under consideration, only five countries rallied unconditionally to it. They were Madagascar, Gabon, Malawi, Dahomey under President Hubert Maga, and the Central African Republic. Dr. Busia's Government committed itself to the principle of dialogue but, like President Hamani Diori of Niger, made it plain that such a dialogue should be in the context of the OAU. Ghana's point of view was expressed in these terms by her Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. William Ofori Atta, who said: "We say one of the conditions for dialogue is that South Africa gives a clear and unambiguous indication to talk. The wise authors of the Lusaka Manifesto have said we must watch for changing circumstances. When circumstances change then an opportunity might arise for some form of contact to be made. Freedom fighting should not cease. It is one of the weapons we have accepted. While we do this we must watch out to find whether there are avenues for other contacts or for adopting other weapons."

Dr. Okoi Arikpo made Nigeria's position vividly clear. Nigeria would oppose to the last drop of its blood that the OAU as an organization of all independent Africa

should enter into dialogue with South Africa. <sup>33/</sup> These attitudes towards the dialogue suggestion was a direct pointer to the fact that the OAU, unlike the OCAM or the CEAO, could not be an object of Houphouetist manipulation.

In more practical terms, the opponents of the dialogue were proved right by the failure of President Kaunda's attempts to settle the Rhodesian question by way of a dialogue.

Events after the removal of Kwame Nkrumah from his Presidency in Ghana became significant in intra-West African relations. Some countries that had had Ghana on their red list changed their attitudes, in most cases because the new Heads of States who were mostly soldiers were put on friendly terms by their military profession or by some similar events which had occurred in the countries which they happened to rule. For example, there was a military coup d'etat in Nigeria in January 1966, and in the following month, in February, a coup took place in Ghana. This means that both regimes needed sympathy and a consolidation of power and position, and because of this they did not wish to create enemies. Ghana and Nigeria had had some strained relations some years back. The relations were so strained that Mr. Jaja Wachuku, then Nigeria's Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not even want to step on Ghanaian soil when his plane to Addis Ababa landed in Ghana. That was during the Nkrumah administration.

When General Gowon made a return visit to Ghana barely thirteen days after Brigadier A. A. Afrifa, the then Head of State of Ghana, had paid an official visit to Nigeria, the Ghanaian Head of State recalled the uncomfortable days which had existed between the two countries by saying: "If occasional unhappy situations such as were experienced before the 24 February 1966 tend to mark our relations, we have always taken them as a family affair and have not allowed them to upset seriously our traditional friendship."<sup>34/</sup> It is, however, doubtful that the civilian governments of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and Sir Tafawa Balewa, with all the accusations and counter accusations each lashed against

the other, still considered the rivalry between them as a family affair.

Nevertheless, in the case of Brigadier Afrifa and General Gowon it can be understood, as has already been said above, that they had some things in common. Both of them gained their top posts through military takeover; each needed encouragement from the other. Ideological differences did not exist between them, above all both of them had graduated from Sandhurst, and more precisely they were from the same military company, the Normandy Company. These are some of the factors which made them understand each other very readily. Unlike the military rulers, their predecessors, the civilian leaders, had nothing in common but hatred and distrust which were based on unfounded presumptions.

Instead of working together to solve the common problems which they faced, viz., poverty, disease, illiteracy, etc., the leaders of the two nations resorted to accusations and counteraccusations of discrediting nature. In this vein, it was pointed out rightly when General Gowon said: "We share a community of interests and look forward to discussing with Your Excellency a number of these issues which are of interest to our two nations. Ghana and Nigeria must have greater understanding and cooperation and work closely together both in our bilateral and Pan-African interest. Let there be no rivalry but brotherhood and understanding at all levels and at all times in the interest of greater Africa of today and tomorrow." 35/

It was not only Ghana-Nigerian relations which improved after the removal of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in 1968. The NLC, the Government of Ghana, published Decree No NLCD 235 to set up a Commission known as the Ghana-Ivory Coast Border Demarcation Commission under the chairmanship of Mr. James Mercer. The terms of the Commission stipulated, among other things, the Commission was

- 1) to undertake the physical demarcation of the border between the Republic of Ghana and the Republic of Ivory Coast in the manner agreed upon between the Governments of Ghana and Ivory Coast;
- 2) to hold negotiations on any matters arising which concern the demarcation of the said border;
- 3) to hold such enquiries as are necessary to solve any human problems occasioned by the present position of the said border and by the proposed border demarcation;
- 4) to embody in its report appropriate recommendations for the preservation of the beaconing objects and the track marking of the border.

It was also one of the terms that the Commission meet every six months to review border problems which might arise. The Commission has since been holding regular meetings. At the end of a six-day meeting that took place at the State House in Accra on Saturday, 26 May 1973, Mr. Louis Antouine Aduko, the Vice-Chairman of the Commission, appealed to African leaders not to apply rigid modern laws in solving their border problems. He suggested that as Africans their "problems should not be solved through rigid laws but rather in an African context." 36/

This, however, indicates that although the principle of "Pacta Servanda sunt" still exists and should exist, in the relationships between African countries in the event of any disputes, the parties concerned should solve them in brotherly atmosphere." 37/

Earlier in the year, precisely on Saturday, 3 March, a three-day meeting of the Ghana-Upper Volta Border Demarcation Commission ended at Bolgatanga. At the closing session Lieutenant-Colonel George Minyila, Ghana's then upper Regional Commissioner, said that Ghana would exploit all opportunities to further strengthen the existing cordial relations between the two countries. In replying to this, the leader of the Upper Volta delegation, Mr. Ernest

Ouedrago, also expressed satisfaction at the Commission's achievements and called for closer and effective co-operation between the two countries.

Apart from these border demarcation accords, Ghana showed a gesture of friendship to her neighbour in the north. On 30 May 1973 Ghana air force planes started air-lifting the first consignment of 470 bags of wheat pellets to Ouagadougou, Upper Volta. In all, a total 4,000 bags of wheat pellets were to be supplied under the operation to that country. These wheat pellets, a kind of animal feed, were to help feed cattle in Upper Volta in order to control the high death rate following a severe drought.

In addition to that gesture, the National Redemption Council, (NRC) the Government of Ghana, decided to waive completely a clause in the Ghana-Upper Volta Transport Agreement, thus allowing free movement of vehicles to enable food items to be carried to Upper Volta. Other remarkable agreements were also made by the NRC to help reduce the suffering of Ghana's northern neighbour in the spirit of true brotherhood.

Writing on a conference of the Permanent Commission for Cooperation between Ghana and Upper Volta, the Daily Graphic of Ghana, which did approve of the financial and economic committee that was set up by the two countries, commented that the Ouagadougou meeting had greatly boosted the relations between the two countries. The paper further said: "What the conference achieved was more concrete evidence for good interrelationship than political gimmicks like the ceremonial breaking down of the barriers with the "axes of Paga." These are all positive indications of good neighbourliness.

Relations between Ghana and her eastern neighbour have had their ups and downs. They were cordial in 1972 and even more cordial in 1973 but changed adversely in 1974. On Saturday, 11 November, Mr. N. M. Akou, the then Togolese Ambassador in Ghana, addressed Togolese nationals in Kumasi. The Ambassador advised them not to involve them-

selves in antisocial or subversive activities which could damage the good relations that existed between Ghana and Togo. He reached the climax in his speech by saying that "Togo and Ghana are one and there is nothing that can separate them." Although the Ambassador had reached an illusive climax, this was perhaps what the two countries were aiming at, for which reason newspapers did not make a fuss about it.

In the following year, in 1973, Togo and Ghana ratified in Ghana cooperation agreements covering health, sports, information, and trade. On this, too, the Daily Graphic said: "We are determined to improve cordial relations with other African countries, particularly our neighbours." This friendly atmosphere was marred when Ghana's two former ambassadors, Mr. S. G. Antor and Mr. E. O. Dumoga (the former accredited to Togo and latter to Dahomey), both of whom had decided to stay in Togo after the coup in Ghana on 13 January 1972, presented a petition to Dr. Kurt Waldheim, The Secretary General of the United Nations, on his arrival in Lome on 24 February 1974 asking for the reopening of the Western Togoland question. This question had been settled by plebiscite with a crystal clear question: "Do you want to be integrated permanently into the Gold Coast, which is about to become Ghana?" The result of the plebiscite was 92,000 in favour of integration and 67,000 against, with about 80 per cent of the eligible voters taking part. 38/

No doubt it cannot be that such a secessionist move by prominent refugees like Mr. Antor and Mr. Dumoga, both of whom had once held ambassadorial posts, can be made in the territory of a country without the consent of the Government whose effective authority and sovereignty prevails. It could be that it was an exclusively irresponsible action of Mr. Antor and Mr. Dumoga, but internationally the responsibility for such an action has to be borne by the country that has offered them shelter. Against this background it is implicit that the government of Togo could not have been in the know about what the two refugees were going to do.

In contrast, relations between Togo and Nigeria have always been cordial. Their relations have been so cordial that the two countries have even concerted their efforts to bring about the foundation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that embraces all the countries in the subregion.

When one takes a careful look at Nigeria and her relations with the other West African countries, it can be seen that apart from cold relations with the Ivory Coast, Nigeria has always maintained good relations with her West African neighbours. She has even played the role of a peacemaker to peacefully settle the dispute between three francophone African countries, Guinea on the one side and Senegal and Ivory Coast on the other. At least General Yakubu Gowon was able to convince President Sékou Touré to "reconsider his position with regard to the complaint which Guinea lodged with the Security Council of the United Nations Organization." <sup>39/</sup> Instead, General Gowon proposed that a solution to this painful conflict be found within the OAU in the interest of the entire African continent. <sup>40/</sup>

Relations between Guinea and Ghana now are in a test tube. They were really good during the rule of ex-President Nkrumah, but they became strained after his removal from office and when Guinea gave him shelter. They grew even worst when one Guinean minister was detained in Accra on his way to OAU meeting. They were put in the test tube when Guinea refused to hand over the corpse of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.

Two nations that had once formed strong unions known as the Ghana-Guinea Union, 23 November 1958, the Union of African States, 29 April 1961, and which were even planning to have representations in each other's parliament, for which reason they appointed resident ministers instead of conventional ambassadors, turned to become two hostile nations. The enmity between them grew so much that they did not even have consulates in each other's country.

When diplomatic relations were resumed, Mr. Laye Kourouma, Guinea's Ambassador to Nigeria, was given an accumulated post by having Ghana assigned to his duties. When presenting his credentials to Colonel Acheampong in Accra on 8 June 1973, the new Ambassador expressed gratitude that the strained relations between the two countries had eased after seven years. 41/

Correct as it is, this has never brought the relations between the two countries back on the level of Ghana-Guinea-Mali relations in the old UAS days.

## CHAPTER II

### THE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WESTERN LITERATURE AND IN THE LITERATURE OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

#### I. The Concept of Integration in Western Literature

Although this study deals with West Africa, this particular chapter treats a topic which is outside its scope. The reason for this is obvious, but should it need any clarification, we would point out that since the West African countries have been under colonial rule for many years, intellectuals in that part of the world have not as yet been able to work out their own theories on economic integration. This absence of a specific theory of their own has made the question as to which of the existing theories on economic integration worked out by intellectuals in other parts of the world could be used as the cornerstone of the proposed West African economic community a delicate one.

Practically speaking, a mere selection of one or the other theory is not what is important. On the contrary, a theory, in order to be operational for the West African integration, should contain the following all-important characteristics:

1. It must be capable of explaining the economic foundation of the countries in the subregion.
2. It should be able to ensure possibilities to sell West African agricultural crops in the world markets at reasonable prices.
3. It must show practical ways by which the economic dependence that has hitherto existed even after the attainment of political independence can be liquidated.
4. It should help the West African economic community to build such industries which will cut short the importation of some items of goods from the developed countries.

5. It must provide possibilities for the necessary production in West Africa.

This is the background against which we have decided to analyze some of the many existing theories on integration. In a work like this, of course, all theories on the problem under discussion cannot be treated. For this reason, we have thought it expedient to select theories of some eminent theorists, and we shall be dealing in this chapter mostly with different meanings and interpretations which these theorists give to the word "integration." This is because of late the word "integration" has been subject to a variety of interpretations. The reason for this can apparently be attributed to different economic interests which these intellectuals write to protect. These different interpretations of integration have been even more acute due to the existence of the two social systems of socialism and capitalism. This does not necessarily mean that differences in opinion on the word do not exist within the realms of either of the two social systems. Surely, they do but, on careful study of the many theories and their interpretations which do exist, it can be seen that all those who attempt to define the word do so either to protect the economy of their countries in particular or to defend in general the social system in which their countries are accommodated. For example, Soviet intellectuals, relying on their socialist principles, say one thing whereas the western intellectuals are divided into different schools of thought which range from liberalism to dirigism. Nevertheless, Western authors write from the Western viewpoint and for the cause of private enterprise and the Soviet authors write from the Soviet point of view, i.e., the protection of their socialist gains in foreign markets.

In some contemporary Western literature integration is defined as the unrestricted flow of goods, capital and labour from one country to another and the removal of all barriers to this flow. On careful study it can be understood that such a definition has been given to protect

the interests of those countries which have much to sell at the world market, i.e., those industrialized countries which produce a variety of items of goods and which have also a huge amount of capital to be invested in other countries.

B. A. Balassa, an American and also a contemporary Western author, thinks in the same vein but gives an even broader suggestion. In his book, Balassa says that integration should be regarded in the first place as a process, and in the second place as a definite condition or state. Arguing further, the author says that as a process integration embraces measures designed to end discrimination between economic units belonging to different countries whereas as a condition, or state, integration means the absence of any kind of discrimination between national economic units. <sup>42/</sup> Balassa speaks here of an end to discrimination between economic units of different countries and the liquidation of it; in other words, he wants American goods and other economic values to be floating to other countries without discrimination. From this, it can easily be imagined that when writing his theory Balassa had his country's economic might in view.

A similar viewpoint is also met in J. Tinbergen's book. He stresses the point that integration is "the creation of the most desirable structure of international economy, removing artificial hindrances to the optimal operation of free trade and introducing deliberately all desirable elements of coordination or unification." <sup>43/</sup> Here the real essence of the Western integration is concealed, because integration as it now exists is just but a new form of economic partition or repartition of the Western world among the leading monopolies based widely on greater concentration of production. An example of this is the international cartel, a type of partition which has been in practice for a long time which has on several occasions ended as a source of serious friction and conflict amongst countries.

What must be said here is that if in saying this the author had only states and governments in mind but not private monopolistic organizations as integration partners as well, then his theory could be accepted, as in that case the roots for competition and conflicts among the participants are eliminated. But if the author had in mind also private monopolistic organizations, then there exists the tendency of a fierce and big competition in the internal market of a weaker partner's country.

Apart from these theories, there are many others with different approach. For example, G. Myrdal approaches integration as a liberal critic of capitalism. Unlike others, he associates the term "integration" primarily with the situation prevailing in the developing countries and with the position of these countries in the world economy. He thus takes into account such factors as the widening of the gap between the levels of development of the industrial and developing countries and the increasing contradictions and competition within the world capitalist economy.

In the second place, Myrdal sees that integration is confronted with a number of serious contradictions both in respect of the capitalist world as a whole and on a regional West European plane. According to him, "economic integration is the realization of the old Western ideals of equality of opportunity...and it is also the realization of the same ideal of equality of opportunity in the relations between peoples of different nations. <sup>44/</sup>

It can easily be seen that Myrdal holds the belief that national integration, as defined by him, has been largely achieved in the countries of North America and in Europe as well as in New Zealand and in Australia. However, his theory will not be analyzed here as we are only interested in his realistic approach to the subject under discussion.

Other Western theorists hold an opposite view. They think that the term "integration" should refer first and foremost to the creation of special interstate bodies designed

to implement on an international scale certain measures in the field of economics. In this regard, Wannwald and Stöhler speak of a functional and institutional integration. <sup>45/</sup>

T. F. Deniau, also a prominent economist, discusses the differences which have occurred between the protagonists of laissez-faire and those of planning, <sup>46/</sup> and W. Röpke stresses the differences between integration based on a market economy and that based on a planned economy. <sup>47/</sup>

T. Scitovski writes: "Some economists argue that a common market and the free movement of capital and labour would be sufficient to achieve the aims of integration; others feel that the mere removal of obstacles to free product and factor movements, while necessary, would not nearly be enough and would not have to be supplemented by co-ordinating and harmonizing national economic policies and institutions, by inaugurating new all European plans and policies, and by creating the supranational administrative bodies necessary to implement these plans and policies." "... It is saddening," he goes on, "if not surprising, that these disagreements and differences should be as great among professional economists as they are among others." <sup>48/</sup> Balassa, on the other hand, speaks of "two extreme views - an all-out liberalist and a dirigist solution" of the problems of integration. <sup>49/</sup> On this, Professor E. Saadis says that the Treaty of Rome has a hybrid nature and that this is caused by the differences which exist between the proponents and the opponents of dirigism. <sup>50/</sup> S. Dell discusses two different outlooks. In his book he places the intellectuals into two groups. The first group consists of those intellectuals who hold the opinion that formation of a Common Market in Europe is merely a stage in the process of establishing a wider free trade area embracing all Western Europe and which could eventually help establish an Atlantic economic community. The second group consists of those intellectuals who oppose the idea of wider membership for the Common Market and instead call for closer relationship among

its members for the creation of a United States of Western Europe. Just as "for the free traders the idea of integration was simply a means to free trade, so for the integrationists, the free trade idea is considered useful only if it will lead to integration." <sup>51/</sup> All these definitions and their interpretations are, to some extent, a reflection of the profound contradictions which exist between the interests of the monopolies of the countries they represent. For example, if we analyze the so-called neo-liberal interpretation of the concept of integration, a comprehensive exposition will be found in their approach to the subject. The most outstanding exponents of this school of thought are W. Röpke, A. Rustow, A. Müller-Armack, A. Pedöhl and some other theorists like Mises and Haberler. These writers assert in various ways that "integration" should mean to reestablish, at least in the West European economy, the conditions that existed prior to World War I, when multilateral trade was relatively free, customs duties relatively low, and currency restriction nonexistent. In this regard, Röpke states that if anything deserved the name of international economic integration, surely it was the world economy as it developed up to 1914. <sup>52/</sup> It appears that by this Röpke wants to emphasize that the most important criterion of international economic integration is free convertibility of currencies, which makes for a community of markets, prices and settlements.

A. Müller-Armack shares this viewpoint with Röpke, for he states that the "state of the economy before 1914..., with its convertible currencies, was an excellent example of functional integration. There can be no question but that such integration on a worldwide scale should continue to be the basic aim of our economic policy." <sup>53/</sup> This, however, is the main line of thought of the neo-liberals who offer a great challenge to the proponents of so-called dirigism as regards European integration. H. Giersch, for instance, states that the dirigists "reject any form of integration which would mean a surrender of the advantages of a centralized planning and direction as well as

a direct intervention in economic activities, to which they attach such great importance. <sup>54/</sup> Röpke and others speak in the same vein; they assert that it is national dirigism or rather national collectivism which brings about international disintegration, and they insist on their idea that integration can never be reestablished through "international dirigism"; at the same time they try to underline their views by saying that collectivism and international economic integration are incompatible. <sup>55/</sup>

Neoliberals uphold the view that a free market automatically brings the interests of all countries into the closest harmony. Implicitly they mean that any attempt to regulate the market leads to contradictions and conflicts between countries. On this, Müller-Armack writes that "the more the various interests of different countries are exposed to complex dirigism, the more protective classes and special rules there will be, and the more the various states will be induced to do such things in the interests of their partners which they would not themselves wish to do, the more there will be real antagonisms in the Common Market. It is quite likely that dirigist action within the common market concept will be the very factor that may produce considerable tension in the future. <sup>56/</sup>

These are apparently the reasons which persuaded Röpke, Müller-Armack, and others to subscribe to the activities of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an organization aimed at liberalizing international trade and lowering customs ties as well as reducing state interference in the sphere of foreign trade.

However, it has to be remarked that at the same time they reject organizations constituted on similar lines such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which has a supernational supreme body with extensive administrative powers. In the eyes of Röpke and Müller-Armack, the activities of such an organization are nothing but the manifestation of dirigist tendencies and thus cannot be consistent with the principles of "a free market economy." <sup>57/</sup>

From this it could be deduced that economic integration thus means strengthening the position of the leading monopolies and securing their domination in all aspects of economic activity in the countries of Western Europe. For the theory of market or functional integration directly expresses the wishes of the monopolies. In passing, it should be remarked that the neo-liberals' concept of European integration is also a type of the old bourgeois theory of free trade.

Unlike the neo-liberals, the dirigists assert that integration should lead to greater government interference in the economic sphere. Significantly, the difference in opinion which exists between these two groups of intellectuals, namely, the neo-liberals and the dirigists, must not be overestimated. For although the two conceptions appear to be diametrically opposite, some common features do exist. This is inherent in the fact that the neo-liberals admit the need for some forms of government interference in the sphere of foreign and domestic policies; however, they limit this interference to specific aims. They accept the fact that a market economy which is completely unrestricted is not realized spontaneously and that for this reason the state has a role to play, which it does by creating and maintaining the proper conditions for the successful functioning of such an economy. In this sense Röpke stated that no genuine market economy could exist without such a state.

In the light of this it can be seen that like the dirigists, the neo-liberals are ardently in support of government regulations; however, they prefer such regulations to be effected in the field of agriculture.

In addition to the above-mentioned theories, there are some others which absolutely do not correspond to the current integration process and thus have just abstract definitions of the word. A good example are "unification" and "process which leads to a degree of unity." Practically, such short definitions, in the form of simple words or phrases, only lead to the deformation of the concept it-

self and thus reduce this complex and important international phenomenon to a simple abstract and mathematical symbol. Such definitions, as a matter of fact, offer a little help in the search for an appropriate and suitable one. If phrase-definitions like "economic unity," etc., were to be adopted as the most suitable definition for integration, then integration would have little or no significance at all; for in this case integration could be applied as well to the merging of enterprises of production or to mobilization of resources of some individual firms to form a big monopoly or a company, etc.

On the other hand, there are some Western authors, for example, H. Krämer, who have worked out some long definitions for the word. Such long definitions, although they appear to sound well, do not add much to revealing the essence of the word. In his book, H. Krämer writes that "integration is a process or a condition under which the individuals, and above all those of economic, juridical and political standing are entangled to one another to form a permanent unity in undertaking a certain activity."  
58/

Such a definition would not be accepted by theorists in the socialist countries, for in their case a definition should enhance a specific class character or basis; since in their approach to all social sciences every phenomenon or relationship which exists between a group of people—to be more explicit, all interstate relations, no matter what their social order, either socialists or capitalists—has a special class significance. This class approach, unfortunately, is not to be found in H. Krämer's and other Western economists' definition of integration.

## II. The Concept of Integration in the Literature of Socialist Countries

The change from capitalism to socialism has brought with it a change in all the social, political, and economic institutions. It has also brought about a change in production relations which have in turn led to a change in in-

ternational economic and political relations, i.e., those relationships which exist between states. Nevertheless, the relationships which exist between class groups of people who have been united under one umbrella by their common relationship to the means of production have now become the source of the root of all political and economic thought of almost all intellectuals. Every prospective intellectual tries in one way or another to defend one of the two existing social systems, that is, either capitalism or socialism. It can be said in some cases that the writer is liberal, that is to say, that he is not committed to any special social system and has tried to free himself from the entanglement of either of the two ideologies. But when the writer's work is examined thoroughly and considered from a class viewpoint, it can be detected that the work has to some extent been aimed at defending an institution in one of the two social systems. But defending an institution of a given society either explicitly or implicitly also means defending the aims for which the institution stands, and this, in turn, means defending the class whose interests that institution serves.

In short, every phenomenon has a class character, and it is this class approach which has also brought about a fundamental change in the methodology of all social sciences in the socialist countries as compared with those of the West. This change is realized also in the field of economic sciences. For example, although the intellectuals of socialist countries do subscribe to the international character of the integration process which has been going on in many regions or rather many parts of the world and to its historical significance, their methodology and approach to the analyses of such problems are quite different. This does not mean that different interpretations to one and the same terminology do not exist among the intellectuals of the socialist countries. Surely, different interpretations and even opinions do exist among them but the scope of such differences of opinion

is not so wide as to bring about a change in the whole edifice of the socialist foundation of the expressed ideas. Since all the different interpretations cannot be analyzed here only the most outstanding ones will be selected and discussed.

A greater part of the socialist intellectuals hold the opinion that the main object of integration is the national economy and also all its production ties and relations with the states involved. This means that integration is geared not to an abstract thing like "economic unity" or coordination of separate markets—although this takes or may take place—but to a concrete object like economic formation and like a national economic organism of specific groups of states. Western writers, especially those who ascribe to the liberal conception of the word "integration," see foreign exchange, market connections, trade turnover, and the international exchange of capital, manpower, and services as the object of integration. On close examination we see that the internationalization of economic activities of states has widened, a phenomenon which has been gradually urging the drawing together of national economies.

It has, however, to be remarked that there are also some people among the intellectuals of socialist countries who hold the view that the object of economic integration is "foreign trade," that is, trade between countries. In this regard it must be stated that the sphere of activities of integration, the extent to which it embraces in part or in whole a national economy on different stages, differs from country to country, depending on concrete historical and socioeconomic conditions.

If, however, we consider international economic relations from the point of view of production, and this has been the main integration approach of the socialist countries, and if we examine economic integration not as the "state" which tends to exist for a short time but as a long-term tendency, a historical process, then of course it

would not be correct to come to the conclusion that integration is related to production or to national economy of states and to that only, although some factors like market ties also play an important role in the course of the integration process.

At this juncture the question as to what the real essence of the word "integration" might be arises. In answering this question, Z. Kamecki writes that integration means the formation of a definite "economic organism which embraces a group of countries." <sup>59/</sup> S. Tikal thinks in the same vein. For he asserts that integration is a "process of forming a new economic organism on an international basis which takes away the obstructions which stand in the way of productive forces, a process dictated by the socialization of labour and production." <sup>60/</sup>

On a careful study of these two writings, the question arises as to whether or not integration is based on the process of bringing national economies together, i.e., a tendency towards the internationalization of the economy of different countries. In answer to this question it must be stated that to some extent the internationalization of national economies also means integration.

In the light of this it can be said that integration is the highest stage of the internationalization of production and of economic relations which enhance specific qualities. This form of internationalization of production, like all other social phenomena, has its own historical evolution background. It first appeared at a specific stage in the development of the productive forces at the time when the world's capitalist market began its formation. On the surface this gradually took the shape of the development of international exchange of commodities, i.e., foreign trade. With the intensification of concentration of production, the international transfer of capital increased and the labour force grew.

With a changeover from capitalism to monopolism, a new phenomenon evolved which later took the shape of internationalization of capital. At the same time the process of expansion and the deepening of relations between concerns and trusts of different countries on the basis of division of market, agreements on commodity prices and common ownership of shares set in. On account of this, private international monopolistic unions which had by then turned the world economically to capitalism, tried to some extent to eliminate the play of demand between productive forces and domestic markets.

But, as opposed to former times, the development of productive forces has now reached a level in many of the industrially developed countries, especially the young ones, at which they effectively function not only in separate enterprises or within the various monopolies but also within the leading branches of production, and this, together with the process of national reproduction, depends relatively on external forces, which in turn are interdependent with the process of national reproduction. This interdependence grows to such an extent that it tends not only to foster the tendencies towards internationalization of production but also calls for its liquidative development.

This, however, increases the volume, scale, and intensity of economic relations between the national economic organs of the countries involved. These relations develop both absolutely and relatively and often are overshadowed by the development of national production and social produce in the countries concerned.

Universalization of mutual economic ties and relations then starts to develop. This development then spreads to cover many fields, including foreign trade; scientific and technical cooperation between the countries concerned; international specialization; exchange of apprentices, specialists, and labour force; and consequently to joint production as is in the case of international consortia,

companies, and industrial complexes. In the light of this other relationships, especially scientific and technological and those of techniques of production and services penetrate into economic relations.

Relationships between national economies then take a new shape, this time involving stronger ties. To make these ties even more stable and reliable, the enterprises enter into binding relations, legal relations. Bilateral and multilateral agreements are concluded, mostly through international monopolistic organizations and unions. This is sometimes on governmental levels under special conditions based on the standard of development of the economies of the countries involved. These are the factors which ultimately give birth to integration. It can be seen that economic integration is not a simple repetition of the old form of internationalization of economic life of countries but is a more complex and refined new stage called for by modern means of production.

On this, A. A. Arzymanian, A. G. Maleikovski, T. Vladigerov, E. Kamenov and others have identical views. They have in one form or another stated in their books that "integration" is not a simple arithmetical sum of markets of the member states but is a more perfected continuation of it brought about by market expansion at a specific stage of capitalism. Z. Kamecki, a Pole, reasons in the same vein. For he says in his book that economic integration which embraces many different countries is not a simple sum of their economic structure - supposing -, he went on, a fundamental change should occur between them as a result of the contractual structure which would at the long run lead to a formation of a single economic structure. <sup>61/</sup> V. Pavlat has an analogical view on integration, <sup>62/</sup> for he says that tendencies towards optimization of the activities of national economic unification sometimes lead to a change of structure and to economization of time.

There exist some other principal questions connected with economic integration. One such question is whether integration is a spontaneous process or a regulated one and what the subjective factors therein are. In answering this question economists of socialist countries do not tend to have a common answer, for whereas one group does not attach importance to this question, another group attaches utmost importance to it. The latter group feels that the subjective element in the process of the formation of economic integration is the main thing which determines the quality of the proposed integration.

On this it should be stressed that with the rate of increase of production in general, there is also an expansion of all forms of international economic exchange, i.e., international trade, as well as international division of labour; for the fact is that the development of many national economies is subject to external influence and that makes economic relations between countries more complicated. Under such circumstances the states cannot do otherwise than participate in the process of economic integration. Of course in socialist countries, since the entire economy is monopolized by the state, external economic relations are also monopolized by the state. In the capitalist countries, however, where the key economic establishments are owned and monopolized by private monopolist organizations, such state participation in the process of economic integration is partially envisaged in the rules that regulate the activities of the individual monopolistic organization in relation to the activities of similar organizations of other countries.

In other forms, too, in conjunction with the monopolistic organizations which exist in their territories, governments pose externally as a state-monopolistic medium in pursuance of wider economic relations and markets.

This, however, is a complicated process, for the monopolists urge their various governments to sign trade agreements of different types. The most regular ones are:

1. a free trade area agreement, i.e., reduction or abolition of customs duties on trade among several countries in the absence of a common external tariff;
2. a customs union agreement, one which abolishes duties in trade among member countries and sets a common external tariff;
3. a common market agreement, i.e., one which eliminates restrictions on trade and on the flow of capital and labour;
4. an economic union agreement, i.e., a supplementation of common market conditions with coordination of internal economic policies of the member countries.

All these, if processed through in the order above, are presumed to lead to complete economic integration and thus to the institution of a single common currency, adoption of a common social policy, and possibly also to the establishment of a common supranational authority, a single government.

Participation of governments in signing trade agreements, as has earlier been described, enables them to have the right to regulate the economic activities of the monopolistic organization under the terms of the international economic agreements concluded. This substantiates the fact that economic integration is not a matter of spontaneity but, on the contrary, is subject to governmental regulation. It is noteworthy to mention in this regard that such a control is realized through "state monopoly."<sup>63/</sup> This shows that a process of economic integration, despite the social economic system under which it is taking place, be it capitalism or socialism, is subject to state regulation.

In this way it can be seen that economic integration, as a more advanced stage of internationalization of the economic life of two or more countries, has both economic and political significance.

The economic significance here lies in the fact that integration is quite different from all other forms of economic cooperation in view of its complicated character whereby national economies of different countries are drawn together. This ultimately brings about a radical change in the structure of the individual national economies as well as in the structure of the economic relations of the participating countries.

The political significance is that in order to indulge in any international process, there is need for an expressed wish of the member countries. Such a wish is normally expressed in the form of an agreement which is always designed specially to regulate the economic relations between the signatories.

From these two points it can be clearly seen that integration is both an economic and a political process.

- 1) economic, for it leads to the formation of regional production complexes;
- 2) political, for integration between countries is always based on interstate relations, viz., bilateral or multilateral government treaties aimed at instituting a common programme of action in this or that field of economic relations.

It is exactly this participation of states or governments in the process of integration which brings about radical changes in the structure of both the national economy and economic relations, because it is the state or the government which formulates feasible economic policies and also the course which the integration process should follow. In general, such economic policies enhance special relationships such as production relations, i.e., the position of classes. Because of this it would be more a matter of building castles in the air than a reality to think of the formation of an economic integration of two or more countries with different social systems, i.e., socialist and capitalist states. It is because of this that L. M. Kurichenko says in her book that integration is a more qualitative, a new stage of internationalization of economic life. But as integration is both economic and political processes its

formation can be possible only between states with similar types of social economic structure, with a similar form of the means of production. <sup>64/</sup> For this reason political considerations should not be neglected when one is defining economic integration. After all, political considerations are the basis of international economic relations, and it is international economics which serves as a stream through which the realization of integration flows. For this reason the establishment of economic relations between two sovereign states is also seen as a preparatory venture towards the integration process. Thus the process of integration is a step towards the drawing together of national economies of two or more independent countries, that is, when for some reason the main objective has not been achieved or when not the entire but only a branch of the economies of the parties has actually been brought together.

From what has been described above, we see that economic integration becomes complete when the national economic life of two or more states has actually been brought together, fused together to form one entity, i.e., when production and the exchange of commodities, of economic units of the participating countries as well as their economic policies are unified.

Economic integration of countries can thus be defined as an objective and a regulated process of accommodating the national economies of two or more states with the same social economic formation into one economic entity under one administration. The most important factor of this definition which needs to be noted is that all the essential aspects of integration are met therein. To begin with, the definition stresses that 1) integration has an objective base: the process of drawing national economies together, the internationalization of economic life; 2) integration is a regulated process, that is to say, it is not a spontaneous process but on the contrary demands a deliberate action of the integrating parties in fostering between themselves stable economic relations. In so doing they un-

dertake the obligation of making favourable conditions for their enterprises, production complexes, and all their trade organizations so as to enable them to establish contact with their partners in the other country or countries. Enterprises should be encouraged to achieve this end;

3) in its development the process of drawing the economies of nations together brings about a new and more qualitative degree, namely, fusing national economies and forming a more close and friendly relationship between the parties and thus creating a more favourable condition for optimization of economic structure of the participating states; 4) the development of integration leads to the creation of an international economic complex which unites the national economies of the states involved, resulting in many cases in a regional organization; and 5) economic integration is possible only between states with the same social economic formation, i.e., a single form of the means of production. In conclusion, it must be stated that integration is a natural historical process through which countries and people are drawn together by way of intensifying their economic independence based on a regular process of internationalization of production, development of international division of labour, and expansion of the world market. 65/

### III. The Soviet Approach to West African Integration

The question of economic cooperation between West African countries and their endeavours towards economic integration embraces a wide range of political and economic problems which touch not only the interests of the countries involved but also the interests of Western and Eastern countries. Because of this, any analysis of integration in West Africa is substantially influenced by the ideological adherence of the person analyzing. It is because of this that a point which may seem important to one author may not seem to be equally important to another; hence the difference in approach to the question.

For example, although R. Green's and A. Seidman's book has given a good account of the problems of integration in Africa, their suggestions on how such problems could be solved do not correspond to the social economic foundation of African Unity. This is how they see integration in Africa: They assert that the "creation of a unified economy to achieve rapid structural change requires unification of planning and strategy and implementation through a continental planning agency. The decisions of the planning body will be of crucial political as well as economic importance to each state. Quite clearly, no state can entrust powers to make and enforce basic economic political decisions to a body over which it does not have political control. No single state could expect to control any decision or expect to agree fully with each; but it would require all decisions to be made in a framework of agreed sociopolitical goals and economic strategies, adopted as the underlying basis for specific economic decisions."<sup>66/</sup>

Undoubtedly this sounds very nice, but it appears to be unrealistic, because the problems of economic integration in Africa cannot and must not be based on a continental planning agency, at least not at this time. Experience has shown that although some of the African leaders, for example, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, pay lip service to a continent-wide organization, they are even less interested in subregional economic cooperation or in a subregional organization in which they may not feature prominently by being the most eloquent therein. If a conference on such a continental planning agency, <sup>67/</sup> as has been suggested by Green and Seidman, were to be called in Africa today, certainly almost all the member states of the OAU would participate, but the decision of the conference would not be implemented.

On the contrary, African countries favour subregional integration better because of their language and border ties. Also, since most of the countries are landlocked, subregional cooperation becomes somewhat indispensable. When we take a close look at the activities of the OCAM, we find

that although the organization was founded on the 12 February 1965, its Charter was actually signed on 27 June 1966. This organization, however, "harks back to the aims of the Brazzaville Group of the years 1960-61 and supersedes the Union Africaine et Malgache de Cooperation Economique created in 1964." <sup>68/</sup> This shows quite clearly that the OCAM member states never gave up their desire to form a regional organization even after the formation of the OAU, a continental organization, in 1963.

On careful study of the charters of the OAU and the OCAM, it can be seen that the OCAM was actually seeking the collapse of the OAU. The reason for arriving at such a conclusion is that Article 1 of the Charter of the OCAM stipulates that the "organization shall be open to any independent and sovereign African state that requests admission and accepts the provisions of this organization." Article 2 says that "... in the spirit of the organization of African unity, its purpose is to strengthen cooperation and solidarity between the African and Malagasy states in order to accelerate their economic, social, technical, and cultural development." <sup>69/</sup>

The OAU Charter speaks in the same vein. Article I says the "organization shall include the continental African states, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa." Paragraph 2 of Article II goes further, saying that "to these ends, the member states shall coordinate and harmonize their general policies, especially in the following fields: a) political and diplomatic cooperation; b) economic cooperation, including transport and communications; c) educational and cultural cooperation; d) health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation; e) scientific and technical cooperation; and f) cooperation for defence and security." <sup>70/</sup>

From these quotations it can be realized that the formation of the OCAM in 1966 was not at all necessary, since both the OCAM and the OAU operate in the same territorial area—in independent and sovereign states of Africa, the

surrounding islands and Madagascar—and since their objectives are identical, namely, solidarity, cooperation, and development. But the member states of the OCAM decided, at all costs, to form another organization, disregarding the material as well as financial implications which exist in running two international organizations, both of which have identical aims. In passing we have to point out that this is but one of the reasons why we say that West African integration cannot be a factor of a continent-wide planning agency. However, this must be taken to mean that we are opposed to the idea of such a continent-wide planning agency. We only want to point out that this just cannot work.

When we turn to the study of Soviet books written on the problems of economic integration in West Africa, we find that the Soviet Africanists' approach is based, principally, on two main questions: 1) is the integration process in West Africa calculated to consolidate the economic independence of the countries concerned or is it one which has been designed to serve the interests of foreign monopolist-capitalists? and, 2) can the countries of West Africa which have taken the course of a noncapitalist way of economic development have any objective position in the proposed West African economic community without forfeiting their economic independence?

These are the two main questions which have gained some prominence in current Soviet literature. While concerned with these, Soviet economists at the same time suggest that "liquidation of economic separations in African countries will, vitally, lead to the solving of problems facing the individual countries, such as acceleration of the rate of growth of industrial development, elimination of destructive competition, and creation of industries based on the demands of neighbouring countries." <sup>71/</sup>

Professor Lubimov, while suggesting that integration would be the most appropriate way for Africa to solve her economic problems, at the same time stresses the point

that without integration there could not be a steady growth of industrial development there.

When we take E. N. Korotkova's book on the subject, we find that the author gives a solid analysis of the economic groupings on the continent. In her monograph Korotkova examines a variety of questions which are directly related to economic integration in the independent African countries, particularly the problem of sociopolitical trends involved. The author states that in light of the present condition which exists in Africa, the progressive character of tendencies is embodied in the fact that such an integration has to be constructed against monopolist capitals. She adds that "economic integration could bring much benefit to the peoples of Africa only under the condition of a radical social change based on noncapitalist way of development." <sup>72/</sup> E. N. Korotkova concludes that in "the process of creating economic communities, African countries at the same time limit their dependence on their former metropolises in the sphere of external economic relations." <sup>73/</sup> Another Soviet author, M. Kollantai, has an opposite viewpoint on economic integration in Africa. In his book the author makes clear that although coordination of programmes of development of individual countries and programmes of capital investments in big state enterprises has definite significance, he maintains at the same time that not all common markets formed have been in the interest of their member countries. According to him, a common market formed by African countries could as well be in the interest of the imperialist monopolists, especially if its participants are orientated towards capitalism. Kollontai ends his argument by saying that the capitalist way of economic development leads to intensification of disparity of economic development and the deepening of contradictions between the participants of such an economic community, for which reason the national specialization of their industries cannot be guaranteed. This, he says, is proof that expansion "of economic relations between the developing countries should not necessarily be taken as a progressive feature." <sup>74/</sup>

Professor N. G. Pospalova does not agree with this. She says in her book that the "creation of regional markets are a means of integrating the economy of the developing countries and of intensifying their anti-imperialist position." <sup>75/</sup>

On this question L. V. Vinogradova emphasizes her opinion that economic integration is an objective process dictated by all the necessities of the development of modern productive forces and of socioeconomic relations in Africa, and that for this reason economic integration should embrace all the key parts of the economy of its member states. <sup>76/</sup> The author remarks further that imperialist countries now and then seek to use the integration process in Africa to their own advantage. <sup>77/</sup> For this reason only an anti-imperialist approach towards economic integration activities of the states of Africa can secure the economic development which will serve the real interests of the people on the continent. <sup>78/</sup> Nevertheless, she says that the integration process causes obstruction to the growth of African nationalism and differentiation in the socioeconomic structure and political orientation of the governments of the African countries. <sup>79/</sup>

Taking nationalism to be the main approach to integration, G. V. Fokeev says that African nationalism is realized only in the external affairs of the states of the continent. For this reason, he says, African nationalism will not in any way obstruct the course of the formation of any union amongst the African countries. <sup>80/</sup> In conclusion the author says that "different social systems or different economic re-orientations would not hinder the creation of an economic community. <sup>81/</sup> A. C. Kodachenko views this problem from a different angle. He suggests that the most effective way for economic cooperation between African countries would be to coordinate the economic plans of the partners. This, he adds, should be done between countries with equal level of economic development and with the same social system and economic

structure.<sup>82/</sup> Further, he says that a "more solid cooperation could exist only between those developing countries which actively fight against neocolonialist tendencies and at the same time institute progressive changes in their social economic structure." <sup>83/</sup> He thus bases his argument solely on the development of productive forces which exist in Africa. On this he says that integration in the developing countries has not been called for by the existing state of the development of productive forces. For this reason there is, he went on "a need for mutual cooperation at state level." <sup>84/</sup> He further points out that the "economic relations which exist between socialist countries and African countries" <sup>85/</sup> are a factor which would help make integration in Africa a success.

## CHAPTER III

## FORMS AND METHODS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

I. Recommended Forms and Methods of Economic Integration in West Africa

The great potentialities of economic cooperation among West African countries and also the contradictions and difficulties that stand in their way determine the principles, methods, and forms of economic integration, which differ fundamentally from those of the integration of the EC countries. Economic relations among these latter countries, while according in some measure with the need for growth of the productive forces, are in present-day conditions an instrument of the further strengthening of capitalism.

This is substantiated by the fact that the collapse of colonialism made it difficult for the former metropolises to have cheap labour and cheap raw materials. There also occurred a change in the balance of force in the world as the result of World War II. For these reasons it became even more difficult for the metropolises to find sufficient venues for the sale of their products, they had no other alternative but to unite in some form of integration. Hence the formation of the EC. In this way the member states of the EC hoped to expand the scope of their market areas. In other words, in the place of the lost market in some of their colonies, the EC member states tried to find a substitute in Europe. The abolition of customs restrictions on transfer of capital and of labour force created favourable conditions for the further development of specialization of production and growth in the international division of labour. The creation of the EC is in effect a creation of more refined intra-European trade.

A great role was played by France and the Federal Republic of Germany in the creation of the EC. The reason for their active participation in creating this intra-European trade organization is economic, demonstrated mainly by

their competitive ability. Obviously France was becoming economically weak as the result of World War II. She had a sharp drop in industrial production as compared with her output just before the war. A great blow to the growth of her economy was the collapse of her colonial system, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and other parts of her colonies having achieved independence. This, of course, deprived her of raw materials. Worse still, the USA, the FRG and other western countries had entered into fierce economic competition in her former colonies and in some territories which were still under her control.

All this put France in a less favourable position and behind the other European countries in the field of capital investment and national development as well as in concentration of production. In 1956 capital investment in national production was 22.4 per cent in the FRG, 24.1 per cent in Italy and 17.3 per cent in France. 86/

If we take a look at the change which occurred in the field of recruitment of labour force, we realize that here, too, France lagged behind the FRG and Italy. If, for example, about one thousand people were employed in a big enterprise in the FRG, about 360 were employed in Italy and roughly 210 were employed in France in a similar enterprise at the same time.

France therefore hoped that by taking part in some form of economic union, she could in some way place the structure of her industries on a better footing and consolidate her position in her remaining colonies so as to expand her export.

As we stated in the previous chapter, an integration process has both economic and political motives. Here, the political motive which led France to take so active a role in the creation of the EC is not missing. It can be divided into two sub-motives. The first was that the fierce struggle between the socialist bloc and the capitalist world necessitated a creation of a strong politico-economic organization in western Europe which would be able to stand up against the ever-increasing economic and political might

of the socialist camp. The second was that France had conceived the idea that by forming such a union, she could have a chance to exercise her hegemony over the other partners of the Community.

This, however, tended to be a miscalculation on her part. FRG's economic potentialities exceeded by far those of France, and the monopolist capitalists in West Germany were also keen and eager to get the European Economic Community formed. Owing to her industrial might, West Germany was also badly in need of foreign markets. She had put all her production efforts after World War II into rebuilding the country, and much more had been produced than was needed for her own internal consumption. So a great hunt for external markets was not only desirable but also imperative.

For this reason West Germany would not object to any idea of a formation of an organization which would give her the external market she so vitally needed. She was really interested in it and considered the Community as a booty of capitalist markets where she could trade. For her there was no better trade venue than the formation of the EEC, especially as there would be no limitation on the import of commodities, investments, services, and capital into the member states.

If the industrial production of the FRG is examined in context with the other member states, it is seen that in 1957 West Germany's production was almost equal to that of all the other member states of the EC taken together.

This was a tendency that could have helped the FRG to acquire economic hegemony in western Europe, including Italy. Italian monopolists, on the other hand, were striving for survival. They had become so weak that they were in dire need of a cooperation that could lead them to a better international division of labour. Other weak member states of the EC also signed the Treaty of Rome on similar grounds.

In short, this is the background against which the EC was formed. It can be seen from this that the general ob-

jective of the member states of the EC in forming the Community was to perpetuate the existing international division of labour.

In contrast, the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the subregion is not a calculated aim of domination of any one country over the other but only a way by which the member countries can change the forcibly imposed division of labour, eliminate their system of unequal economic relations with the industrially developed countries, and lay a new, mutually beneficial basis for international economic relations. This basic difference in the aims and tasks of economic integration between the countries of West Africa on the one side and those of the EC on the other determines the differences in the principles on which the economic relations in these two groups of countries are based.

The ECOWAS is designed to be in keeping with more just and rational standards as embodied in the ten principles proclaimed in the Bandung Declaration (1955), <sup>87/</sup>namely, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states; recognition of the equality of all races and nations, big or small; noninterference in each other's internal affairs; settlement of disputes and international conflicts by peaceful means; abandonment of the policy of pressure on their countries; respect for the basic rights of man; renunciation of the use (or threat of use) of force; promotion of mutual interests and cooperation, etc. <sup>88/</sup>

Economic integration in West Africa, as has been discussed here, is a topic which one cannot mention without also mentioning the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), especially its 1964 session, which recommended the creation of regional economic groupings and integration and other forms of economic cooperation among developing countries as a means of expanding their intraregional trade and also as a means of giving encouragement to their economic growth and the overall development of their industry and agriculture, giving due regard to the

differing economic and social systems prevailing in the various countries. Such cooperation, the 1964 UNCTAD stressed, should be an effective contribution to the economic development of these groupings and should not impede the progress of other developing countries which are not members of such groupings. <sup>89/</sup> These considerations have been the main contributing source to the setting out of the principles for the formation of the ECOWAS. Besides these principles, however, there are still others which have been set forth in official documents and pronouncements by statesmen, public leaders and economists which can be summed up as follows: The developing countries justly insist on their sovereign right freely to enter into commercial and economic relations with one another and freely to dispose of their natural resources in the interest of economic progress and of the well-being of their peoples.

Strict observance of the UN declarations on the inalienable right of the developing countries to freedom and sovereignty over their natural resources, the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, and the elimination of the vestiges of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations is indispensable for the successful development of economic integration among the countries of West Africa in particular and of Africa in general.

Coming back to West Africa proper, some leaders and statesmen there have also expressed their views on the proposed economic integration in that subregion. For example, at a Conference <sup>90/</sup> of experts and jurists from West African countries charged with the task of taking concrete decisions for the formation of the ECOWAS, which was held at the State House in Accra on 11 February 1974 Major Felli, Ghana's Commissioner for Economic Planning, said in addressing the delegates that the people all over West Africa "cry for national self-discovery and for that greatness which is within their reach." He added that Africa had been oppressed, repressed, and manipulated for

too long and should therefore shake off the shackles of the past and move on. Further, the Commissioner said, "We have nothing to lose by coming together but the mess of potage from erstwhile masters and continued dependence and servitude." 91/

Commenting on this, the Ghanaian Times, one of Ghana's dailies, stated in its editorial that the formation of such a union would bring numerous benefits to the member states which hitherto had suffered unstable economies as a result of unfair trade negotiations imposed by the so-called advanced countries. The newspaper pointed out that the formation of a union in West Africa would promote that type of association which would exploit available natural resources there and break down artificial barriers militating against intra-African cooperation. 92/

By virtue of their special position in the western world's economy, cooperation among West African independent states has some peculiarities which reflect on the complexities and contradictions of the existing socioeconomic conditions. West Africa consists of countries with different levels of economic development and different political orientation. Also, it embraces classes, social groups and forces that differ in ideology as well as in political and economic views. Some of these classes and groups are anti-imperialist in character though this does not preclude the existence among sociopolitical forces and the people in authority of a difference of opinion as regards the ways development in these young states should take, especially as far as principles, methods, and forms of economic cooperation are concerned. Official circles in the countries that have embarked on independent national economic development, as Ghana once did and Guinea is doing now, see in natural cooperation an instrument for curbing foreign capital and for furthering economic progress. They hold the view that the disbanding of puppet groupings and a withdrawal from trade and currency unions with their metropolitan powers is a prerequisite of this progress and that the idea of economic cooperation can materialize only

when there is genuine desire on the part of the nations that form it.

States that are politically and economically dependent on foreign powers or states in which unfortunately power happens to be in the hands of pro-imperialist elements are not nearly so consistent. They always favour a sort of a cooperation which will not cause a change in their economic relations with the imperialist powers. Most of the ruling circles in such countries, especially the Middle Class, are somehow connected with foreign capital and for that reason do not want to or cannot agree to any restriction of the activities of foreign monopolies in West Africa. Because of class interest, influential circles among the bourgeoisie in these countries often seek to compromise with foreign capitalists in the hope that these capitalists will help them extend and bolster their positions. In some cases the national bourgeoisie lets itself into direct deals with foreign monopolists, a practice which is widely met with in some West African countries. All this creates difficulties, and it is because of these difficulties and differences that the ECOWAS cannot be a carbon copy of the EC in form and in methods.

Although the East European counterpart of the EC, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), best known in the West as the Comecon, is said to be based "on the principles of voluntary participation and full equality, respect for sovereignty and national interests, mutual benefit, and comradely mutual assistance," <sup>93/</sup> it has its own peculiarities which are not met in West Africa. For this reason the form and methods of West African economic integration cannot be the same as those of the CMEA.

Although forms and methods of cooperation are specific to each region and country and even to each economic branch of a given state and can only be evolved in the process of the formation of the cooperation itself, there are certain general standards for gauging to what extent certain methods and forms are in the interest of economic progress.

A view prevalent among the leaders of West African countries is that conditions that exist on the capitalist world market make protectionism an inevitable satellite of co-operation. G. Myrdal wrote: "In a sense, the underdeveloped countries, once they embark on economic development, just have to be protectionist if they do not want to forsake it." 24/

True, there is a fairly strong body of opinion among western economists favouring a free trade policy. There are others, too, who call for trade blocs and integration and who consider also that continued close economic interdependence between young states and their former "parent" countries is a guarantee of the former's progress. Hence, free movement of commodities, services, capital and manpower is, they hold, essential to the normal functioning of the "natural" international division of labour and to the building of an efficient economy in the developing world. In his international development plan Professor J. Tinbergen of the Netherlands thus urges the two worlds to unite in a kind of global common market. Organization of such a market embracing the most important branches and providing for the establishment of a coordinated system of investment could constitute, in Tinbergen's opinion, one of the principal tasks of the United Nations.

Wide publicity has been given to theories designed to substantiate such views "scientifically." One of these theories is that of comparative costs, according to which the existing international division of labour has taken shape and is developing on the basis of comparative production costs, with every country producing and exporting those goods which give it the greatest advantage over other countries, i.e., which are produced at the lowest cost. This, it is claimed, results in the most rational international division of labour and in the optimal specialization of countries. According to the exponents of this theory, the present system of international economic relations is beneficial to all countries, the developing ones included. As for the lopsidedness of their economies, their speciali-

zation on the production of agricultural and industrial raw materials, the explanation offered is that these countries have "advantages" over the western powers in these fields. From this it is inferred that it would be economically unprofitable for them to develop other branches of their economy.

In reality, the level of production costs is not something constant, bestowed by nature. In the case of the developing countries it is directly influenced by this very raw material specialization which has been thrust upon them by their former metropolises. It is precisely the domination of foreign capital by the former metropolises which hampers industrialization and which consequently raises the production costs of manufactured goods.

The theory of comparative production costs is employed by the apologists of neocolonialism to vindicate and perpetuate the international division of labour that exists in the capitalist world. It is again employed to keep the developing countries permanent agrarian and raw material appendages.

This theory, which places much importance on the regulatory role of market anarchy, does not conform to the socio-economic conditions now prevailing in the newly freed countries. Their cooperation cannot be left at the mercy of the vicissitudes of the "free market." "Free trade" is profitable only to the economically advanced countries with approximately the same levels of development. For this reason, the principle of reciprocity underlying "free trade," or the most-favoured-nation treatment, is unsuitable to the West African countries at present; because of the disparity of economic levels, it places them at a disadvantage with respect to the economically developed nations.

The advocates of "free trade" say that by lifting tariff restrictions the young states would boost their trade with the West. But West African countries are interested only in such increase in trade as would further their economic progress. "Unconditional relaxation of import restrictions," a UN survey points out, "whether on all im-

ports or only on goods originating within a region, would increase trade, but removing protection to infant industries might set back industrial progress in underdeveloped countries." 95/

Of late, monopoly circles in the West have been pushing on West African countries the idea of "common markets" with the participation of the big powers. In his recently published book "Functionalism and World Politics," which represents a trend typical of western ideologies James P. Sewell insists on the economic integration of the young states with the western countries. The political purpose behind such theories can readily be seen.

Having failed in their policy of enmeshing the developing countries in their military political blocs, some former metropolises now pin their hopes on trade and economic alliances. But here their record isn't impressive either, because the young states have already realized that any form of association with any power opens the floodgates to imperialist expansion, which in turn will endanger their economic development. Addressing a meeting of the UNCTAD Council in August of 1967, Dr. P. Prebisch, former Secretary-General of this Organization, strongly criticized the practice of "association" of the developing countries with the developed countries through the establishment of preferential tariffs. He said that the vertical division of the world by means of preferential system, tying North America to western Europe and Latin American countries to the United States, could only result in the political domination of economically advanced northern states over southern countries through agreements by which preferential treatment is granted to the former. One cannot but agree with Dr. Prebisch. In the same vein it has to be added that participation of the former metropolises in trade and economic groupings of developing countries like the ECOWAS will only lead to the emergence of a still worse form of neocolonialism, to the appearance of economic empires in place of the collapsed political ones.

This is exactly what the metropolises' "aid" to their former colonies sets out to achieve. In his message on foreign aid submitted to Congress in February 1967 ex-President Lyndon Johnson wrote that henceforth US aid would be dispensed mostly on a regional basis with a view to furthering economic integration and progress. This reminds us of Jawaharlal Nehru's words to the effect that the European Common Market might prove a more potent means of controlling underdeveloped countries than those which were employed when every colonial power exercised undivided rule over its colonies. <sup>96/</sup>

Because most developing countries see with increasing clarity that "free trade" theory and practice is little more than a form of neocolonialism, some authors in the developed countries are devising new strategies. One is the theory of the division of labour and specialization of developed and developing countries. Its advocates not only raise no objection to protectionism and integration in the interests of industrialization but declare themselves in favour of the preservation of customs duties and other regulatory means on condition that a "favourable" climate is created for foreign investors and that spheres of production and markets are divided between the developed and the developing countries. These ideas, known as the "theory of twofold integration," are expounded most fully in the works of two French economists, F. Perroux and E. Roche.

The main aims of such theories are twofold, namely, political and economic. What is the political aim? Since the process of integration is now going on in varying degree everywhere in the developing world, some authors consider the support of integration a political necessity. At the same time, however, they try to steer the young states along the road of the economic formation of their countries and thus prevent the consolidation of national economic formation. The economic motivation is to make this development beneficial to their states.

The principle of "free trade" is equally unacceptable in the relations of the West African countries with developed countries, East or West. Many countries, economists, statesmen, and politicians, while agreeing with the need for West Africa to take protectionist measures with regard to the economically developed countries, consider that within the developing countries the principle of free trade should be applied. Free trade and competition, they assert, will make for the most effective economic growth. Accordingly, some press organs are also urging the young states to unite in "common markets" which must fully conform to the capitalist economic methods and forms.

Favourable conditions for foreign capital are presented as being vital to economic progress within the framework of "common markets," and "free trade" zones are supported to the extent to which they facilitate economic expansion. During his visit to Africa in 1962, former US Assistant Secretary of State L. M. Williams hailed plans for an African common market which, he said, was essential if that continent was to attract capital for the development of modern industry. Commenting on this, the African press noted that in Mr. William's opinion western investors would prefer to sink funds in Africa as a whole rather than in a country with a limited market.

All this is not to say that as things now stand, "common markets" and "free trade" zones in the developing world are entirely devoid of progressive aspects. Economic contacts between young states, even on the principles of a "free" capitalist market, raise them a stage higher as compared with the old economic disunity and antiquated forms of running the economy and provide some scope for the development of the productive forces. That is why "common markets" and "free trade" zones, sometimes supplemented with special agreements on furthering industrialization, appear to be the most widely favoured form of trade and economic association for West African countries.

Yet it is obvious that cooperation based on capitalist competition will not contribute much and indeed may do harm to the progress of the young states. The logic of history is such that capitalist forms, although most widespread at present, hold out poor prospects for the solution of long-range problems. The weak development of productive forces and the existence of precapitalist formations keep down the efficiency of the market mechanism and the price mechanism in particular. In contrast to developed capitalist countries, where prices play an important part in the regulation of the economy, West African countries cannot rely on prices to stimulate a rational reallocation of national resources.

In developed countries, where effective demand is the principal factor bearing on economic growth, integration spurs growth on by expanding the market and increasing effective demand. In the case of West African countries, economic advance is determined not by demand but chiefly by supply, by the scale of production, and development there is predicated on capital accumulation and investments. Although it removes impediments to the growth of effective demand, free trade does not solve the problem of supply and of expanding production. ECAFE experts were quite right in saying that "mechanical application of the principle of trade liberalization as embodied in the integration schemes in western Europe will be of limited practicability and significance to the developing ECAFE region."  
27/ This applies equally to the countries of West Africa.

With an unplanned market it is impossible to control and direct the economic development of the new independent countries along rational lines. The reciprocal lifting of restrictions within economic groupings gives free rein to market forces and thereby sharply intensifies competition which, as is known, damages the existing economic structure and accentuates disparities in the development not only of separate economic branches but also of the whole economy of the countries concerned. Moreover, countries which are further developed economically begin to attract capital

and manpower from lesser developed ones. This is but one of the causes of the drawn-out crisis of the East African Common Market of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Or let us take the example of the Central American Common Market (CACM). Since "common market" and "free trade" zones prevent the establishment within the CACM of a mechanism of equitable distribution of benefits accruing from mutual cooperation, Salvador has come to be the principal beneficiary, while Honduras, the least developed country of the CACM members, like Tanzania in the EACM, feels wronged and thus demands a revision of the CACM Agreement.

As we have seen, cooperation within economic groupings cannot thrive under conditions of "free market" anarchy. Hence the pressing need for such economic regulators as would benefit all the participants and help elevate the level of economic development instead of deepening disparities. In the opinion of some circles in West Africa, protectionist measures strictly selected for each country could serve as such a regulator. But these measures can be effective only if there is a genuine comprehensive cooperation among the states concerned. The joint implementation of such measures within an intra-subregional organization would stimulate the development of further economic branches in the member countries more actively than could similar measures taken by individual countries.

But while protectionism in relations among West African states on the one side and between them and the developed countries on the other creates only general conditions for their economic growth, more effective impetus to cooperation could be provided by preferential regimes covering separate branches of the economy or the whole complex of their external contacts. It must be agreed that preferences reciprocally granted by the West African states among themselves should not be extended to developed countries, East or West.

A major achievement of the 1964 UNCTAD session was its rejection of the principle of reciprocity in relations between developing countries and developed countries and the recognition of the former's right to conclude preferential agreements to the exclusion of the latter. Following this rejection GATT also gave up its old dogmas and agreed to allow such preferential treatment in the interest of economic cooperation.

As has been noted above, economic relations between the West African countries cannot make any real progress unless there is a favourable political climate, a certain minimum of mutual confidence, and a sincere desire for cooperation. Such conditions understandably cannot be created overnight.

Professor Adebayo Adedeji <sup>98/</sup> of Nigeria says it is an "evolution of an economic community in West Africa" and that "a pragmatic approach should be adopted." He further stresses that an economic community must be regarded as an organic entity which should be allowed to grow over a number of years. <sup>99/</sup> A similar viewpoint is also expressed by the Daily Graphic of Ghana: "In our view, it is already unfortunate that divisive forces tend to make it difficult to form one continental economic union with one stroke; so we hold that the opportunities for at least forming regional blocs should not be wasted on the formation of splinter groups like the CEA0, which now is a grouping of only a few French-speaking states in West Africa." <sup>100/</sup> All this substantiates the fact that the road leading to the formation of a real economic organization is pretty long.

However, the way to successful cooperation lies in curbing foreign capital. It is for this reason that we have to note that no extension of economic contacts between the countries of West Africa can be regarded as a step towards economic independence as long as the key branches of their economies remain under foreign control. But curbing and ousting foreign capital requires time, because definite socioeconomic conditions must ripe for this.

There are other no less complex and long-standing problems directly or indirectly related to the very process of the organization of economic contacts. For instance, the removal of trade barriers is inexpedient as long as trade policies towards third countries have not been harmonized. The only result of such liberalization would be to enable third countries to increase their export to West Africa.

The present level of economic exchange in the subregion is still low, and complete liberalization of trade will not raise it appreciably until the national economic complexes have become complementary to a sufficient degree and large enough quantities of goods and services are offered in exchange.

At this juncture we have to point out that Professor Adedeji was correct in stating that "the acute problem of poverty in Africa more than emphasizes the economic truism that the populations within our national boundaries are too small and the levels of income too low to sustain modern viable economies." <sup>101/</sup> This means that only coordinated development of production will constitute a truly solid basis for mutual cooperation.

A serious obstacle to cooperation in West Africa is the absence of a well developed transport system. However, a more extensive transport system would be economically expedient only if their intra-trade were active enough.

In conclusion it must be pointed out that the present level of development of productive forces in the countries of West Africa is absolutely inadequate for a full integration which would bring together the economic life of all the fifteen countries of this subregion. Much could be achieved if the group were to work out common customs and immigration regulations, an industrial harmonization project, a common agricultural policy, an agreement on monetary and financial transactions, special infrastructural links, a well-defined subregional division of labour, and a trade liberalization system. Great care is needed in doing this; such liberalization should not be limited to a lowering of customs barriers nor should it be accorded

to any country or a group of countries which are not members of the ECOWAS.

Perhaps more beneficial to the countries of the subregion would be close coordination of the trade policies of the partners with their industrial policies so that trade liberalization could not impair their industrial development. Similarly, if there were an agreement to a certain degree on the division of labour, then protectionism could be instituted by each member country. This, however, has to be confined to well-defined economic branches of the member countries.

A special committee could also be established to study the markets of the member countries. It could be charged with the responsibility of conducting research on the EC and the CMEA with a view to formulating a concrete programme for regulating to some extent imports of the ECOWAS member countries. This undoubtedly would slow down the growth of ineffective industries.

In the light of what has been discussed above, the most appropriate form of economic cooperation between the countries of the West African subregion, in view of the complexity and diversity of the problems involved, appears to be a coordination of economic development plans and programmes, whereby inter-subregional contacts should not be overlooked.

## II. The Part Played by OAU and ECA in Creating the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Although the OAU always had a favourable attitude towards the creation of subregional economic communities, its formal blessing on regional economic cooperation was actually given at the first Conference of the Economic and Social Commission, held in Niamey in 1963. At that conference the Economic and Social Commission approved the comprehensive plan which the ECA had prepared for economic development in Africa. In this connection special contact was established with the ECA and several joint

meetings were held to seek more practical ways of developing the economy of Africa and effecting economic cooperation between African countries.

One of the most significant results of these meetings was the establishment of an African development bank, an important economic instrument for African integration.

Abruptly, however, both the OAU and its Economic and Social Commission decreased their efforts in the interest of inter-African economic cooperation. The cause of such an action is not specifically known, but it is attributed to the deterioration of the political situation in Africa and also to some misunderstandings which have evolved within the OAU itself.

The OAU ceased to be active in this field in 1964, and so from that time up to 1966 the problem of economic cooperation was put on the shoulders of the ECA. But the passiveness of such an authoritative organization as the OAU could not fail to have an effect on the calculated objective, i.e., the formation of subregional organizations for economic integration in Africa. The OAU had given a warm reception to a continent-wide economic cooperation but a cool reception to subregional economic groupings, reasoning that subregional groupings were nothing but the work of the metropolises and would not help the course of continent-wide economic integration. In the eyes of the OAU, subregional groupings were nothing but imperialist and neocolonialist intrigues against African unity. Hence the cool reception given to the subregional economic cooperations. As a result of this position taken by the OAU, the process of subregional economic cooperation started to develop outside its walls.

However, this did not last long, for the OAU sensed the dangers involved in allowing subregional economic groupings to go their own way; that was a trend which could have sooner or later brought about the collapse of the OAU itself. For this reason the OAU changed its position. At the Tenth Session of its Council of Ministers Conference in

1967 a decision was adopted by which virtual approval was given to the formation of subregional economic units on the continent. Early in 1968 the OAU prepared and distributed throughout Africa a document on market integration. In that document the individual economic unions that were in existence on the continent were reviewed and the need to accelerate the process of economic integration there was stressed.

In addition the OAU suggested some ways through which mutual economic relations could be developed. The main idea behind this move by the OAU was to cover up the passive attitude it had taken against the formation of subregional economic cooperation in Africa and to explore a convincing avenue to get control over the various economic groupings on the continent which had already gained root.

Unlike the OAU, the ECA has always actively supported the formation of subregional economic communities in Africa. The ECA has also taken an active role in working out concrete plans as to which form the cooperation should be. It is, therefore, important to mention in this regard that the ECA has taken many practical steps to help make this endeavour a success. At its third session the ECA adopted a special resolution on the formation of a Permanent Committee for Trade and at its fourth session it adopted another resolution on the creation of a Permanent Committee for Natural Resources and Industrialization. Also, a suggestion was made to the Executive Secretary to conduct a research study on the main problems which exist in African markets. That is still not the end, for at all the ECA's subsequent sessions the question of intra-African cooperation was discussed. It was rightly said in an economic review prepared to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the ECA that the working out of the forms and the direction of economic cooperation in Africa had been a main objective of the organization for the past ten years. 102/

The ECA has always supported and still supports economic integration established on the following basis: 1) for-

mation of integrational economic units with the participation of several countries; 2) unification of these units to form a subregional community; and 3) fusion of all these subregional communities to form a continent-wide economic unity. Efforts to realize this objective are increasingly being made by the ECA through research on the technicalities of the feasibility of cooperation on industrial plans, transport systems and on trade and monetary policies of the subregion. At the same time the ECA takes into consideration the different conditions which prevail in these subregions as well as those which exist in the individual countries.

Although it would be premature to assert that the ECA has been completely successful, its plans have borne fruit. For it was the ECA which laid the foundation of subregional economic cooperation on the continent. Furthermore, the ECA has popularized the idea of economic cooperation among the countries of the continent through conferences, seminars, and intra-African forums. A committee consisting of Africans has now been formed under the auspices of the ECA which works actively on this problem. Up to now the most important aspect of African economic cooperation has been the working out of a coordination policy in the sphere of industrialization. This is undoubtedly being done by the ECA. Industrialization in Africa is important. This fact was clearly underlined at the 1966 Cairo Symposium on Industrial Development of Africa. At that symposium the late Tom Mboya, the then Kenya's Minister for Economic Development and Planning, remarked that industries should play the same role in Africa as they have done elsewhere in raising the living standard and in providing occupation for the people. "We have to denounce those who come to tell us that our future depends solely on agriculture. In this vein we have to reject those who are trying to convince us that Africa is not yet ripe for industrial development. We have to plan that type of economy which would support and strengthen one another." 103/

As the case is, the international markets of most of the African countries are limited to the building of big profit-making enterprises. This, however, is not a matter of official policy. It only highlights one of the needs for cooperation. In this context it must be mentioned that almost all African countries admit that establishing modern industries on the basis of small national markets is possible only with the cooperation or the participation of other countries, i.e., in the form of a kind of a union. Thus, having paved the way for the creation of industries in Africa, the ECA seized the opportunity of engaging in propaganda on comprehensive and complex industrial development of a subregional nature. The ECA Secretariat is arguing that a market zone has already been formed in each of the subregions, and this argument is being supported by stressing that density of population, transport connections, monetary systems, and historically evolved ties in the regions are all factors which contribute significantly towards the creation of big industrial complexes.<sup>104/</sup>

With the swing towards industrialization, the ECA initiated a tentative programme of industrial development by sending a special mission to different African countries to undertake research and compile documents. The special mission visited 27 countries of West, East and Central Africa.<sup>105/</sup> Their findings helped the ECA to prepare industrial plans for the subregions and for the continent, as mentioned above.

Specialists of the ECA attentively studied the subregions to determine the possibility of constructing big industries in each of them. They did this by examining local, regional, and national market demands. The result was a success, for they were able to determine which items of goods would be in great demand on the all-African market. Paper, coffee, chemicals, rubber, glass, and textiles were the goods recommended for subregional trade; commodities like fertilizers, sugar, and cement were recommended for trade between not less than two countries. From this it can be seen that some African countries have min-

eral resources which can help them construct industries for their internal consumption but that they need the cooperation of other countries if they are to embark on big industrial projects.

The ECA has organized many useful conferences and symposia, but the one which contributed most towards economic cooperation among countries in Africa was the Cairo Symposium on Industrial Development which we have already mentioned. At that symposium concrete steps were taken towards building the foundation of cooperation in the industrial field, coordinating national plans through a specially formed organ for subregional economic integration, establishing a unitary transport system, and instituting a tax system which could help widen the scope of the possibilities of financing the projects of the countries concerned from their own resources.

From 18 to 23 December 1973 a Second Session of the Conference of African Ministers of Industry was held, again in Cairo. The Conference adopted a sound Declaration which responded to the domestic needs of the African countries. The key theme of the Declaration was the need to promote intra-African trade. It was stressed that the infrastructure required for development transactions among African countries was to be expanded in a spirit of solidarity in order to create a viable African economic bloc.

The need for African self-reliance was also envisaged in the Declaration. It is stated that any intra-African cooperation should be aimed at the creation of large-scale multinational industries and export industries and that such a self-reliance objective could be achieved only by way of technical and financial cooperation among the countries concerned. This intra-African multinational enterprise approach was indicated by the Declaration to be the appropriate instrument for creating multinational industries and eliminating the market limitations imposed on certain projects. The Declaration calls upon African governments to initiate consultations on multinational projects.

The conference decided to set up a "committee comprising the bureau of the conference and the sponsoring organizations, i.e., the OAU, the ECA and the UNIDO, to ensure the follow-up of implementation of resolutions and decisions of the conference in between the meetings of the conference and report on progress made in implementing the recommendations set out in the Declaration at the next conference of African Ministers of Industry in 1957." 106/

The Declaration further set forth some basic principles and guidelines for cooperation and development in Africa. Here special attention was paid to the strengthening of the link between agriculture and industry, the formation of clearly defined long-term industrialization strategy and plans, the establishment or strengthening or supporting of institutions to provide or undertake industrial financing investments and promotion services, etc.

Another recommendation was made covering the fields of export promotion, the integration of African industries, investment promotion by the creation and strengthening of investment promotion machinery within the framework of a policy of African self-reliance, and technical as well as financial cooperation at continental level.

This Declaration on industrialization in Africa 107/ is not the only good fruit of the conferences which the ECA has participated in sponsoring. In conjunction with its Second Conference of Ministers, ECA organized about 71 confidential and non-committal bilateral consultations in 1973 in which about thirty-two African countries participated. Another meeting which was held in Dakar under its auspices recommended the establishment of an African Purchasing and Supplies Association. The ECA has also taken many fruitful initiatives in the Trans-African Highway Project, a move which will help develop the transport facilities on the continent.

### III. The Economic Community of West African States and Its Evolution

Ever since the division of Africa into subregions the ECA has been making many moves to forge economic groupings in the subregions, including West Africa. Such moves include the Lagos Conference on Industrial Coordination in Africa, held in November 1963; the Niamey Conference on Economic Cooperation, held in October 1966; and the conference held in Accra in 1967 at which some articles of association for the establishment of an economic community of West Africa were signed.

At the Accra Conference an Interim Council of Ministers was established and charged with the task of preparing a draft treaty for the proposed community. Dakar was chosen as the first venue for the meeting of the Interim Council of Ministers, which took place in November 1967. The ministers agreed that the inaugural meeting of the proposed community should take place at the level of Heads of State.

Before the meeting of the Interim Council of Ministers there had been another meeting of Heads of State of the Organization of Senegalese River States in Bamako, Mali, at which they expressed their intention to extend their cooperation through the creation of a regional group embracing the whole of the West African subregion. To this end the Heads of State mandated one of their members, the President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, to let the other leaders of the subregion know about the decision they had taken to expand their organization to embrace the whole of West Africa so as to create an economic community.

The President took his mission seriously in accordance with the mandate given him. As a result, a Conference of Heads of State was held in Monrovia in April 1968, at which a protocol was signed to establish the West African Economic Community. In addition to this, Guinea and Nigeria were given the mandate to prepare priority studies of areas of cooperation. At the same time, Senegal and Liberia were charged with the task of preparing a draft treaty and a protocol on a customs union for the community.

In carrying out their assignment, representatives of Guinea and Nigeria met in Lagos in June 1968. In November of that year they held another meeting, this time in Conakry, where they prepared a report which was later submitted to the fourteen West African countries for study pending its consideration by the Interim Council of Ministers. But unfortunately the Interim Council of Ministers never met, for which reason neither the priority studies nor the draft treaty and the protocol on the customs union have been discussed.

The success of the Monrovia Conference of Heads of State fell well under the level expected: of the fourteen countries in the subregion, five (Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, Dahomey, and Sierra Leone) did not attend.

The reasons for their failure to attend the Conference varied. Sierra Leone had just had a coup d'etat and so a consolidation of the position of the coup-makers was more urgent. In Dahomey there was friction in the Government, and that was the immediate concern of the leaders there. The Ivory Coast, on the other hand, did not attend because, as was officially explained, "the whole project was being rushed." But it later became known that this country did not attend because France did not sanction the Meeting in fear that the grouping could be dominated by the Anglo-Saxons. The reason why Togo and Niger did not attend cannot be specifically stated, but it would not be very far from right to assume that the same external force that prevented Ivory Coast from attending prevented them also.

After the conference these countries never showed any signs that they were interested. The efforts which the other nine countries had made to call the Monrovia Conference were also dying. Indeed, the whole idea of forming an economic community in that subregion was fading away. But there were two countries which would not give up optimism. In April 1972, therefore, the Heads of State of these countries, Nigeria and Togo, made yet another attempt to revive the whole process of establishing the

economic community. This time there was significant success, because as the result of the efforts of these leaders all fourteen countries, including Ivory Coast, attended the Conference, this time held in Lomé, Togo.

Togo, which had boycotted the 1968 conference for the formation of the community not only attended this time but was a cosponsor of the meeting. Dahomey and Niger, which had sided with Ivory Coast in boycotting the Monrovia Conference, also turned new pages. They openly renounced the formation of any union in the subregion without Ghana and Nigeria.

The wind of change was blowing towards unity, and it appears it did catch President Senghor when he said that it was regrettable that there had not been progress on the formation of a West African economic community of both Anglophones and Francophones. <sup>108/</sup> It can only be assumed that M. Senghor was not speaking against his conscience when he said this. Anyway, whether he was sincere in his words or not, Senegal did attend the Lomé Conference, which was designed to expand the embryonic community formed by Togo and Nigeria.

At the conference some proposals which the sponsors of the conference had duly and carefully prepared were used as the basic document of the proposed economic community. The document said among other things that any economic community formed in West Africa should aim at eliminating linguistic and cultural barriers which exist in that subregion. The document further said that any approach to the formation of the community should be pragmatic; membership in the community should be left wide open to all the states of the subregion. The Senegal-Ivory Coast-sponsored Communauté Economique d'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) did just the opposite.

Besides these proposals, there were others on the possible structure as well as on the scope of activities of the community. One important point which the document did not fail to mention was that the subregion's economic com-

munity should "be regarded as an organic entity which should be allowed to grow over a number of years." 109/

The document pointed out certain areas where cooperation and success could be achieved. Trade liberalization, customs and immigration, industrial harmonization, agriculture, monetary and financial matters, and infrastructural links were noted to be the possible areas.

The main elements agreed upon at the Conference made up almost all that was stated in the document. The Lomé Conference was attended by Liberia, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Cameroon, and Ghana. It was decided that a meeting of jurists and experts would be held in Accra, Ghana in January 1974 to formulate in more precise form the ideas agreed upon for the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It was further decided that the results of the work of these jurists and experts should be submitted to a Ministerial Meeting for consideration to be held in Niamey, Niger, in March 1974. Finally, a document for the community was to be adopted at a Conference of Heads of States and Government, to be held in Lagos, Nigeria.

The Accra Meeting of jurists and experts did not come on in January as scheduled. It took place later, from 11 to 15 February 1974. It was opened by Major R. J. A. Felli, Ghana's Commissioner for Economic Planning. In his address the Major advised the delegates to take concrete decisions towards the formation of the ECOWAS but to "refrain from weaving theories and expanding philosophies on common markets. Your simple mundane task is to give precise form to the articles of a treaty which will translate the expressed collective will of your leaders and peoples towards the formation of an ECOWAS." The Major emphasized that West Africa could no longer look across the sea towards Europe for economic salvation. 110/

The Meeting was attended by Nigeria, Dahomey, Togo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Gambia, and Ghana. Mali, Senegal, Niger, Upper Volta, Mauritania and Ivory Coast, all belonging to the CEAO, were not there, at least not for the opening session. It was for this reason that Colonel Acheampong, Head of State and Chairman of the National Redemption Council of Ghana, said in his address to the leaders of the delegations that "we unite economically or we perish." He regretted that it had not been possible for certain West African countries to attend.

Nevertheless, although the absence of these countries is regretted, one thing which should be noted is that there has been a breakthrough of the myth which had surrounded the problems of the formation of the community. For considering the territorial areas of each of the two sponsors, Togo and Nigeria, their populations, official languages, the growth of their economies, their annual incomes, and their monetary systems, one cannot help but say that "if the political will is there, economic cooperation" 111/ between West African countries as a subregion can be possible. President Eyadema of Togo was quite right when, in opening the first Ministerial Council Meeting in Lomé, he said that "with determination and mutual understanding among member states as well as willingness to make the necessary sacrifices there is reason to be optimistic about the future success of the proposed community. 112/

When the political will is not there, then language problems do serve as obstacles. West Africa has two main languages, French and English. Besides these there is the Hausa language, which is widely spoken everywhere. Furthermore, other languages do not confine themselves to one country. For example, Akan is spoken in Ghana and in Ivory Coast. Ewe is spoken in Ghana, in Togo, and also in Dahomey. Yoruba is also spoken in Dahomey and in Nigeria. Moreover, intermarriages have been going on for a long time between peoples of different countries. Most of the Blanksons and Mensas in Nigeria hail from Ghana; in the same way most of the Bandeles and Musas in Ghana hail from

Nigeria. Servis and Akvasivis naturally hail from Togo as well as from the Volta region in Ghana. <sup>113/</sup> If one were to call the name "Kofi" in Ivory Coast, many people would answer to it. Many people would do the same in Ghana and in Togo as well.

All this indicates that the official languages, which happen to be English, French, and perhaps Portuguese if Guinea Bissau joins the Community, should not give cause for disunity. After all the EC nations speak about seven different languages and nevertheless have been able to accommodate themselves in a healthy framework of a community which can be considered as one of the best organized economic communities in the world.

Languages have not been an obstacle to the formation of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) among the socialist countries either. Nor were the different monetary systems and the different levels of the economies of those countries, ranging from Cuba's level as a developing country up to that of the USSR, the world's second economically and industrially most developed nation.

Considering all these points, one can hardly ignore the fact that the "political will" which should stimulate co-operation tendencies is not to be found among the leaders of West African countries, hence the delay in forming the ECOWAS.

In the light of this, it becomes difficult to agree with Dr. Adebayo Adedeji, who, in explaining why economic co-operation of West African countries had been most elusive in the past, said: "The reasons for the failures of the past attempts have been due to the fact that we have hitherto tried to build a closely knit economic community when we have not yet acquired the experience of working closely together. We have adopted a 'wholistic' approach which has required all the fourteen countries to be members at one go and for all levels and types of economic cooperation

to be embarked upon at the same time. Indeed, we were trying to run before we have learnt the intricacies of walking." 114/

When the political will is there, the number of states which found an organization is secondary. And again, regardless of number, no progress on the formation of such an organization can be achieved in the absence of (at least implied) political will. It is this that holds the key to any form of cooperation. Again it is this which urges two or more states to acquire the experience of working closely together. How can countries work closely together when one only of them wants to? How can Dr. Adebayo talk about working closely together when the country for which he serves as the Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction was not even for the sake of courtesy invited to the Bamako CEAO Conference as an observer?

Nevertheless, the Commissioner later put the train on the correct track by saying: "We are calling on the states of West Africa to come together to form a meaningful organization devoted to the pursuit of genuine cooperation based on equality and on the principle that each member would contribute its own quota. It is our belief that the time has come when we must explore new and dynamic methods to give meaning and content to West African economic cooperation. With the necessary political will, discipline, and dedication, no barrier is insurmountable." 115/

It is important here to make some analysis of the role which the ECOWAS is to play in the life of the economies of its members. To begin with, it must be stated that when the ECOWAS is properly formed and constituted, it will serve as the legal foundation of the international division of labour which is to exist between the fourteen countries. This can help solve many problems in West Africa in particular and in Africa in general. General Yakubu Gowon, the Head of State of Nigeria, was right in his observation when he said that "regional economic groupings or a wider continental grouping in Africa would afford

greater protection for products and exports from African states." 116/ International division of labour there will help to foster intra-African economic relations.

Dr. J. E. Adetoro had this to say on the subject: "The West African Economic Community will offer to the people of the subregion an unprecedented opportunity for closer cooperation in harnessing national resources for the good of the people." 117/

The Ghanaian Times went even further in its editorial comment saying that "the formation of such a union would bring numerous benefits to the member states which hitherto had suffered unstable economies as a result of unfair trade negotiations by the so-called advanced countries." The paper concluded by saying that the formation of the union would promote the type of association that would exploit available natural resources in West Africa and break down artificial barriers militating against intra-African cooperation. 118/

All these are optimistic views of the proposed community. There is still a lot to be done. The countries in the sub-region should learn to do away with selfishness. They must have the stimulus to sacrifice and they must have the courage to understand themselves. Without trust, sacrifice, and political will based on mutual respect and understanding, the proposed ECOWAS can not succeed. In this context President Diori Hamani of Niger was right when he said: "Our cooperation when it gets off the ground implies sacrifice of our immediate selfish interests in favour of a long-term advantage." 119/

## CHAPTER IV

## POTENTIAL OBSTACLES AND DIFFICULTIES FACING THE ECOWAS

I. Influence of the European Community on the Member States of ECOWAS

Since many books, pamphlets, and articles have been written on the structure, activities and history of the European Community (EC), we shall concern ourselves in this chapter mainly with the impact of the EC on the formation of the ECOWAS; in so doing, we shall endeavour to point out the influence which the former has so far had on the latter. Analysis of this impact is inevitable because all the independent countries of the subregion <sup>120/</sup> have joined hands with the other member countries of the OAU <sup>121/</sup> to negotiate commonly with the EC for a new status of cooperation.

There are, however, eighteen Francophone countries that have been already associated with the EC under the terms of the Yaoundé Conventions. There are also three Anglophone countries of East Africa, namely, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, that have been associated with the EC under the Arusha Agreement.

The main difference between these two types of association is that the Yaoundé Convention is of greater scale than the Arusha Agreement. The reason for this difference is that France, being one of the founding members of the EC and at the same time one of its most powerful members, exerted influence on the other members to secure some favourable concessions for her former colonies. Despite the many attempts which France has made to conceal the fact that the African associated countries lose much more than they gain from the EC, it has been brought to light that of the 25 countries that have been classified as the "least developed" eight were associated to the EC, and of these eight, <sup>122/</sup> four—Dahomey, Mali, Niger and Upper Volta—are in the West African subregion. Their annual per capita income is considerably below US\$ 100. <sup>123/</sup> This is obviously

too little to enable these countries to engage in industrial development. It is principally against this background that the Vice President of the Supreme Military Council of Niger, Major Sami Souma Sisso, said at a news conference that some countries, including France, had placed very large sums of money at his country's disposal for development. As an example, he cited that the People's Republic of China had offered Niger an interest-free loan of 12,000 CFA francs. The Vice President said: "These are indeed very large sums of money, but they are not enough for our country's development." <sup>124/</sup> It could be argued that the least developed countries have been suffering from the effects of the drought, but such an explanation, as nice as it may sound, is unacceptable because there are other associate countries, for example Burundi and Rwanda, which are not affected by the drought but have also been listed among the "least developed" by UNCTAD.

It is no wonder that superficial observers have attributed the cause of poverty of these countries to drought, being landlocked (some), subsistence farming, cattle husbandry, colonial monoculture, etc. The disadvantages to these countries resulting from association with the EC, however, have somehow been overlooked. But this is what must be taken into consideration first, even before the drought; for what is possible to do must be done before anything else. As the saying goes, artificial disasters, unlike natural ones, can be overcome easily. For this reason the artificial disasters created by the EC countries could have been overcome by them. Unfortunately, this has not been the case; on the contrary, the EC member countries have now and then been aggravating the deterioration of the economies of these West African countries. It is because of this that both Yaoundé Conventions as well as the Arusha Agreement must be critically reviewed in this chapter.

To begin with, the word "association" means nothing more than a form of special political and economic relations between the EC members and the African countries which have

this status. These relations cover all aspects of trade and economic ties, "including a customs union, the movement of capital and manpower, and the rendering of financial and technical assistance through the European Development Fund." <sup>125/</sup> The main attitude of the EC countries towards the association policy is reflected in their Declaration issued in Copenhagen on 14 December 1973. The Declaration, which is better known as "European Identity," says among other things that "the Nine attach essential importance to the Community's policy of association. Without diminishing the advantages enjoyed by the countries with which it has special relations, the Community intends progressively to put into operation a policy for development and on a worldwide scale in accordance with the principles and aims set out in the Paris Summit Declaration." <sup>126/</sup>

Combining the status of association with peace, the Declaration says further that "there can be no real peace if the developed countries do not pay more heed to the less favoured nations. Convinced of this fact and conscious of their responsibilities and particular obligations, the Nine attach very great importance to the struggle against underdevelopment. They are therefore resolved to intensify their efforts in the fields of trade and development aid and to strengthen international cooperation to these ends."

From this it can clearly be seen that "to become an associate does not mean joining the Community: it means organizing on an equal footing with the Community a shared framework of economic and development cooperation." <sup>127/</sup> This, at the same time, means that the associate countries can not in any way enjoy the same privileges which the member countries of the Community enjoy, for one of the basic aims of the EC is that its members have the political will to succeed in the construction of a united Europe.

There is no doubt that it is because of this that the common market, based on a customs union, was created, as all its established institutions and machinery are geared

towards the implementation of common policies, towards the unification of Europe. Such unification is needed because whereas in the past Europeans were individually able to play a major role in most world affairs, these affairs have now become too complicated and difficult for any of the member countries of the Community to solve alone.

The EC countries that once had colonies have lost all or most of them. Decisions binding these former colonies are not taken by the metropolises any more. The proceeds of the sale of the mineral resources and raw materials of the former colonies no longer go to the former metropolises as they did during the colonial era. Again, the sole right to trade in the former colonies does not belong to the metropolises any more. The former colonies now have the right as sovereign states to conclude trade or economic agreements with any country or group of countries which they consider shall be mutually helpful.

This, in short, means that the EC members that once held colonies had to apply some other tactics.

If a general assessment is made on association, it can easily be seen that the associate countries have lost much from such a deal by present standards. Even President Senghor of Senegal, one of the die-hard Eur-Africans, still supporting the principle of "reciprocity," who was quoted as saying: "We will continue to give to Europe the preferences she has enjoyed in our markets, as much for considerations of human dignity as for commercial and juridical reasons," <sup>128/</sup> was forced by some circumstances to say that "the associates also suffered from indirect consequences of the lowering of the common external tariff, the policy of generalized preferences and the Community's agricultural policy." <sup>129/</sup> "It would be desirable to take action on the causes and not the consequences of the losses sustained by the associated states," <sup>130/</sup> the President added.

This suffering of the associated countries is elaborated further in the Deniau Memorandum, which points out that the mutual preferential advantages of association enjoyed

by the parties concerned have been steadily diminishing; the cause has been attributed to "the way in which the associated countries have used their tariff autonomy vis-à-vis other countries." <sup>131/</sup> This sounds as if the EC members have not had any trade contacts with the non-associated countries. The fact is that the EC countries have, in recent years, lowered their external customs tariff on the importation of a number of commodities from the countries of the rest of the world; for example between the years of "1960 and 1971 the duties on coffee were reduced from 16 to 7 per cent ad valorem, cocoa beans from 9 to 4 per cent, palm oil from 9 to 6 per cent; on tea they were lifted altogether." <sup>132/</sup> This undoubtedly has to some extent upset the privileges which the associated countries should have gotten.

Apart from this unilateral breach of privilege, the EC members have also violated the customs rules which were formulated with the ultimate intention to help stimulate the export trade of the associated countries. When we take the export of vegetables and fruits as an example, we find that some time in the autumn of 1972 the Council of Ministers of the EC, without the consent of the associated countries, instituted some regulations which limited the importation of certain vegetables and fruits into the EC countries, namely, those such that are produced in the countries of the Community.

But in such a case, especially when international trade is concerned, any limitation of import of commodities in one or in a group of countries is also a limitation of the export of the trading partner or partners, in our case the associated countries.

One more point on association which needs elucidation is that trade relations of the EC members do not confine themselves to the Community members and the associated countries. The latter as well as the former have the right to trade with any third country. Because of this, the EC members always look for cheaper commodities from outside the ranks of the associated countries. This has resulted in

the signing of bilateral trade and economic agreements with non-associated countries. Having implemented these agreements, the EC members in some cases trade with other developing countries even more than with the associated countries. The effect of such dual-dealing is that keen trade competition is created between the associated and the non-associated countries, a situation which makes the position of the associated countries in the EC market always unstable.

Association, as beneficial as it may be to the developing West African countries, allows only lopsided development, viz., raw material production which has to be exported to the EC market. But the prices of these raw materials on the world market are not fixed by the producers themselves, unlike the prices of manufactured goods which are fixed by the producers and which they twist quite often, thus causing price fluctuations.

This, then, creates a sort of an unbalanced international division of labour between the EC members and the associated countries, one that puts the associated countries at a disadvantage and increases economic instability.

Although such instability is caused not only by price fluctuation but also by some effects of natural disasters of an objective character such as weather fluctuations which bring changes in rate of production, unceasing manipulation of prices aggravate the recession tendencies in these developing countries even more. Against this background it can clearly be seen that Deniau's assertion in his memorandum that "between 1965 and 1969 the average volume of groundnut oil exports fell off by about 28 per cent under conditions where price fluctuations at no time exceeded ten per cent" <sup>133/</sup> is unacceptable. The fact is that the economies of the associated countries are not diversified enough to stand up to the EC countries, and as raw material suppliers the associated countries cannot expect any bright future of economic diversification, one which would ultimately put an end to the fluctuation of earnings they have hitherto been experiencing.

As obvious as it is, it bears repeating that whereas the EC countries are highly industrialized with industrial diversification already having been completed, African countries are still underdeveloped, with practically only agricultural products as their main foreign currency earning medium. This puts the African countries at a disadvantage no matter what concessions are given to them, at least as long as prices for raw materials on the world market are not fixed by those who produce them.

African states would be in a more equitable position with the EC countries if they had the same right to fix prices for their own commodities as those who produce industrial and manufactured goods have. For example, the price of a Volkswagen car or a Renault is fixed by the firm which produces it, not by the world market. The prices of commodities coming from Africa are subject to another system. This means that a situation of inequality between the EC countries and the African countries in terms of trade has already been created even before the commodities of the African countries set sail.

As regards the CET, which has reduced import duties on some commodities—a step that is said to be of advantage to African countries, it can be seen quite clearly that although the CET appears to be giving a concession to the associate countries, the real fact is quite the opposite, for although commodities such as iron ore, petroleum, cotton, rubber, copper, and oil seeds are somewhat exempted from customs duties, this is because they are vital for the running of the industries of the EC countries. For this reason the Community countries dare not obstruct their supply, for that would be suicide. Commodities other than these are subject to customs duties in different forms. For example, those countries which depend on agricultural products like cocoa, coffee, groundnuts, oil-seeds, palm-oil, tobacco and cotton are deeply affected by the CET stipulations. The Republic of Guinea and the Ivory Coast depend very much on coffee for their export. The duty on unroasted coffee is somewhere within the range of seven

per cent under the CET stipulations. Duties on roasted coffee are even higher, about 15 to 18 per cent.

Cocoa is an important cash crop for Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Togo. The CET tariff for cocoa is four per cent, but the Yaoundé Agreement provides for its free entry; cocoa butter and paste, however, face a tariff of about 12 to 15 per cent.

Palm oil and palm kernel oil face a CET tariff of about four to six and five to twenty per cent respectively; they contribute much to the economy of Nigeria and Dahomey.

Groundnuts play an important role in the foreign currency earnings of Senegal, Nigeria, Gambia, Niger and Guinea. Crude groundnuts enter the EC countries duty-free, but curiously enough groundnut oil faces duty of 5 to 20 per cent.

The term "duty-free" must, however, not be taken absolutely, for duty-free here indicates the principle of reciprocity. This principle is met with in both the Yaoundé Convention and the Arusha Agreement. The main concept of this principle is that imported products from the associated countries to the EC and which fall under this category shall be free from customs duties and other charges of similar nature. In the same way, export commodities from the EC countries shall enter the associated countries free of customs duties and similar charges.

This, as a matter of fact, is in the interest of the industrialized EC countries, because as monocultural countries the associated countries import a great number of goods from the Community countries, almost all of which enter without customs duties. This entry of goods free of customs duties has an effect on the revenue collection of the associated countries, as in this case the sources of income have then been limited. Such a limitation of foreign exchange earnings serves as the main cause of a negative balance-of-payments and is also the cause of other debts from loans which the African countries have hitherto incurred.

This means that the financial and technical assistance of the EC has not helped the associated countries to solve their economic problems. They still have to look for financial assistance from outside the EC range. 134/

Senegal's trade deficit soared more than double in 1973, rising from 1600 m. frs CFA in 1972 to 3700 m. frs CFA in 1973. The Prime Minister of Senegal, M. Abdou Diouf, told his National Assembly that the rise in debt was due to inflation and drought. However, he failed to add that another cause of inflation was the trade disparity between his country and the EC. The reason is perhaps that Mr. Diouf felt that an attribution of the failure of Senegal's economic progress to the disparity of its trade with the EC would eventually undermine his country's "Eur-Africa" preaching.

But Eur-Africa or not, the relevant point here is whether it is the whole edifice of association or the Yaoundé Convention which puts the associated countries at a disadvantage. The answer is that which has been described earlier from the economic point of view. It is hardly possible for countries with monocultural commodities to compete with countries with diversified economies, and for this reason it could be suggested that although some type of economic connection should exist between Africa and Europe, it should not be the concept which the Euro-African preachers advocate. Neither should it be a continuation of the Yaoundé type, as "Yaoundé is neocolonialist, tainted with the brush of France's special relationship with her former African colonies, and designed to condemn African countries to being choppers of wood and drawers of water." 135/

To maintain direct relationship with the EC would inevitably mean the conclusion of a new economic agreement. From this point of view it was quite correct when Alhaji Shahn declared at the Commonwealth Finance Ministers' meeting in London that Nigeria could not subscribe to the Yaoundé Convention or to Lagos-type or Arusha-type agree-

ments with the EC. <sup>136/</sup> "We in Nigeria," the Alhaji said, are not convinced that the Yaoundé Convention with its reverse preferences or the Lagos-type agreement with its quota limitations is capable of meeting our needs. It is therefore all the more necessary for us to intensify the search for an arrangement that will best serve Nigeria's national interest." <sup>137/</sup>

A similar opinion on the unsuitability of the terms of the Yaoundé Convention was voiced by many African leaders, among them President Tolbert of Liberia, who said at a Dakar newspaper interview (Le Soleil) that his country considered the proposal for trade associations between the EC and Africa to be unsuitable. The President was referring to the association terms offered to the commonwealth countries under Article 22 of Britain's accession treaty. But from the side of the EC an opposite view was held; its Commission had privately let it to be known that it would prefer all the African countries to opt for the Yaoundé type of association. One important British personality, Lady Tweedsmuir, British Minister of State, also declared that it was her personal opinion that the Yaoundé type of association was the best choice and that if asked, the British Government would suggest the same.

A similar viewpoint was held by the Eur-African champion, President Senghor of Senegal. But in his case it is not strange, because he is so much committed to the course of France that he would not like to see a change in anything that France had initially established. Nevertheless, the wind of change then in Africa was stronger than Senghor's conservatism, for a great number of African countries thought it desirable that they should coordinate their efforts in order to negotiate a meaningful agreement with the enlarged EC. For this purpose, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted in May 1973 eight principles to guide the African states in their negotiations with the EC. The main substance of the principles were that African countries should seek a separation of trade non-reciprocity from aid, a change

in rights of establishment to avoid discrimination against third parties, and a change in regulations governing the movement of payments and capital to take account of the aim to achieve "African monetary cooperation." <sup>138/</sup>

In July of the same year another conference of African ministers responsible for economic affairs was held in Lagos. As the result, a common strategy for dealing with the EC was adopted and a single spokesman was elected. At this conference Mr. Nzo Ekangaki, <sup>139/</sup> the then Secretary-General of the OAU, proposed a ten-point platform on which Africa should stand during her negotiations with the EC. Among other things the Secretary-General proposed that Africa should negotiate with EC as one bloc comprising all the African countries which had the desire to establish trade relations with Europe. However, he exempted the Maghreb countries from this group, since the Maghreb countries were making special arrangements for association.

The Secretary-General further said that the new negotiations should not be based on the existing agreements, notably the Yaoundé, Arusha and Lagos agreements, although experience gained from them should not be overlooked. Defining the type of economic relations the African countries should have with the EC, Mr. Ekangaki said that the appropriate type of arrangement was a cooperation agreement, one that included trade and development. Such an agreement was to be concluded independently of GATT, and the African countries were to refuse to grant reciprocal preferences and to establish free trade areas with Europe for the purpose of justifying acceptance of European preferential tariffs. The contractual notion of the cooperation agreement should be construed to be the acceptance of preferential tariffs from Europe against the assurance of the provision of our raw materials and other goods to Europe at remunerative prices. The contractual notion should not necessarily imply the reciprocation of preferential tariffs.

Touching on the EDF, the Secretary-General suggested that the Fund should be increased and that the EC should not be allowed to give less funds than they had hitherto been giving to both the associates and the associables. But he specifically stated that preferential treatment should be given to the handicapped states.

On prices for raw materials, Mr. Ekangaki suggested that remunerative prices for such commodities be assured through the conclusion of special protocols, preferably on individual products as in the case of sugar. He added that it would be better for the African countries to seek some sort of investment guarantees from EC, especially for those states that wish to encourage private investments from the Community countries. He said that this would help to avoid overloading economies.

Being the Secretary-General of the OAU, Mr. Ekangaki wanted much of the negotiations to be in line with the stipulations of his organization. So in this direction he suggested that certain principles such as the right of establishment, provision of services, movement of capital, and rules of origin be seriously reviewed and that in so doing the Charter of the OAU be taken into consideration.

He felt that institutions such as the Parliamentary Conference of the EC should not be an integral part of the proposed cooperation agreement. Instead, he suggested that only those minimum institutions that would help ensure the proper running of the cooperation agreement be embodied in the agreement.

After this speech by Mr. Ekangaki Mr. Babacar Ba, the Senegalese Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, a strong adherent of the Yaoundé Convention and a strong supporter of the "reciprocal advantages," took the floor but only to say that the associates would try to work for the interests of Africa as a whole. It was strange to hear him say this, especially as Mr. Ekangaki had made it crystal clear in his speech that he was proposing to the EC non-reciprocity from Africa in any agreement between the latter and the former.

Under normal circumstances the Senegalese Minister would have reacted against Mr. Ekangaki's speech, for in an address to the European Commission in Brussels, President Senghor had said that reciprocity had been one of the bases of the association status accorded to the African countries. The President had even committed himself, as stated above, by saying: "We will continue to give to Europe the preferences she has enjoyed in our markets, as much for considerations of human dignity as for commercial and juridical reasons."

But on this occasion Mr. Ba's attitude was cool and calm. He perhaps felt that the Secretary-General's speech had moved the majority of the delegates and so he had to give way to consensus. Nevertheless, that was not the end, for later on in Brussels Mr. Ba displayed his dissatisfaction with the "non-reciprocity" advantages outside the conference hall just before the close of the preliminary meeting at which Mr. Wenike Briggs, Nigeria's Federal Trade Commissioner, had delivered his speech. The Senegalese Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs told journalists gathered there that the principle of non-reciprocity had been inserted in Africa's draft text in the night of 25 July at a meeting which had continued until the morning of their encounter with the EC. This was strongly denied by the OAU Secretariat, which had duplicated the document for distribution. Later Mr. Kamanda, the Assistant Secretary-General of the OAU, was reported to have said that Senegal was with Ethiopia, Dahomey, Ivory Coast and Nigeria on the committee which drafted the speech and what Mr. Briggs had read was in the final draft even before the full group met. This point was also stressed by the Nigerian delegation. Mr. Babacar Ba, seeing that he had lied to the journalists, later said that the point in dispute was not serious and could be dealt with in Dar-es-Salaam.

The Lagos Conference ended with the establishment of a special OAU Secretariat in Brussels, which was empowered to work hand in hand with both the Yaoundé and the Arusha Secretariats already there. In addition to this, Mr.

Wenike Briggs, Nigeria's Federal Trade Commissioner, was elected spokesman for Africa at the talks in Brussels. A letter was sent by General Gowon, the then Chairman of OAU to introduce Mr. Briggs to the EC.

The preliminary meeting of the ACP with EC was held from 25 to 26 July 1973 in Brussels. Mr. Briggs delivered his speech, the main essence of which was that African states were convinced that justification for preferential treatment for Africa lay in the international obligations of the developed countries to the developing countries in general and to Africa in particular, taking account of the fact that Africa was the least developed continent in the developing world. Due to the fact that 16 out of the 25 recognized "least developed" countries were in Africa, such an agreement between the member states of the OAU should not embody reciprocal treatment. He suggested that any arrangement between the Community and African countries should place special emphasis on the transfer of technology from the former to the latter and that such transfer be based on easy and acceptable terms.

Stressing a point on export earnings stabilization, Mr. Briggs said: "We note with interest the proposals of the EC but we not only wish to ensure that this will be linked to the deterioration of the terms of trade of African countries in a way that will not add to their debt burden, but also that the values of their exports will be maximized." As regards institutions which would operate the agreements, Mr. Briggs did not want to commit the African countries to any specific number. He simply said that "it is the type of agreement negotiated that would determine the institutional setup."

From the other side the most notable result of this preliminary meeting was that a session of the EC Council of Ministers was held on 24 July, a day before the opening session of the actual meeting with the ACP countries. At that session a text acceptable to the Nine was worked out. It was duly read by the then President of the Council,

Mr. Ivar Norgaard, the Danish Minister for Economic Affairs, at the opening session on 25 July.

After having traced the history of the Treaty of Rome and the Conventions of Association, viz., Yaoundé I and II and the Arusha Agreement, Mr. Norgaard recalled the three options of association which had been stated in Protocol 22: full association (Yaoundé type); limited association (Arusha type), or a trade agreement. The speaker added that there was a freedom of choice between the three types.

However, his document was not clear enough, for although the principle of reciprocity was not specifically mentioned in the text, the contractual basis of the arrangements in the light of GATT was referred to. This, as a matter of fact, was what Mr. Ekangaki had advised the African group against. Anyway, Mr. Norgaard made it plain that what he was putting forward were just guidelines for negotiations.

As has been noted above, this first encounter was but a first round of negotiation between the ACP countries and the EC. The African countries returned to their camp. It was evident that there were still differences between the Africans themselves; that had been shown by Mr. Ba's reaction in Brussels outside the conference hall. For this reason another meeting of Africans which had been scheduled to take place in Dar-es-Salaam was imperative. Curiously enough, Mr. Ba did not cause any trouble there.

At that meeting the participants set up their negotiating machinery for further meetings with the EC. The machinery consisted of the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Ambassadors and Plenipotentiaries, who were to be assisted by some experts and consultants and an ad hoc secretariat. The second round of ACP-EC negotiations was held from 17 to 19 October 1973. although actual negotiations had long been going on between the EC Commission and the Committee of Ambassadors and Plenipotentiaries of the African Caribbean and Pacific Countries.

The main upshot of the second round of the EC-ACP negotiations was that the whole edifice of the negotiations took on another shape, this time more substantial. The object for discussion was reduced to two broad aspects, namely, trade and economic matters on the one side and financial and technical cooperation on the other.

At this time the African countries brought forth their demands, which were largely based on free access of all their export products to the EC Market. This means that the African countries wanted

- a) elimination of customs duties and other charges having equivalent effects,
- b) exemption of their products from the provisions of the common agricultural policy of the EC,
- c) removal of all non-tariff barriers,
- d) application of the rules of origin to their products.

Besides these demands there were other topics which had to be discussed, such as exploration of avenues for the possible growth of export earnings of the African countries, the right of establishment and conditions of services, and of the movement of capital.

As regards economic, financial and technical cooperation, there was much discussion on

- a) the overall volume of the EC aid to be given to the African countries,
- b) the programming of this aid,
- c) the need to ensure the participation of the negotiating countries in all the decision-making processes affecting the utilization of this aid,
- d) EC aid for regional projects,
- e) EC special aid for less favoured or least developed countries, including landlocked countries and islands,
- f) economic cooperation with special emphasis on industrial cooperation and transfer of technical knowhow.

From 20 to 22 February 1974 a second session of the Conference of the Council of Ministers of the African Group negotiating with the EC was held in Addis Ababa to examine the report of the Committee of Ambassadors and Plenipotentiaries on the result of their last meeting, i.e., their demand made to the EC for exemption of their products from the provision of the common agricultural policy of the EC; removal of all non-tariff barriers, and application of the rules of origin to their products.

A better harvest was reaped at this conference, for the areas of differences between the two negotiating parties, the EC and the African Council of Ministers, had been narrowed. A fairly good indication of this was what the Nigerian Federal Trade Commissioner, Mr. Wenike Briggs, said in Lagos on his arrival from Addis Ababa on 23 February 1974. He stated that the EC had agreed in principle that all products except those that were under its common agricultural policy could enter its zone duty-free.<sup>140/</sup> However, there was no mention as to whether the African group was obliged to accord the same privileges to the EC member countries.

Another significant development that evolved at this Conference was the proposal made by the African Council of Ministers to the EC to the effect that if 25 per cent of raw materials used in the manufacture of a product came from any one country, then that country should be regarded by the EC as the country of origin of that particular product. The EC could not commit itself to this and so decided to submit a paper on it soon.

This proposal, as good as it may seem to be for the Africans, is one which could be ineffective even if the EC should endorse it, because it is not in any way easy to set aside 25 per cent of the raw materials of any manufactured product or commodity. Let us take, for example, chocolate. About 75 per cent of the raw material used in manufacturing it is cocoa. This is, however, a disputable fact, the manufacturers can argue, especially at this stage of the development of science and technology when

many things can be produced with artificial substances to appear like natural ones.

This is only one factor. There is yet another one which will make this 25 per cent concession impracticable. That is when similar raw materials are produced in more than one country, for example, again cocoa. Cocoa is produced in Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Brazil, etc. In this case how could the country of origin of chocolate be determined? The same difficulties would apply to other raw materials such as timber, groundnuts, coffee, etc.

The claim for such a country-of-origin advantage undoubtedly will not be accorded by the EC to all those African countries which produce the same raw material. The African countries, for their part, will consider this as a breach of agreement, and this could be a potential cause for eventual distrust among the Africans and the EC.

With the Africans, too, the tendency of dissension or rivalry in the course of their struggle for "country of origin" advantages cannot be ruled out. If such a situation arises, it will as a matter of course weaken the African common front in its future relations with the EC. However, the tendency for such conflicts and distrusts could be eliminated if Africa were to be treated as a single supplying area and if goods originating in any of the countries there could be exported to the EC countries from any other.

One factor which Africans must not ignore is that although the EC as a whole is an inter-European states organization designed to foster economic, trade, political and other relations between its members, the actual realization of these aims, except for political relations, are performed by big monopolies, concerns, etc., whose ultimate aims are to earn as much profit as they can so as to get the best hold on the world's economy, which in turn will help to raise the standard of living in their countries.

With this profit-making aim in view, one should probably not entertain the feeling that any form of association will render the expected services the associates anticipate, except, perhaps, some few minor trade concessions or grants that might be offered to them. On the political side of the relations between the ACP and the EC countries, too, one has to be less optimistic.

In return for the limited help which France gives to the Francophone African countries, she continues to manoeuvre her former colonies both within the walls of the UN and in Africa against their own brother Anglophone Africans, especially in the field of economic integration in West Africa. On this point, President Pompidou's speech in Niger set guidelines for some of the Francophone leaders in that subregion. Former President Pompidou said: "It is only logical that Francophones and Anglophones should cooperate more fully," but he hastened to add a warning that relations between Anglophones and Francophones should not be a "one-way relationship, there must be a just equilibrium." This equilibrium could be achieved, according to M. Pompidou, only if the Francophones "harmonize their efforts so as to counterbalance the heavy weight of Nigeria." 141/

This, as a matter of fact, was a warning that although the Francophones might have bilateral trade agreements with the Anglophones, they did not have to enter into any serious cooperation, let alone seek the formation of an economic community. The Francophone countries, having heard this warning from their former master, decided to go on their way without their brother Anglophones. Hence the formation of the Francophone Communauté Economique d'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO).

What should be remembered is that when President Pompidou was saying that he did not have the interest of the Francophones in mind, he said that because of Nigeria's "antipathy towards France," 142/ because France had been supporting Biafra during the civil war, and again because of Nigeria's outspokenness against a Yaoundé-style association. For Nigerians appear to believe that Yaoundé im-

plies Eur-Africa and casts the African associates into the role of "choppers of wood and drawers of water," as stated before.

Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that Nigeria should take an active part in the ACP-EC association negotiations. Nigeria's action was endorsed by Mr. Jean-Francois Deniau, who had admitted that the type of free trade agreements reached between the EC and the 18 associated African states had not worked as well as had been hoped because of the inequalities in development between the two sets of partners. He then suggested that something new had to be added to existing agreements in order to cope with trade, aid, and debt problems. He further stated that during the negotiations over Britain's membership of the EC, the long-term responsibilities of the enlarged Community towards the Third World had "hardly been discussed." <sup>143/</sup> In other words, Britain was preoccupied with her own entry negotiations but not with that of her former colonies. The whole burden of concrete negotiations was put on the shoulders of the former colonies.

Things did not go easily, but unity is strength and with it many difficult things can be simplified. And so it was in the case of the negotiations of the African Anglophones, the African Francophones, the Caribbean and the Pacific countries with the EC. After 18 months of talks closed by a 24-hour session, negotiations ended on Saturday, 1 February 1975. The separate negotiations between Britain and her sugar suppliers had contributed much to the delay in reaching agreement, because it would have been difficult to reach an agreement without the important sugar chapter in the Convention.

There were other points of disagreement which contributed to the delay in reaching agreement. The amount of the European Development Fund from which aid funds would be provided by the EC to the associated countries was one point of disagreement. Agreement was easily reached on the distribution and management of the money but could not be reached

on the proposal that the Fund be relieved of the cost of its administration by transferring it to the general EC budget.

Another important point which also gave rise to disagreement was the ACP countries' demand that the EC help to stabilize their export earnings.

Complete trade liberalization of the terms of entry of ACP goods into the Community was also one of the points of disagreement, since the EC realized that some of these goods would compete with their own goods.

A demand was made by the EC that the ACP should oblige themselves not to offer any industrial country other than an EC member most-favoured-nation preferences. But this is what is found in most of the bilateral agreements of the ACP countries.

Despite all these difficulties, an entirely new agreement based on the initiative of the ACP countries was reached, according to which the EC agreed to guarantee against price fluctuations, which have been the main cause of economic difficulties of the ACP countries. Since the export revenue of these countries depends heavily on agricultural products and on some insignificant industrial goods, the ACP countries managed to secure a scheme to establish export earnings from 12 main products, namely, cocoa, coffee, ground-nuts, cotton, hides and skins, timber and wood products, bananas, tea, sisal, and iron ore. The greatest achievement here is that under the terms of the Convention a special provision has been made which makes any one of the 46 ACP countries eligible to receive financial help totalling nearly £200 m over a period of five years provided this country depends on one of these basic products for more than 7.5 per cent of its export earnings.

This could be so interpreted that for example, Togo should get less for its cocoa sales to EC in 1978 than the average over the past three years. The Community would have to pay the difference.

The 24 least developed ACP countries, among them Mali, Niger and Chad, will qualify for help if their export earnings from these products drop by more than 2.5 per cent.

On trade in general, the package provides for entry entirely free of customs duties and levies. Tariff-free entry for all agricultural exports from the ACP countries has been stipulated in the package. It was perhaps the size of the Community's aid which caused the most disappointment, for of the £ 4,000 m in aid which the ACP countries asked for, only about £ 1,700 m was given.

The new package, which covers basically trade and aid, is to be called simply a Convention. The EC had originally proposed Association, but the ACP countries rejected this because it would then have indicated too close a relationship with the EC.

The success of the negotiations is a good indication that the "developing nations have retained control over the way in which they run their economic policies. They also have severed some of the more paternalistic links foisted upon the former French colonies, among them under the Yaoundé Convention, which the new agreement replaces." <sup>144/</sup>

## II. The Existence of Two Economic Communities in the Same Subregion

The English-speaking African states have various "very niggling, very complex exchange controls; their money is not in practice convertible." "In commerce with English-speaking countries there had been long delay in payments. For payments from Nigeria, Senegal had to wait up to four years." You cannot have an economic community under these conditions.

Against this background it would be better to achieve unity "among Francophones" who speak the same language and use the same currency, which is automatically convertible through the Communauté Economique d'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO), established at the Bamako Summit Confer-

ence in June 1974. "If this works, in three years we can set up the wider grouping. At the same time we can multiply bilateral agreements between the Francophones and the Anglophones such as already exist between Senegal and Nigeria, for example. In these agreements we can profit from a clause in the Bamako Treaty which permits the same customs advantages in trade with the Anglophones or the Maghreb as among CEAO partners." <sup>145/</sup> These words which President Senghor of Senegal is reported to have uttered portray the way he would like the West African Economic Community to go. Such a viewpoint is also endorsed by President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast. The President's adherence to this viewpoint is expressed in these words: Great Britain did not take part in the establishment of the EEC and only later asked to join.

Well, as has already been said, President Pompidou had advised the Francophone countries against economic unions with the Anglophone countries, including Nigeria. <sup>146/</sup> The main reason for M. Pompidou's warning was that Nigeria had grudge against France; France had supported Biafra during the civil war, so Pompidou was afraid that Nigeria's influence in the Francophone countries might mar relations between his country and the former colonies. But diplomatically it would not have been convenient for the French President to single out only Nigeria, hence the general warning against the Anglophone countries.

Inside Africa, too, Nigeria had offended President Senghor by her refusal to accept the gospel of Eur-Africa which the President had been preaching. Nigeria's relations with Ivory Coast were also not good, because during the Nigerian civil war Ivory Coast was on the verge of recognizing Biafra. Also, Nigeria had refused to endorse President Houphouet-Boigny's proposal that African countries should enter into a dialogue with the white minority rulers in southern Africa. As regards Ghana, Senghor was displeased with her reestablishment of relations with the Republic of Guinea, because President Sékou Touré had persistently been accusing Senegal of her complicity in a planned invasion of Guinea.

Ghana's relations with Ivory Coast had also not been cordial, because Dr. K. A. Busia had been overthrown by a military coup and the new regime there had denounced the dialogue proposal.

Besides these points there are yet others which should not be overlooked. For example, at international conferences in which both the Anglophones and the Francophones participate, the Anglophone delegates usually have either no knowledge of the French language at all or just a scant knowledge. Because of this, speeches by the Francophone delegates must be interpreted into English. For this reason the Anglophone delegates are not influenced by the splendid oratory art which some Francophone delegates use to hypnotize the other young Francophone delegates. This does not please the Francophone leaders.

Finally, it was Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny who brought about the idea of creating the CEAO. They were also the very persons who had been rivals for a long time on the question of leadership amongst the Francophones. The reasons for their rivalry lie in the conflicting historical roles of Senegal and the Ivory Coast in the last decades of French colonial rule. Senegal, with the AOF capital in Dakar, was the old centre of administration and political life, whereas economically the Ivory Coast had overtaken Senegal during the 1950s.

No doubt the choice of leadership had to be made between the two Heads of State. Both of them had been in power since independence and before that date both had had a long record of political influence as members of the French Parliament. In most other Francophone states the present Heads of State are newcomers (through military takeovers). President Sékou Touré of Guinea, another leader since independence and former member of the French Parliament (if only for two years, 1956 to 1958), was not under consideration for leadership because of the fact that his country had left the currency zone of the French Franc as early as 1960 and also because of his general isolationist attitude.

The only two then, who could contest for these "all-influencing positions" were President Houphouet-Boigny and President Senghor. They managed to solve this problem by sharing. Senghor was given the due respect he needs for his French oratory wits and Houphouet took over the position of leadership among the French-speaking countries. How much this pays off in terms of their countries' income is a question which only they themselves can answer, and how far these positions have helped to raise the standard of living of the workers and farmers of their countries is a question which only the farmers and workers there can answer.

What is of importance here is that the reconciliation of M. Senghor and M. Houphouet-Boigny as well as their new relations needed special consolidation, and this was found in their adherence to the course of France and in their anti-Anglophone sentiments. Hence their unwillingness to invite the Anglophone countries to the Bamako Summit Conference, which led to the establishment of the Francophone CEAO in 1972.

The most significant point here is that Nigeria, which was a faithful friend of Senegal and Ivory Coast during the era of Monrovia Group - Casablanca Group rivalry, had now been isolated. So had Liberia. The rivalry itself has taken a new form; it is a matter no longer of ambitious radicals against patient conservatives but of some ambitious conservatives among the Francophones against the Anglophones. Precisely it is two trying to manoeuvre six. But things have now changed greatly in the subregion. A pragmatic approach to intra-African relations has already gained foot; what is needed in West Africa now is not display of the French language but a practical and objective approach. After all, the CEAO is not the first Francophone organization formed in West Africa. The West African Customs Union UDEAO came and passed without offering anything to its members. All its members were Francophones, with common currency and common cultural ties.

In the light of this, Major Alladye, a member of the military regime in Dahomey, was right when he said: "So far I have failed to discover what good Dahomey has derived from membership in OCAM and other such groupings."

Major Alladye, expressing his disagreement to Nigeria's exclusion from the CEAO, said: "Our relations with Nigeria are based on concrete and pragmatic natural interest." His dissatisfaction grew even more evident when after the CEAO Conference in Abidjan he said: "Language is only language. I may speak French and Nigerians may speak English, but this is merely a technical problem. What matters is that I feel that Cotonou is nearer to Lagos than Dakar. <sup>147/</sup>

There is no doubt about Major Alladye's intention to continue the pragmatic relations that exist between his country and Nigeria. By his speech he unmasked the common language pretext which some leaders in the subregion were using to achieve their ambition. Dahomey's position as regards the creation of a West African Economic Community without language barriers was further consolidated by President Lieutenant-Colonel Kerekou's speech, in which, among other things, he stated that "the recently formed West African Economic Union (CEAO) is unrealistic because it excludes Ghana and Nigeria. <sup>148/</sup>

With this as the cornerstone of her policy on intra-West African economic relations, Dahomey reduced her status in the CEAO from full membership to that of observer. Another Francophone country, Togo, also became an observer and later demonstrated her total disagreement with the exclusion of Nigeria in the CEAO by setting up a union which was designed to serve as an "embryo" for a West African Community which would embrace all the independent states in the subregion.

These were not the only countries which protested against exclusion of the Anglophone countries. At the Bamako Summit Conference President Diiori of Niger was the main protagonist of the Anglophone countries. His refusal to sign the CEAO agreement nearly caused the disruption of the Conference if not the dissolution of the CEAO itself.

Fearing that he might ultimately leave the organization, the other members manipulated to elect him President for the next session. Nevertheless, this did not help very much, for the President was later reported to have said that it would be "unrealistic" to set up a WAEC without the participation of English-speaking African countries in the area. President Diori was speaking to an interviewer from the Ivory Coast Government Daily "Fraternité Martin." He had a plan by which the creation of West African Economic integration should follow. For the realization of his plan the President suggested that integration in the subregion should pass through three stages, the first of which, he said, should be "restructuring and strengthening of the economic potential and of the monetary union of the French-speaking countries." The second should be the "setting up of a West African Payments Union for the different monetary zones existing in the area," the third stage should be the "setting up of a West African Economic Community of Francophone and Anglophone States, which should give each member country an equal chance for economic development and which might establish a common currency."

He expressed his country's intention of continued adherence to relations with Nigeria by saying that "as far as we are concerned, Niger cannot ignore the economic weight of its powerful neighbour Nigeria, with which we have very ancient links."

Mali, though unable to be very outspoken because of her dependence on Senegal for outlet to the sea, insisted that the Anglophones should be invited. When these persuasions failed, her President, M. Traore, declared "Nigeria, which knows our real position, will not consider the creation of the CEAO as an affront and knows that this is only a stage."

From these declarations it can clearly be seen that of the eight states who form the CEAO, Togo, Niger, Dahomey, and Mali have expressed their willingness to have an economic community consisting of both the Anglophones and the Francophones. Upper Volta has not said anything against

this and neither has Mauritania. It is therefore only the Ivory Coast and Senegal which are against. This in effect means two shaping the economic relations of six.

From the other side, too, i.e., from the side of the Anglophone countries, there has not been any public pronouncement by any of the leaders there against joining the CEAO. Ghana's position has always been clear, and her leader, Colonel I. K. Acheampong, when accepting the credentials of Guinea's Ambassador to Ghana, said that the formation of a West African economic community embracing all West African countries was imperative.

Ghana is not so much concerned with who starts it; her main interest is to get things going. The effort which Nigeria has been making to establish the West African economic community described earlier is self-explanatory.

Gambia's Minister of Finance, Commerce and Industries, Alhaji I. M. Garba-Jahumpa, has called for continued links among the 15 countries which have agreed to form a West African economic community. He said among other things that Gambia wholeheartedly supported the formation of the economic community and would do everything possible to ensure that Africa was totally liberated.

Liberia's position is expressed in an interview of President Tolbert published in *Le Soleil*, Dakar's newspaper. The President said that there were no signs that any provision had been made for English-speaking African countries to join the CEAO. He added that the French-speaking countries shared particular common advantages which were not relevant to other countries in the subregion.

All this shows that the English-speaking countries of the subregion would like to join hands to form a common organization but that the manipulations of two leaders in the subregion closed the doors against their entry.

One surprising thing is that the organizers of the Abidjan meeting which did finally establish the CEAO had refused the request made by Colonel Acheampong that Ghana be

allowed to attend the meeting as an observer with the excuse that "it was then too late." <sup>149/</sup> But the organizers found enough time to invite observers from all the nine EC countries, including Britain.

Besides these observers, M. Jean-Francois Deniau, the former Commissioner of the EC who had presented a memorandum on the Community, was invited. However, he was not representing the EC at the meeting but was there in his capacity as the new French Secretary of State for Cooperation.

Mr. David, an expert in customs and duties, was also there from France. From his past activities, M. David is known to have been very active in the French-speaking African countries, especially during the creation of the French-speaking West African countries customs union, the UDEAO. When he realized that the UDEAO was ineffective, Mr. David, who has always held the opinion that it is impossible for the Anglophones and Francophones to establish common effective cooperation, let alone a community between themselves, gave other directives. Hence the formation of the CEAO. This means that the CEAO was designed to replace the UDEAO, which had had many setbacks.

From this point of view, therefore, one can have the impression that both M. Deniau and M. David were present at the Abidjan Conference just to supervise the accuracy of the playing of France's chords, as the two Bamako meetings of 1970 and 1972 had not produced any concrete agreements. There were therefore strong indications that the presence of the English-speaking countries there would then not be needed.

Somehow the absence of the Anglophones at the Conference, although not good, served a purpose. It proved to the organizers and the world that it is not the Anglophones who make negotiations difficult simply because of the different language they speak or because they don't belong to the same currency zone as the Francophones. It is the principle of give and take—how, when, where and what should be given away or taken—that makes negotiations difficult.

President Senghor, one of the organizers, later had to admit this fact, but it normally takes people of this nature a reasonable length of time to concede defeat. The President bluntly said that although the CEAO members speak a common language and have a common currency and common historical links, they took a long time to arrive at agreement, and that was an indication that they were not ready for a wider grouping. Mr. Senghor said: "Yes, I must say that it was not very easy to have an agreement between French-speaking countries. If we had English-speaking countries as well, the agreement would be even more difficult to achieve. 150/

This statement makes it look as though all the Franco-phone countries had the same problems, and for that reason one might argue that there should not have been difficulties in coming to agreement. But although most of the problems may be similar, the countries all have specific problems of their own. Such problems range from their geographic positions up to the extent of the development of their various economies. Some of the CEAO countries, e.g., Niger, Mali and Upper Volta are landlocked, while others, e.g., Senegal, Ivory Coast, Togo and Mauritania, are not. Another group of countries are suffering from the effects of the drought in various degrees, while others are not. Industries are more developed in some countries than in others. The Gross National Products (GNP) of some countries are higher than of others. The GNP also varies from country to country.

For these reasons it is quite naive to think that each country will not bargain to obtain the best concessions, which will help improve its economy. This is perhaps what the organizers of the CEAO Conference in Abidjan did not draw into consideration.

These were the main reasons why the 1972 Bamako-CEAO Summit Conference was unable to produce any agreed version of the text of the agreement to establish the CEAO. The Ministerial Council, which had been charged with the task

of exploring the possible venues for agreement on protocols for meat and cattle, fishing accord, etc., was unable to fulfil this task and had to refer it back to the Heads of State. There was also disagreement on the second article of the original treaty. This is the article which regulates membership. As usual, an article of a treaty which regulates membership of a community that has like the CEAO from the onset made it its policy to exclude some more important countries cannot be unanimously accepted by all its members, especially with so many different positions of its members to the same question, as described earlier.

Article 2 of the Treaty stipulates that "The Community is open to all African states who would apply. The admission of a new state is decided by unanimous vote of the member states of the Community." No doubt, this is the clause with which those Heads of State who were against the entry of Ghana, Nigeria or any other Anglophone country to the Community could use to obstruct their entry. Such leaders wanted to do exactly what their metropole France had done to obstruct the entry of Britain into the EC for a time.

Dahomey foresaw this trick and suggested that the phrase "by unanimous vote" be changed to "simple majority," but this suggestion was rejected, a fact which proves that the organizers still wanted to apply an EC principle in West Africa at a time when intra-West African trade should be encouraged, promoted, and consolidated. Some leaders in the subregion wanted to repeat in the CEAO the melody which France had played in the EC. Another, less important, suggestion made by Ivory Coast to the effect that "only a West African country could apply to join" was accepted. It could be the fault of those who drafted the text of Article 2, for they should have inserted the word "West" just before the words "African States" to let it read "The Community is open to all West African States who wish to apply" for membership.

It was not only Article 2 of the Treaty which caused disagreement. Article 35, which was to replace the original Article 14, also had to be referred to the Heads of State. Article 2 stipulates that the Community shall have a "Common Development Fund" for which finance will come from a special tax. How this was to be done or to be implemented was what was causing concern, for it could not be done without creating difficulties for the landlocked countries in the region.

The utmost aim behind the insertion of Article 35 in the Treaty was to achieve a Yaoundé-style formula of reciprocity advantage in the CEAO, except that in this case tax levied on goods produced within the CEAO area was to be utilized solely for the development of industries of the less favoured members of the Community.

Article 35 was unacceptable to some of the members of the Community because they saw in it a trick by the richer countries of the Community, with their many industries, to acquire a sort of preferential status. The less rich countries of the Community put forth their own proposal that if the Article was to be retained in the Treaty, then such a tax should be levied on all goods produced in the CEAO or on those which entered it.

Their case was quite understandable, for the richer countries such as Senegal and Ivory Coast would have been getting richer and richer and the poor ones even poorer. To play this feeling down, President Houphouët-Boigny was obliged to make a convincing promise that in the course of the first five years all revenue would be shared among the less favoured countries.

As a matter of fact, this sort of unbalanced economic relations is what the Africans have been fighting against in their talks with the EC. It is therefore surprising that some African countries should have the desire to enter into such unbalanced economic relations with their own brother Africans. But these are the practices which the organi-

zers of the CEAO Conference term as "organizing the Franco-phone countries before inviting the Anglophones."

One interesting point which should be noted is that Niger's and Mauritania's demand that the Treaty contain a provision for free entry of their imported goods on transit through the coastal countries was finally rejected.

The Bamako Conference is quite significant because it was the first Francophone conference at which the leaders refused to sign a meaningless document just for the sake of creating an organization. It was also the first time the formation of an exclusively Francophone organization was opposed and also the first time the Senghor-Boigny clique realized that things would not go in their way any more.

## CHAPTER V

## FIELDS OF COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA

I. Industry

One of the most important problems facing the countries of West Africa is the type of the economic structure they inherited from their former metropolises. The structures of the existing economies are of such a nature that without complex reorganization they will not help very much the formation of the subregion's economic community.

Admittedly, a regional economic community is not formed just because an international organization like the ECA has proposed its formation. Neither is it formed because similar economic communities have been successfully formed in other regions. Although a suggestion from an international organization such as the ECA is useful and the experiences of other similar organizations are also helpful, the most important factor in the formation of a regional economic community is the objective of that envisaged economic community. In other words, it must be determined what industrial or agricultural products the countries concerned possess and will be able to supply to the economic community.

In the case of the countries of West Africa such products are very limited in number, owing to the fact that most of these countries produce almost similar products, most of them agricultural.

If we consider industrial products, we find that of the 14 countries in the subregion only five have minerals that could be used as the basis for creating, extracting and processing industries. Liberia and Sierra Leone have iron, Sierra Leone and Ghana have diamonds, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone have bauxite, Ghana has gold and manganese, and Nigeria has oil, tin and natural gas.

There are some processing industries in some of these countries. For example, there are processing industries for ferrous metals in Ghana and in Nigeria. Non-ferrous works are found in Ghana and Guinea. Other industries such as automobile assembly plants are found in Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Senegal, Nigeria and Ghana. Tractors and other agricultural machines are assembled in Senegal. Motor-cycles and bicycles are assembled in Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Senegal. Electronic industries for producing transistors, electric bulbs, dry cell batteries and accumulators have been established in Dahomey, Senegal, Nigeria and Ghana.

From these examples it can clearly be seen that countries like Togo, Gambia, Niger and Mali either do not have these industries or what they have is quite insignificant.

But the cardinal aim of each member state of an economic community of this type, which is based mostly on a customs union and reverse preferences, is to sell as much of its own products as possible and buy as little as possible. This is in fact the only way by which every country acquires much of its foreign currency earnings, especially in the field of visible foreign exchange earnings. It appears, however, that Togo, Gambia, Niger and Mali will not be able to stand up to the competition of countries like Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone at the economic community's industrial market.

It is against this background that a system of inter-territorial specialization of production and cooperation should be suggested for this subregion. By this system the production of a specific article would be concentrated in one or several countries of the community. Such a country or countries will then be able to develop the methods and technical process for producing this article. If this is properly organized, it will help the country or countries concerned to expand production. But large-scale production is also a scour to a healthy export trade. The other member countries of the community will become interested, and the

growth of this interest will serve to strengthen the economic relations that exist between the member countries.

Internationalization helps to liquidate production parallelism, i.e., a spread out of production of the same commodities (e.g., transistors) in almost all the community countries.

It is in the light of this that specialization should always be accompanied by cooperation of production, especially between enterprises that produce similar commodities and spare parts or accessories, for specialization and cooperation in production are but two sides of the one process of international division and organization of labour.

As in any other economic relationship, internationalization of production has its important element. In this case it is the agreement which the signatory parties conclude to establish the relationship that obliges them to cooperate in specific fields, an agreement that defines the quantity of the proposed commodities, date of delivery, types, technical data, and how the development on the products can best be implemented.

Expansion of relations based on specialization and cooperation should be made in such a way that this does not damage the interest of the member countries concerned. Practically every country or groups of countries that have the desire to enter into bilateral relations on this basis should and by virtue of their state sovereignty have the right to do so, but under a system of community formation the common community terms of agreement can be much more favourable.

Such specialization agreements could be concluded to govern production of chemical industries, metal works, and machine building industries. In the light of the fact that machine-building industries are the main basis of technological progress and modern industrial development, it would be a prime contributing factor if the countries of the West African subregion concentrated their efforts on this interterritorial industrial development.

In his speech at the third annual general meeting of the Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria held on 14 February 1974, Dr. J. E. Adetoro, Federal Commissioner for Industries in Nigeria, said: "...it should be possible for interested member states to buy equity shares in projects situated in other member countries..."<sup>151/</sup> Putting this thought into action, Nigeria is reported to have taken the bull by the horn by acquiring five per cent of the shares of the Mifergui-Nimba and Simandon Company of Guinea, and this, it is said, was done in the spirit of economic cooperation to which both countries were committed.

The Mifergui-Nimba and Simandon Company of Guinea is the one charged with responsibility for exploitation and sale of Guinea's iron ore resources. The shares, which cost Nigeria US\$ 100,000, are said to have been fully paid.

According to the estimation of Nigerian officials, this deal is expected to secure Nigeria with the supply of at least one million metric tons of iron ore annually from the Company for her proposed iron and steel industry.<sup>152/</sup>

A joint venture of this nature is right on the course of industrial integration in the subregion, but maximum benefits can be achieved only if the joint project is mutually beneficial. However, if we take a general view of the standard and the level of economic development in the subregion, we can easily arrive at a conclusion that although the suggestion made by our learned Dr. Adetoro is sound, the aftermath of its implementation is destined to be not mutually beneficial. The reason for saying this is that Dr. Adetoro is quite fortunate to have been a member of the Government of Nigeria, the richest country in the subregion, its sources of income streaming from the pipes of oil and from cash crop products like cocoa and groundnuts. These make it possible for Nigeria to acquire the necessary, if not excess income which enables her to look for equity shares in other countries.

Now let us consider this suggestion from the economic standard of Mali or of Niger. These countries have no oil fields which can offer them so much foreign exchange earnings as Nigeria has been accumulating since the oil crisis. On the contrary, these countries have been hit by the drought, they are landlocked, they are small in population and above all they are listed among the "least developed" countries. With these points as background, optimism for Mali and Niger hardly exists that they will ever financially be able to acquire equity shares in other countries. On the contrary, they even have to strive desperately for their own existence.

This being correct, we would indicate that Dr. Adetoro's suggestion, that "it should be possible for interested member states to buy equity shares in projects situated in other member countries," has been calculated from the point of view of Nigeria's economic strength, if not its might. Such a venture will be a disadvantage to the poorer countries within the economic community. It will make the poor countries there even poorer while the rich ones will have the advantage of having commanding positions in the economic life of the poor countries in the subregion. But as practice shows, economic domination of one country over another is in effect political domination as well. For economic domination and political domination are but two sides of the same coin.

Dr. Adetoro's suggestion would have held if the level of economic development of the member countries of the proposed ECOWAS were equal, or at least if the difference between them had been insignificant.

It is even doubtful if the Government of Nigeria would like other ECOWAS members to acquire shares of any significance in Nigerian major projects, including its oil; it is even unwilling to sell oil to ECOWAS countries at a reduced price but instead suggested giving loans, an undertaking that could make the recipient dependent on Nigeria.

As regards our suggestion, cooperation in production is the most feasible way the West African countries can explore to booster their industrialization and economic progress. It enhances as a matter of course a new form of international economic relations which allow the setting up of enterprises of optimal sizes to carry on production on larger scale at low cost. In addition, specialization makes it possible to organize mass production of industrial goods in the countries where it is economically most profitable, especially where manpower and material resources can be fully implored to give maximum effect. It helps to eliminate the uncalled for duplication of production of commodities. This, in turn, helps to save manpower.

There are many fields where specialization can be effected to save manpower and funds, for example the field of electronic equipment production. The ECOWAS countries could have specialized in the production of specific electronic equipment. The equipment could have been sold at intra-West African markets.

Another field of specialization is that of chemical industries. But countries with a small population like Liberia and Togo would undoubtedly run into the difficulty of having a quantity of commodities that could well surpass their domestic demands. Besides this, the construction of big plants puts excessive stress on small countries, especially as such countries would have to invest a great deal of capital in the projects. On the other hand, if small countries start industrialization projects with a view to satisfying only their domestic demands, they then face the danger of not making economic advance. For this reason it is always advisable that the markets of other countries be taken into account. This helps the country concerned to create only those large specialized mass-producing enterprises which it needs instead of creating a whole complex of industrial branches.

If this is coupled with inter-state cooperation, the effect will be to stimulate production in those branches of the economies which operate below capacity due to limited domestic demand. With production in full strength, other industrial branches which otherwise would be unprofitable could then be established, specializing, let us say, in car radio sets, ignition distributors, windshield wipers and other articles of this nature. Another country could be entrusted with the responsibility of producing shock absorbers, tyres, gear boxes, brakes, etc. Another could specialize in electrical systems, including plugs, battery production, etc.

In the case of West Africa, where even the foundation of light industries has not yet been initiated, it would be expedient for the member countries to concentrate their efforts on light industries for the time being in order to prepare good ground for heavy industries.

As regards the ways and means of financing such projects, the African Development Bank should be made the main credit-giving establishment. Details of the members' contributions can be worked out by a joint conference of specialists and finance ministers.

For the successful running of ECOWAS activities, committees for radio and electronic industries, chemical industries, steel and iron industries, oil and gas industries, geology, coal industries, standardization, light industries, and agriculture could be set up.

## II. Agriculture

Indisputably, all the ECOWAS countries are agrarian, producing only raw materials. Some of them, for example Nigeria, have two main cash crop products as the source of their foreign currency earnings; others, for example Senegal, has only one main cash crop product, namely, groundnuts. Since these products serve as the source of foreign exchange earnings, they are exported predominantly to Europe and America. In turn, some foodstuffs such as rice,

potatoes, and some canned foods are imported by these countries. In all cases the raw materials, e.g., coffee and cocoa, are bought at a cheaper price than the manufactured ovaltine or chocolate which the ECOWAS countries buy from abroad.

Apart from this, there are a great many forests in West Africa. The logs and timber are exported to Europe and America, where they are used to manufacture furniture and paper of all types to be sent back to these countries for sale at a higher price.

A stop to this practice could well be made through the ECOWAS by resorting to specialization and cooperation, as we have suggested.

Take cocoa as an example. We find that Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Togo are the main producers of this crop. Their annual supplies would be sufficient for a large-scale output of chocolates, beverages, or toffees, and all other articles with cocoa content.

With sufficient supply at hand, factories for any type of commodity with cocoa content could be established in any of these countries in consonance with their specialization agreements. Apart from the countries mentioned, the neighbouring countries would also get the benefit of related branches of these enterprises.

The same would apply for crops such as coffee, groundnuts, and other West African primary products. Such efforts would help ease the effects of the drought on countries like Mali, Niger and Upper Volta, who will then be able to get a flowing but cheaper supply of both raw and manufactured food items.

One area of cooperation in the field of agriculture concerns the problems as to how the ECOWAS countries can co-ordinate efforts in their struggle against animal pests and insects which destroy their fruits, vegetables and crops. Cocoa for instance, suffers greatly from pests, and farmers need insecticides, for example DDT, to spray the trees and

the pools in order to destroy them. In countries like Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria, however, the burden of spraying the trees is the sole responsibility of the farmer who owns the farm. In some instances the governments of these countries do make some insignificant gesture of helping the farmers.

In the light of the importance of the cocoa crops in the life of the economies of the countries which sell them, it should have been the governments' cardinal aim to take all possible and necessary measures to prevent the cocoa trees from falling prey to insects to prevent every pod of a crop from destruction. But the attitude of the governments has been quite different. It is not generally realized, but the fact that any cocoa pod that gets spoilt affects the country's economy is indisputable.

For this reason it would be very helpful if the ECOWAS made it a major policy to coordinate their efforts against all destructive insects by setting up committees to that effect. The success of the work of the committees, however, will depend mainly on the application of science and technology, which are now becoming direct and productive factors in our time. But the problems involved in them are so complex that any country which tries to solve all scientific and technological problems on its own without the full cooperation of other countries always faces the danger of running into difficulties of various types. Against this background it could be recommended that an ECOWAS project in this field be established. This project could include technical assistance in construction of enterprises, exchange of technical data and documentation, mutual assistance in training personnel, coordination of research, and establishment of joint research institutions as well as specialized technical institutions. This would help to create new branches of industries and to build large, modern enterprises.

### III. Transport and Communications

The transport system in West Africa is not yet developed. In most of the countries it is difficult even to reach one town from another. Hills and valleys, rivers and lakes, thick forests and semi-deserts are the main obstacles that stand in the way of road construction there. It is even difficult for big lorries and trucks to reach some areas of the countries in order to collect and convey agricultural products to the main ports for shipment.

In view of the difficulty of transportation in West African countries, farmers have to carry bags of cocoa, coffee, etc. on their backs to the buying points for sale.

Even some of the main roads in the national capitals and cities, short of those in the villages which practically are of no economic importance, need thorough repair.

If West Africa is taken as a whole, it can be seen that road facilities there are not good, except for a few selected ones that in most cases connect the capitals to the airports, harbours, and centres of tourist interest. But in the course of nation-building and economic development, prestige projects, although nice-looking, do not contribute very much; what is vital in this direction is the construction of roads to reach the products which must be conveyed. It is because of this that a complete web of roads and railways is needed in the subregion. It is apparently for this reason that Nigeria has embarked on a comprehensive road-building programme "under which a total of 9,834 kilometres of federal trunk roads would be rehabilitated and reconstructed <sup>153/</sup> in the course of the development plan.

On the occasion of the official opening of Calabar Ugep-Ikom road, General Yakubu Gowon stressed the point "that rapid economic development in this country depends to a large degree on a good and reliable transport system. <sup>154/</sup> "One of these" the General went on, "stretches from Shagamu in the west through Benin, Asaba, Onitsha, Enugu, Abakaliki and Ikom to our border with the Republic of Cameroon in the east. Incidentally, this road is part of the proposed Lagos-

Mombasa Trans-African Highway." <sup>155/</sup> In another speech at the same ceremony, Mr. Femi Okunnu, Federal Commissioner for Works and Housing, added that the Abakaliki-Ikom-Cameroun border road had assumed both national and international significance because it lay along the proposed Trans-Africa (Mombasa-Lagos-Dakar) highway. The Commissioner said that contracts for the development of federal highways were worth about N 400 million instead of the N 187 million voted in the current four-year development plan. This shows the importance that the Federal Government has attached to the building of roads in the country.

The important point here is that if Nigeria alone has to rehabilitate and reconstruct roads totalling 9,834 kilometres, then the picture should be clear as to how many kilometres in all must be treated in the same way in the whole of West Africa, as Nigeria's project is but one of many such projects in the subregion.

Apart from these national reconstruction plans, some countries in the subregion undertake bilateral projects, as in the case of Ghana and Upper Volta in 1968. After a visit by the then Chairman of the National Liberation Council, Lieutenant-General Ankrah, to Upper Volta, where he had talks with the Upper Volta's authorities, his Commissioner for Economic Affairs, Mr. E. N. Omaboe, announced that the Bolgatanga-Paga road was to be raised to first-class level to facilitate transportation between Ghana and Upper Volta. He added that Upper Volta would also raise the standard of the Ouagadougou-Paga road to first-class level.

Later in the year, an official of the construction company Iceco Chachtrau Tayssew Tistrabau-Sabec declared that the tarring of the road, which had started six months ago, would be completed within fourteen months. He again added that the project was being undertaken by the Upper Volta Government. Besides this project, the official stated that there were other projects under way such as the improvement of Upper Volta's communication system to other West African countries, including the building of a 420-mile road to Mali and a 168-mile road to Ghana. <sup>156/</sup>

Road-building is not the only area in which Upper Volta has shown interest. Besides this, her leaders have had talks with Ghana regarding feasibility studies on the Volta Lake ship transportation system, which is to serve to move goods from Ghana to Upper Volta.

A similar waterway project came under consideration in Nigeria in 1974, and its importance as regards intra-West African relations was expressed in these terms by Dr. R. A. B. Dikko, Federal Commissioner for Transport: "The acquisition of the vessel," the Commissioner declared, "would enhance the forging of another much needed transportation link between Nigeria and the Niger Republic." 157/

All these projects are but bilateral ventures intended to improve the transportation systems between the countries. Besides these, there are two gigantic "link to" projects under feasibility studies in the subregion. The first of these is the Trans-African Highway and the second is the Trans-West African Highway. There are also others such as the Trans-Sahara Highway and the eastern routes to Ethiopia and Tanzania, which within the scope of this work we shall not be able to discuss.

The Trans-African Highway is a 6,530-kilometre project which has been designed to link Lagos, on the Gulf of Guinea, with Mombasa, Kenya, on the Indian Ocean. The highway will pass through Nigeria, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Zaire, Uganda, and Kenya. This project is expected to be completed in 1977. The programme for this work was drawn up by the Coordinating Committee set up with the cooperation of the ECA secretariat and other specialists for this purpose. They held joint meetings in Addis Ababa in June 1971 in Bangui in April 1972, in Mombasa in April 1973, in Lagos in April 1974. This highway embraces the Calabar-Shagamu-Abakaliki-Ikom road we mentioned earlier.

Following the lead taken by the Trans-African Highway, construction of a Trans-West African Highway to link the fourteen member countries of the ECOWAS has been proposed.

For its practical realization two routes were suggested at a meeting in Niamey in January 1974. One proposed route, in the north of the subregion, would cover about 4,841 kilometres, passing through Chad, Cameroon, <sup>158/</sup> Nigeria, Niger, Upper Volta, Mali, Senegal and Mauritania. The six coastal countries, namely, The Gambia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Dahomey would have to construct roads from their territories to link to it. The other suggested route is to pass through Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Dahomey and Nigeria, the length of which is about 4,245 kilometres. If Lagos is taken as the centre, it will be possible for travellers to reach Dakar by the Lagos-Dakar Highway, and the Lagos-Niamey-Algiers Highway will enable travellers to reach even the Indian Ocean.

The importance of these trans-highways is that they will stimulate economic activities and encourage inter-subregional as well as intra-subregional trade. First, however, tasks such as the standardization of road signs, traffic regulations, etc., will have to be undertaken. Filling and servicing stations will have to be provided. First-aid posts have to be erected, motels and hotels, too. This will help foster intra-African tourism.

Intra-African tourism would be a big industry which could bring a lot of foreign currency earnings. To ensure smooth organization, an intra-West African tourist agency could be established under the umbrella of the ECOWAS with branches in all the member countries. Their main task would be to organize tours and trips in other ECOWAS countries. The secretariat of the coordinating body of these tourist agencies could be located at the same place where the secretariat of the ECOWAS would be.

Although the creation of multi-national companies for air transport as in the case of the Liberia-Guinea twenty million dollar deal in 1973 must be encouraged, greater emphasis should be placed on a formation of a single sub-regional airline which would incorporate the various air-

lines: the Ghana Airways, the Nigerian Airways, etc. Under such incorporation, a West African Airways for both domestic and international flights could be established. Such a joint project could help reduce fuel and other costs. The best example for this is the common action the Scandinavian countries took to establish the Scandinavian Air Lines. A similar joint enterprise could also be established for shipment of goods from the subregion.

The communications systems in the subregion need improvement. A letter from London to Accra takes three days, but it takes two weeks for mail from Lagos to reach Accra although airplanes take 45 minutes to reach Accra from Lagos and vice versa. The delay is due to the lack of improvement in the communications systems in the country. The same difficulties are met in other countries as well. It is in the light of this that we strongly suggest that communications systems there be improved to march the standard reached by science and technology today. For example, a modest approach to this problem such as that undertaken by Nigeria and Dahomey in 1974 could be copied. An agreement was concluded on a 48-channel UHF link between Dahomey and Nigeria, a micro-wave link for the relay of television programmes between the two countries, and a satellite station at Lanlate, which will be useful to Dahomey for international communication. Another communications link between Ghana and Ivory Coast was also agreed upon during their talks in March 1969. The two countries agreed to establish a telex service between their capitals by May of that year. The service was to be offered for five hours each day. Also, preliminary technical studies were discussed for a future earth satellite station at Abidjan which would establish direct communications with Europe.

#### IV. Promotion of Intra-West African Trade

One of the main setbacks of the formation of the ECOWAS is the weakness of the trade relations amongst them. There exist bilateral trade agreements between the countries of the subregion, but practical trade operations have always

been insignificant. Taken on average, the overall annual trade turnover between these countries is not more than ten per cent. The West African countries pay main attention to their export trade operations to North America, Europe, and Japan.

Taking Ghana as an example, we see that her export to other African countries, including those of West Africa, totalled 2,309,000 cedis between January and June 1973. Her imports from these countries amounted to 10,671,000 cedis in value. Of these, goods amounting in value to 41,000 cedis came from Gambia; 4,172,000 cedis from Nigeria; 34,000 cedis from Sierra Leone; 920,000 cedis from Togo; 694,000 cedis from Dahomey; 432,000 cedis from Mali; 661,000 from Niger; 67,000 cedis from Senegal and 175,000 cedis from Ivory Coast. <sup>159/</sup>

Comparing these figures with those from her import trade with Britain which were released in November 1972, we find that Britain exported goods to Ghana amounting in value to 1,354,000 pounds sterling, i.e., about 4,062,000 cedis. At the same time Ghana exported wood, lumber, and cork valued at 714,000 pounds sterling. Her exports to West African countries were: Gambia, 59,000 cedis, Nigeria, 953,000 cedis; Sierra Leone, 60,000 cedis; Ivory Coast, 13,000 cedis; Togo, 57,000 cedis; Dahomey, 20,000 cedis; Mali, 12,000 cedis; Niger, 26,000 cedis; and Senegal, 66,000 cedis.

In 1973, however, trade with the EC countries became an important factor within Ghana's trade complex. For in that year her deliveries to these countries rose by 122 per cent to account for 40.2 per cent of her total exports. Of course, this increase included the deliveries to the UK, Eire and Denmark, as they had by then joined the Common Market.

Trade relations with North America also rose considerably. Ghana's deliveries to that part of the world went as high as 24.1 per cent, her trade with the United States of America reaching 30.1 per cent above the 1972 figure. Her exports to the USSR, China, and other East European countries rose by 17.9 per cent, while those to Japan rose to

29.2 per cent above the 1972 level.

The Commercial Bank announced in 1974 that Ghana's export to other African countries in 1972 had risen from a level of 7.5 million cedis to 33.3 million cedis, an increase of over 440 per cent. But still, one cannot be optimistic, since such an increase, though high, is insignificant in comparison with the rate of increase in trade with America, the EC countries, other European countries, and Japan. If Ghana's trade with the other West African countries is taken separately, the turnover is seen to be low.

On a careful study of both export and import trading trends in Nigeria, a similar increase in both fields can be found when the 1972 and 1973 figures are compared. Export and re-exports amounted to ₦ 2,226.6 million in 1973 as against ₦ 1,434.2 million in 1972. The increase is estimated to have reached 55 per cent. Imports went up by 25 per cent as against 1972, they rose from ₦90.1 million in 1972 to ₦ 1,234 million in 1973.

Comparing imports and exports of the country, it is evident that exports were more favourable, due largely to a very large sale of crude oil and petroleum. These alone contributed to 83 per cent of the total value of export from the country. However, better prices and increased volume of other products such as groundnuts, palm kernel oil, rubber, and hides also contributed to this rise. Furthermore, it must be added that on the whole, Nigeria's volume of export in 1973 was higher than that of 1972 by about "nine per cent, while export prices were higher by over 40 per cent." <sup>160/</sup> Of course, a greater part of these exports (crude petroleum, cocoa, groundnuts, palm kernel oil, etc.) went to countries outside the ECOWAS area.

Similar situations can be found in most of the other West African countries. For although there is a big flour factory in Senegal that can meet the demands of all the West African countries, these countries curiously enough still import flour from abroad, especially from France. It is the same with rice. Senegal, Mali, Mauritania and

Ivory Coast get their regular supplies from France, who imports it from Madagascar. Ghana, Sierra Leone, and The Gambia import coffee from Brazil despite the fact that their neighbours Ivory Coast and Togo have a significant quantity of it for sale.

It would be a step in the right direction if the ECOWAS countries would first patronize their intra-subregional trade for available commodities and then look outside for those not available in the subregion.

Commodities such as meat, fresh fish, canned fish, tea, cement, timber and logs, groundnuts, cattle, yams, rice, cola, etc., would help to foster intra-subregional trade.

#### V. Energy and Natural Resources

Energy is the spur of industries. For this reason it would be an illusion for a country to embark on industrialization without first securing a regular supply of energy. It is therefore quite unfortunate that the countries of West Africa are poor in this most essential product. On the whole it is only Nigeria that has sources of energy, namely, two million barrels of oil a day, natural gas and coal, on commercial basis. Other countries like Ghana and Senegal have been talking of exploration of oil but apparently without success. Some years ago Ghana was talking of an off-shore oil deposit near Salpond, one of her towns. It was later determined that although the oil contents found were rich, the quantity was not sufficient for commercial abstraction. This means that another field is needed to supplement it, but as to whether another oil field exists anywhere in the country is, of course, a matter which the geologists still have to prove.

However, the fact still remains that half a loaf is better than nothing. Nigeria's oil and gas fields can be for years a reliable source of energy supply for the ECOWAS countries. Some pipelines for the conveyance of the oil from Nigeria to the other ECOWAS countries could be constructed. These pipelines could be constructed in the same way as the

CMEA countries constructed their pipeline "Druzhba," i.e., through Friendship. In the course of the construction of the pipelines, every CMEA member government constructed that part of the pipeline that lay in its territory at its own expense. Construction of pipelines can help to reduce the cost of oil transportation that would otherwise have to be done by sea or over land. Another set of pipes can be laid to transport gas from Nigeria.

As regards electricity supply, Ghana's Volta Hydroelectric Station can also be extended to supply electricity to other ECOWAS countries who need it. At present Ghana supplies both Togo and Dahomey with electricity. Unlike trains in Europe, which are electrified, in West Africa trains are coal-powered. Fortunately, Nigeria has coal at Enugu and Okaba and can supply those ECOWAS countries with coal which need it.

Special committees for oil, gas, and coal supply should be created under the ECOWAS Secretariat. These committees would have to undertake feasibility studies on organization, supplies and other matters which might be found necessary.

#### VI. Movement of Manpower

The economies of the ECOWAS countries vary from one country to another as to standard. This is also true as regards employment opportunities prevailing in the countries. The coastal countries of the subregion are a little bit better off than the landlocked countries. Besides, the coastal countries are in possession of various types of minerals, as has been pointed out above.

In the field of economics, any positive development of the economy of a country is also an indication of a demand for labour, the main drive of which is manpower. Manpower can be defined as the utilization of both qualified and unqualified human power in industrial, agricultural or other form of production.

It is unfortunate that the first group of human power, qualified personnel, is inadequate in West Africa. This had always been the main problem facing the countries there. The cause for this is the limited number of highschoools, universities and other, more practical and educational establishments that could prepare such personnel. For this reason almost all the countries in the subregion are experiencing difficulty in getting the requisite number of educated professionals, specialists and trained personnel to run the managerial tasks of the country.

Because of this, the governments concerned have to employ expatriates, who get huge amounts of money as salaries. In most of the ECOWAS countries, too, "mental colonialism" has taken root so deeply that the few qualified citizens who are available are neglected. For example, a task that could have been done by a local citizen very easily is given to an Englishman or to a Frenchman. In some cases, too, job discrimination is practised; preference is given to nationals who happened to have obtained their education or training in either Britain or France, for they are considered best qualified and for that reason have to be given jobs. This "mental colonialism" makes the officials forget that it is not only France or England or the Commonwealth countries that have developed science and technology at their universities and other institutions of high learning. The United States of America, the Soviet Union, West Germany, Japan, etc., countries outside their mental-colonialist scope, are equally, if not better, developed scientifically and technologically. Because of this injustice, many of the nationals who have completed their university and other training are still hanging on elsewhere.

In defending their action, the officials who refuse to offer employment to nationals of their countries say that those affected, or rather the nationals who are discriminated against, did not receive their university instruction and lectures in the official language being used in the West African countries and are therefore unable to hold re-

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In defending their action, the officials who refuse to offer employment to nationals of their countries say that those affected, or rather the nationals who are discriminated against, did not receive their university instruction and lectures in the official language being used in the West African countries and are therefore unable to hold re-

sponsible posts. Others refuse to offer their nationals jobs purely on ideological grounds. This takes place when nationals are involved who have studied in East European countries. In most cases the senior officials who have been empowered to employ people are very old. They have probably finished university some thirty or more years ago and for that reason know little or nothing about the world today and completely nothing about the eastern countries other than what they heard from their university lecturers some thirty years ago, when the lecturers themselves knew nothing but fact distortions, things announced on the radio, most of which were propaganda commodities.

It is ironical that these officials are gradually drawing West Africa into the cold war when in fact the West African countries want to be neutral. It is even more ironical when we realize that the United States, which is so actively engaged in this ideological struggle with the eastern countries, has nationals studying there. The same is true for France and England.

In countries such as those in West Africa, where technology is less developed and where industries are not automatized manpower is vital for the development of the economy. For this reason any waste of manpower is also a waste of production which automatically leads to economic difficulties for the countries concerned.

What is of vital importance here is that if the African countries could have provided alternative places of study for their nationals, that would have been of help. But there was nothing like that. This, of course, has led to the formation of an army of unemployed youth with no food, no shelter, bad living conditions, and above all no protection from their state. Only a few people are cared for and protected by the state. This reduces the citizenship of a great number of the people to second grade as against those privileged. After all, the position of any person in a society is determined by the place he occupies in that society as well as his economic position therein.

The other group of manpower has things easier. Since the people involved are not qualified or specialists and since most of them are illiterates, they can leave their countries for neighbouring states for employment either as labourers or self-employed. Language problems do not arise. In other words, one can leave Dahomey, a French-speaking country, for Ghana or Nigeria, both English-speaking countries, to take a job as a mason without significant difficulties.

Some of these workers, however, encounter difficulties with the government of the country of their destination in one way or the other. For example in 1958 the Government of Sierra Leone took a decision to repatriate about 2,000 Ghanaian fishermen residing in that country.<sup>161/</sup> Commenting on this the Ashanti Pioneer, one of the dailies in Ghana, remarked: "Ghana believes in good neighbourliness and thinks the situation should be carefully examined." Under its editorial captioned "Ghana Too Can Be Tough," the Ashanti Pioneer wrote: "Of course it does not require a soothsayer to point out that the Sierra Leonean action could well have been motivated by the recent unsuccessful juridical processes pursued by the authorities of that country for the extradition of a former leading soldier they wanted." Furthermore, the paper said that Ghanaians were as human beings just as were the Sierra Leoneans; what the Ghanaians would particularly emphasize was that they could similarly urge their military-police administrators to be as ruthless as possible against the Sierra Leonean nationals in Ghana. But the paper ended its editorial by saying: "Let a peaceful solution be found in order that our two sister countries might not strain and break relations." <sup>162/</sup>

On the same subject but on the following day the Ghanaian Times headed its editorial with these words: "The Fisherman's Flight." The paper said: "We...can certainly put into operation measures which would hurt, and hurt badly, the Government and the people of Sierra Leone. For we know that there are citizens of Sierra Leone earning their living here.

We know of the ponderant advantages - economic, political and otherwise, which we have over Sierra Leone."

The paper, agreeing with the Ashanti Pioneer, concluded its editorial by stating "many intelligent Ghanaians are bound to reflect on the fact that the action of Sierra Leone could well have been motivated by the loss of its legal fight in Ghana to effect the extradition of Major Jumu." Whether the two incidents are connected or not, the editorial concluded "we earnestly invite the Government of Sierra Leone, in its own interest and in the interest of African friendship and brotherhood, to rescind its ban on the fishermen."

Coincidentally, three Ghanaian fishermen had been arrested in Togo on 4 December, some few days before the incident in Sierra Leone occurred. They, too, were alleged to have fished in Togo's territorial waters.

Following all the criticism that the newspapers in Ghana made in their columns, it did not take Ghana long to put on the same pairs of shoes. Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia's Government first tabled an aliens compliance bill. The bill passed through all the proper channels and then became law. Those who were affected were forced to leave Ghana. Their properties remained in Ghana, including their enterprises. Some of them had never lived a day outside Ghana and were forced to build a new life in another country. The Nigerian Government managed somehow to get compensation for its nationals who owned permanent properties such as farms with cash crop products. Payments were made under the terms of an agreement that was concluded by the Governments of Ghana and Nigeria and ratified on 16 February 1971. As regards the fate of the properties of the other ECOWAS citizens, no official statement has been made on them by the Ghanaian authorities.

This position has now changed significantly. Under the new administration of Colonel I. K. Acheampong things have changed for the better. Other ECOWAS nationals are now allowed to stay and work in Ghana. To make this formal, the

NRC passed a decree known as the "Identity Cards Decree" in 1972. It is entered in Ghana legal books as Decree NRCD 72. The decree obliges both Ghanaians and others to possess identity cards. The fee for the acquirement of the cards is 50 pesewas for Ghanaians; 15 cedis for other Africans residing in Ghana, and 50 cedis for non-Africans. The cards were later said to serve also as travelling certificates for Ghanaians who have the desire to travel to Togo. That was said to be in compliance with a recommendation made by the Ghana-Togo Cooperation Commission.

This cooperation effort could be embodied in the Charter of the ECOWAS. Such a move could help put an end to further repatriation.

Questions such as those affecting the quantity of immigrants that each member country is prepared to accept in every year or every decade are to be stipulated in the Charter. The length of time during which these immigrants will be permitted to reside in other ECOWAS countries and the type of jobs or employment they will be permitted to take is also to be stated in the Charter. Common identity cards, known as "West African Common Identity Card," are to be issued to all citizens of the member countries of the economic community. These will undoubtedly make the movement of manpower in the subregion easier. But at the same time laws should be formulated to combat contraband, smuggling and other practices that could place the good fate of this opportunity in jeopardy.

## FOOTNOTES

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- 2/ Ibid, p 135.
- 3/ Ibid, p 137.
- 4/ Ibid, pp 223-224.
- 5/ K. Wadajo: Pan-Africanism - The Evolution of an Idea. Addis Ababa, 1964, p 12.
- 6/ Resolution of the First Conference of Independent African States. Accra, 15-22 April 1958.
- 7/ George Padmore: Pan-Africanism or Communism. London, 1965, p 22.
- 8/ L. A. Majorian: Kolonializm Vchera i Sevodnia. Moscow, 1967, p 22.
- 9/ I. T. Potechin: Africa Smotret v Budushee. Moscow, 1960, pp 62-63.
- 10/ See further UN Resolution No. 1514/XV/ of 14 December 1960.
- 11/ See Colin Legum: Pan-Africanism - A Short Political Guide. London, 1962, p 50.
- 12/ Extracts from the statement of the leader of the Nigerian Delegation, The Honourable Y. M. Sule, at the Second Conference of Independent African States. Addis Ababa, 1960.
- 13/ Sékou Touré: The International Policy of the Democratic Party of Guinea. Cairo, 1963, p 144.
- 14/ Cameroon, CAF, Congo, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Chad.
- 15/ Colin Legum: Pan-Africanism - A Short Political Guide. London, 1962, p 53.
- 16/ See further C. Shepherd: The Politics of African Nationalism. New York, 1962, p 105.
- 17/ Agency Guinnienne de la Presse, 19 December 1960.
- 18/ R. A. Tuzmukamedov: Organizatsia Africanskovo Yedinstvo. UMO. Moscow, 1968, p 34; see K. W. Grundy: African Grouping and African Unity, International affairs 14, 1962, p 210.

- 19/ Madibo Keita's address to The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 7 June 1961.
- 20/ Mr. Julius Nyerere, now Tanzania's President.
- 21/ Memorandum of East African Federation for PAFM/ECA. Dar es Salaam, January 1961.
- 22/ N. Azikiwe: The Future of Pan-Africanism. Nigerian Information Service, London, 1961.
- 23/ Address to the Second Conference of Independent African States, Addis Ababa, 1960.
- 24/ Ghana Today, London, 26 April 1961.
- 25/ Edited by Ian Brownlie: Basic Documents on African Affairs. Oxford, 1971, p 2. See also Haile Selassie: Towards African Unity in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 1, 1963, p 281.
- 26/ Article I, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the OAU.
- 27/ An example of this is envisaged in a decision adopted by the Council of Ministers of the OAU member states in Cairo recommending that all member states break off diplomatic relations with Great Britain.
- 28/ Article VI of the OAU Charter.
- 29/ As in the case of Dr. Milton Obote and General Amin of Uganda.
- 30/ As in the case of Ruanda and Burundi; as in the case of Ghana and Guinea after the 1966 Coup in Ghana; as in the case of Uganda and Tanzania after 1970.
- 31/ See International Affairs No. 12. Moscow, December 1973, p 95.
- 32/ Kwame Nkrumah - The Anniversary of the CPP. Accra, January 1960. Selected Speeches of Kwame Nkrumah, p 7.
- 33/ This open rejection of the dialogue proposal of Nigeria caused Ivory Coast to support Biafra during its war against Nigeria.
- 34/ See Nigeria and Ghana Accord, Apapa, p 25.
- 35/ Ibid.
- 36/ Ghana Weekly News Summary, Vol. 11, No. 21, Accra, 31 May 1973, p 2; Ghana Weekly News Summary, Vol. 5, No. 37, Accra, 12 September 1968, p 6.
- 37/ Ibid.

- 38/ See Africa, London, No. 34, June 1974, p 14.
- 39/ Nigerian-Guinean Communiqué, Conakry, 19 February 1974.
- 40/ Ibid.
- 41/ Ghana Weekly News Summary, Vol. 11, No. 23, Accra, 14 June 1973.
- 42/ See B. A. Balassa: The Theory of Economic Integration. Homewood, Illinois, 1961, p 11.
- 43/ J. Tinbergen: International Economic Integration. Amsterdam, 1954, p 95.
- 44/ G. Myrdal: An International Economy - Problems and Prospects. New York, 1956, pp 11-13.
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- 49/ B. A. Balassa: Op. cit. p 6.
- 50/ E. Saadia: Le Marché Communiste et Son Combat. Paris, 1960, p 229.
- 51/ S. Dell: Trade Blocs and Common Markets. New York, 1963, pp 62-63.
- 52/ See W. Röpke, op. cit. p 494.
- 53/ A. Müller-Armack: Fragen der europäischen Integration - Wirtschaftsfragen der Freien Welt. Frankfurt-am-Main. 1957, p 532.
- 54/ H. Giersch: Liberalismus, Dirigismus und die wirtschaftliche Integration Europas, Europas Wirtschaftseinheit von Morgen. Baden-Baden, 1960, p 498.
- 55/ See W. Röpke, op. cit. p 498.
- 56/ A. Müller-Armack, op. cit. p 534.
- 57/ Ibid, p 535.

- 58/ H. Krämer: Formen und Methoden der internationalen wirtschaftlichen Integration. Tübingen, 1969, p 21.
- 59/ Z. Kamecki: Pojęcia i typy integracji gospodarczej. Ekonomista, No. 1, Warsaw, 1967, pp 93-94.
- 60/ S. Tikal: K pojetí mezinárodní ekonomické integrace. Politická ekonomia. No. 12, Warsaw, 1968, p 1125.
- 61/ See Z. Kamecki, op. cit. p 94.
- 62/ V. Pavlov: Světové Hospodárství. Prague, 1970, p 258.
- 63/ Here "state monopoly" has a different meaning as compared with the state monopoly which exists in socialist countries, where foreign trade in general is the monopoly of the state and where all enterprises, although enjoying the status of legal persons, are state-owned. In this case monopolistic groups are private entrepreneurs. When such private monopolistic groups or individual monopolist organizations of different countries agree to form an economic entity, they do so through the instruments of their states, governments, ministries or departments, hence the term state-monopolistic integration. In short, they are state-cum-monopolist organizations in search of greater markets in the capitalist world.
- 64/ L. M. Kirichenko: Zapadno-europejskaja Integratsia i Strany Afriki. Moscow, 1974, p 16.
- 65/ See V. I. Zolotarev: Programma Ekonomicheskovo, Satrudnichesvo Socialisticheskikh Stran. Moscow, 1973, pp 4-5.
- 66/ R. Green and A. Seidman: Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism. 1968, pp 349-350.
- 67/ It must not, however, be assumed that the author is against economic integration in West Africa. No. The author is only pointing out what the result could be if such an agency were to be established.
- 68/ Edited by Ian Brownlie: Basic Documents on African Affairs. Oxford, 1971, p 25.
- 69/ Ibid, p 26.
- 70/ Ibid, p 2-3.
- 71/ N. Lubimov: Afrika v Mirovoi, Ekonomike i Politike. Moscow, 1963, p 233.
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- 73/ Ibid, p 149.

- 74/ V. M. Kollantai: Puti Preadolenia Ekonomicheskoi otstalosti. Moscow, 1967, pp 352-358.
- 75/ N. G. Pospelova: Rasvivaushietza Strani v Borbe za Niezavisimyi Nationalnyi Ekonomiki. Moscow, 1967, p 16.
- 76/ L. V. Vinogradova: Afrika Vaprosi Integratsii Ekonomiki. Moscow, 1968, p 85.
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- 78/ Ibid, p 143.
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- 80/ G. V. Fokeev: Vneshnaja Politika Stran Afriki. Moscow, 1968, p 11.
- 81/ Ibid, p 13.
- 82/ A. C. Kodachenko: Ekonomicheskoe Sotrudnichestvo Rasvivausheitsa Stran. Moscow, 1968, p 108.
- 83/ Ibid, p 323.
- 84/ Ibid, p 7, p 74.
- 85/ Ibid, p 38.
- 86/ Ekonomika Kapitalisticheskikh Stran. Moscow, 1959, pp 353-357.
- 87/ See Colin Legum: Pan-Africanism - A Short Political Guide. London, 1962, p 138.
- 88/ These principles were further developed at international conferences such as the UNCTAD session in 1964.
- 89/ The final act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UN, New York, 1965, E-Conference 46/228, p 13.
- 90/ The Conference was attended by Nigeria, Liberia, Dahomey, Togo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana. No delegates from Mali, Chad, Mauritania, Senegal, Cameroon, Ivory Coast. Niger or Upper Volta were present at the opening ceremony.
- 91/ Major Felli's speech at the Conference.
- 92/ The Ghanaian Times, 13 February 1974.
- 93/ A. A. Shaporov and I. F. Motorin: The Advantages of Socialist International Division of Labour. Moscow, 1973, p 68.

- 94/ G. Myrdal: Op. cit., p 438.
- 95/ Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1963.  
UN, New York, 1964, p 102.
- 96/ See V. Kollontai and Y. Ettinger: Obshchii Rynok y Osvobodivshiyesa Strany Afriki. Moscow, 1963, p 64.
- 97/ Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, Vol. XV, No. 3, December 1964, p 39.
- 98/ Professor Adebayo Adedeji is the Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction in the Federal Military Government of Nigeria.
- 99/ Professor Adedeji's statement during the Conference of Ministers representing various West African countries held in Lomé, Togo, from 10 to 15 December 1973.
- 100/ See The Ghanaian Times, Editorial, Accra, 12 June 1973.
- 101/ See Professor Adedeji's statement at the Conference at Lomé, 10 to 15 December 1973.
- 102/ See A Venture in Self-Reliance. ECA, UN, 1958-1968. New York, 1969.
- 103/ See Industrial Development in Africa. Report of the Cairo Symposium. New York, 1967, p 58.
- 104/ Some are already operating in East Africa, the Senegal River states, the Maghreb countries, and North Africa.
- 105/ For details see ECA Publication E/CN. 14/INR/209, 15 February 1974.
- 106/ African Target, Vol. VI, No. 3, April 1974, p 6.
- 107/ For details see ECA Publication E/CN. 14/INR/209, 15 February 1974.
- 108/ The President's speech at the reception given by the Ambassador of Ghana.
- 109/ Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release No. 1451. Lagos, 11 December 1972.
- 110/ Major Belli's speech at the ECOWAS Conference at the State House, Accra, 11 February 1974.
- 111/ President William Tolbert's interview with Le Soleil (Ghana).
- 112/ Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release No. 1451. Lagos, 11 December 1972.

- 113/ See Ghana Digest, No. 1, 1974, for further details.
- 114/ Professor Adedeji's speech at the Lomé Conference, 10 to 15 December 1973.
- 115/ Professor Adebayo Adedeji was Nigeria's Head of Delegation to the Lomé Conference. He is one of the few intellectuals who have been working hard for the formation of the ECOWAS. Besides this, he has made many valuable contributions to ECA conferences.
- 116/ Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release No. 155. Lagos, 14 February 1974. General Yakubu Gowon's speech at the Dodan Barracks, when Mr Jacob Okanza, Minister/Director of the Cabinet of Congo-Brazzaville, called on him to deliver a message from President Nguouabi of Congo.
- 117/ Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release No. 152. Lagos, 14 February 1974. Dr. J. E. Adetoro's speech on Nigeria's industrial policy as foundation for West African economic integration.
- 118/ The Ghanaian Times, Accra, 13 February 1974.
- 119/ Ghana Weekly News Summary, Vol. 10, No. 48, Accra, 7 December 1972.
- 120/ The North African countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Libya and Egypt) are not included in the ACP-EC Convention of Lomé, concluded on 28 February 1975, which replaces the 1969 conventions of Yaoundé and Arusha. These North African states will arrange their relations with the EC under the auspices of a common Mediterranean policy. It is expected that Angola and Mozambique, after full independence, will join the other African states under the Lomé Convention.
- 121/ Excluding the Maghreb countries.
- 122/ West Africa, London, 16 October 1972, p 1381.
- 123/ Internationales Afrika Forum, No. 6, Munich, 1971, p 332.
- 124/ West Africa, London, 9 December 1974, p 1508.
- 125/ International Affairs, No. 12, Moscow, December 1974, p 66.
- 126/ The Times, London, 15 December 1973. Full text of EC Declaration No. 12.
- 127/ West Africa, London, 23 April 1973, p 525. These words are underlined in Commissioner Deniau's memorandum of the European Commission on future relations between the EC and its associated states.

- 128/ West Africa, London, 9 April 1973, p 463.
- 129/ Ibid.
- 130/ Ibid.
- 131/ West Africa, London, 23 April 1973, p 525.
- 132/ Z. Kuzina: The Nine and the Developing Countries. International Affairs, Moscow, December 1973, p 66.
- 133/ West Africa, London, 30 April 1973, p 557.
- 134/ West Africa, London, 9 December 1974, p 1508.
- 135/ West Africa, London, 16 October 1972, p 1381.
- 136/ For details, see Alhaji Shahn's speech held at the meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers in London, September 1972.
- 137/ For details, see West Africa, London, 9 April 1973, p 1349.
- 138/ West Africa, London, 28 May 1973, p 693.
- 139/ Republic of Guinea did not attend.
- 140/ Federal Ministry of Information Press Release No. 207, Lagos, 24 February 1974.
- 141/ West Africa, London, No. 2873, July 1972, p 867.
- 142/ Africa Confidential, London, Vol. 13, No. 24, 8 December 1972, p 2.
- 143/ West Africa, London, No. 2874, July 1972, p 910.
- 144/ The Times, London, No. 59310, Monday, 3 February 1975.
- 145/ West Africa, London, No. 2874, 14 July 1972, p 885.
- 146/ Anglophone countries in West Africa are Ghana, Gambia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria.
- 147/ West Africa, London, 14 May 1973, p 631.
- 148/ Ghana Weekly News Summary, Vol. 11, No 33, Accra, 14 June 1973, p 28.
- 149/ General Aferi, Ghana's Commissioner for External Affairs, said this during an interview which he gave in Rabat during the OAU Summit.
- 150/ West Africa, London, 14 May 1973, p 629.
- 151/ Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release No. 152, Lagos, 14 February 1974.

- 152/ Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release No. 1506, Lagos, December 1973.
- 153/ Federal Ministry of Information, Press Release No. 36, Lagos, 19 January 1974.
- 154/ General Yakubu Gowon's speech on 19 January 1974.
- 155/ The Lagos-Mombasa Trans-African Highway will be treated later on in this Chapter.
- 156/ Ghana Weekly News Summary, Vol. 5, No. 52, Accra, 26 December 1968, p 5.
- 157/ The Commissioner was speaking at the launching ceremony of two new Federal Government vessels, a ₦ 500,000 vessel, the B/V "Numan," and a ferry boat, the MF "Yola," which cost ₦ 370,000. See also Federal Ministry of Information Press Release No. 166, Lagos, 16 February 1974.
- 158/ These two countries are not members of the ECOWAS.
- 159/ Ghana Weekly News Summary, Vol. II, No. 50, Accra, 20 December 1973; Central Bureau of Statistics, Accra. Figures released on 18 December 1973.
- 160/ Federal Ministry of Information Press Release No. 179, Lagos, 18 February 1974.
- 161/ Ghana Weekly News Summary, Vol. 5, No. 50, Accra, 12 December 1968.
- 162/ The Ashanti Pioneer, Kumasi, 10 December 1968.

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## CURRICULUM VITAE

### BIRTH.

15.10.39 I was born in Kumasi, Ghana.

### EDUCATION.

1952 I attended the Opoku Ware Secondary School, Kumasi.

1957 As a private candidate, I passed the General Certificate of Education (GCE/O-Level) Examination.

1959 By self tuition, I passed History (GCE, A-Level).

1961 I graduated at the Central Komsomol School, Moscow. Subjects passed: Marxism-Leninism, Organization of Industries and of Agriculture in the USSR, Komsomol and Pioneer Organization. Youth Organizations.

1961(July) I returned to Ghana. There, as the Assistant Regional Instructor of the Ghana Young Pioneers (GYP), I taught the Voluntary Instructors of the Organization the Marxist-Leninist Philosophy. Besides this, I taught the GYP members, in Secondary Schools, Political Economy.

1962(August) I left Ghana for Moscow to pursue further studies. I entered the Preparatory Department of the Peoples' Friendship University named after Patrice Lumumba, Moscow, USSR.

1963 I passed the Russian ATTESTAT (London GCE, A-level equivalent). Subjects passed: The Russian Language-Good; Studies in Economic History-Credit; Mathematics-Excellent; Physics-Satisfactory; Chemistry-Credit.

1963(Sept) I entered the Friendship University. (Faculty of Economics and Law).

1967(June) I graduated Master of Laws (LL.M). Besides the normal law subjects taken, I had Credit in Political Economy; Very Good in Logic; Very Good in Philosophy; Good in History of Political Theories; Good in International Relations and Credit in Politics of African Countries.

1967-1970 I did research in Public International Law (partly under the supervision of Professor Dr. V.M. Shurshalov, the Head of the Chair of International Law Department of the Friendship University, and partly under the supervision of Dr. Leonid Yablochkov of the Institute of African Studies, a branch of Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

1971(April) I was admitted to the basic German Language Course of the Freie Universität, West Berlin, where I learnt the German Language.

1972 I was registered at the Freie Universität at the Department of Political Science (Otto-Suhr Institute), where I worked for the Doctorate degree under the supervision of Professor Dr. Franz Ansprenger.

Francis Bremph Jantuah





